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The current Department of the Navy (DoN) Systems Engineering process has 
documented instances of programs failing to detect critical inter-operational failures prior to 
Initial Operational Test & Evaluation (IOT&E).  “Approximately 50% of programs completing 
IOT&E since 2000 have been assessed as not operationally effective and/or suitable” [Defense 
Science Board Task Force, 2008].  Early detection of problems is critical to prevent cost 
overruns and schedule delays.  The cost and time required to correct a problem are directly 
related to how late in the process the problem is found and these cost and schedule impacts 
increase rapidly as the system nears deployment.  Programs are successfully passing 
developmental testing; however, these tests do not provide adequate assurances that the system 
will satisfy user needs or Concept of Operations (CONOPS) based interoperating requirements 
of the operational community.  Furthermore, requirements that are critical to mission success are 
not being identified in the current SE process, and allocations or dependency on supporting 
resources (systems, sensors, data, etc.) are not being reflected in the Systems Engineering, 
contractor development plans, and testing plans. 
The goal of this project was to analyze the current Systems Engineering process 
supporting Department of Navy (DoN) acquisition to increase the percentage of programs that 
successfully pass Operational Test & Evaluation (OT&E) and therefore decrease the cost and 
schedule delays associated with programs failing OT&E.  To do this, the authors developed an 
approach to track InterOperability Readiness Levels (I/ORLs).  As part of this task, the authors 
analyzed deficiencies of the current Systems Engineering process supporting Department of 
Navy (DoN) acquisition in the area of interoperability. 
The deliverables of this project are a detailed description of the I/ORL Process, the 
results of the table top exercise and model validation used to determine the effect these changes 
will have on the current Systems Engineering process, and an assessment of their impact with 
regard to performance and cost. 
During the process review and problem identification phase the stakeholder needs and 
requirements were collected and prioritized.  The current DoD Systems Engineering process and 
Operational Testing process were reviewed and evaluated to determine how system level 
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requirements are developed from user needs and subsequently tested.  Finally, recently 
developed systems that had issues arise during OT&E were identified and examined to determine 
potential sources of failure.  The authors concentrated on areas in the processes that may provide 
insight into why systems were initially passing DT, and then subsequently failing OT&E. 
Based on the results of the open literature and program documentation research, several 
general conclusions could be made regarding the causes of OT&E failures.  The bulk of the 
systems cited in the literature and the specific programs that were reviewed have seen failures in 
OT&E due to a lack of operational suitability or interoperability.  Additionally, the inclusion of 
OT&E personnel early in the development process is necessary to ensure adequate, realistic 
testing or simulation is performed prior to OT&E to discover deficiencies.  In some cases, 
deficiencies found during early testing or simulations have not been identified in the Systems 
Engineering Technical Review (SETR) process.  Or if they have, programs somehow are 
proceeding to OT regardless. 
The analysis of alternatives phase consisted of concept development and down select.  
During this phase it became apparent that the preferred solution of "Develop Interoperability 
Readiness Levels" implies one activity only, yet, this process involves much more than simply 
developing I/ORLs.  It uses Interoperability Readiness Levels as a mechanism to assess the 
maturity of the design of a system with regard to how well it interoperates with other systems in 
support of mission critical threads, and as a means to predict a system's ability to pass 
operational testing with regard to interoperability. 
In the third phase, the detailed design was developed.  To assess interoperability 
readiness levels, it was determined that I/ORLs would need to be evaluated at multiple SETRs.  
There is a top level process presented in developing I/ORLs that considers how this process will 
be implemented at specific SETRs.  The authors created an I/ORL standard outlining the I/ORL 
levels, values, and descriptions.  I/ORLs are intended to assess the state of a system’s 
interoperability using the Systems Engineering process within the existing DoD framework.  The 
I/ORL scale ranges from 1 to 9.  A value of 1 is considered the least mature as it pertains to 
interoperability, and a value of 9 is the most mature.  For each applicable review, an objective 
I/ORL value and a threshold value was assigned.  The objective value is the level that should be 
met at a particular review.  A threshold value is the minimum value that the interface must meet 
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at the review.  If this value is not met, the system cannot proceed to the next technical review 
without further action. 
In the event that the I/ORL review yields results below the objective value, the program 
manager will need to demonstrate a risk mitigation plan to correct the issues prior to moving to 
the next phase of the system development.  The purpose of this is to address potential trouble 
areas in more detail before they delay the system.  This approach highlights potential system 
interoperability issues allowing them to be resolved earlier in the system development.  While 
this process adds an administrative burden, the benefits of tracking I/ORLs and developing 
mitigation strategies outweighs the cost of this burden. 
The process validation phase utilized two methodologies.  A tabletop exercise (TTX) was 
used to demonstrate the functional details of the I/ORL Process as it tracks the interoperability of 
a fictitious system.  Secondly, a computer-based model was developed to track the effectiveness 
of the I/ORL Process if applied across the Navy/DoD.   
During the tabletop exercise, the authors noted shortcomings in the I/ORL Process, 
generated solutions, and applied improvements to the I/ORL Process.  The fictitious Advanced 
Combat Integrated Helmet (ACIH) was selected as a sample system for the TTX because it has 
many internal and external interfaces used for communication.  The audio and visual 
communication between headquarters and ground troops was selected to focus the TTX on the 
ACIH communications mission thread.   
The second part of the validation was a computer-based model designed to simulate the 
I/ORL system.  It simulates the interoperability requirements progress throughout the System 
Engineering process, assigns I/ORL values, and compares the assigned value to the required 
values at each review.  If the system does not meet the prescribed I/ORL threshold for the 
review, the system is reworked to meet the threshold at an additional cost that is assessed 
according to the development phase.   
Based on the modeling and the table top exercise, the authors believe that the current 
Systems Engineering process could benefit from the implementation of I/ORLs.  The modeling 
estimates a savings of approximately 14.2% or a reduction of 6.29% in rework costs over the 
current DoD System Engineering process.  Additionally, the model shows an OT&E pass rate of 
 xx 
 
93.73% with the implementation of the I/ORL evaluations.  This is a significant increase in the 
pass rate of systems from DT to OT&E. 
 
 1 
I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND  
Department of the Navy (DoN) Systems Engineering (SE) processes and practices have 
evolved over time.  Systems Engineering methods and process guidelines have been in 
development since the early 1960’s.  The Department of Defense pioneered these processes and 
practices and developed MIL-STD-499 which was the original specification for Systems 
Engineering.  These Systems Engineering methods have continued to evolve both within the 
federal government and in private industry, particularly since the role of military specifications 
has diminished due to acquisition reform.  Current Systems Engineering methods are 
documented in numerous publications such as the International Council on Systems Engineering 
(INCOSE) Systems Engineering Handbook, and ISO/IEC 15288 Systems and Software 
Engineering – System Life Cycle Process.  The Federal Government, and in particular the 
Department of the Navy, also specifies how these Systems Engineering methods will be 
implemented within the context of naval systems acquisition and these guidelines are specified in 
documents such as the NAVSEAINST 5000.9 Naval SYSCOM Systems Engineering Policy, 
Naval SYSCOM Engineering Technical Review Handbook.  Although the DoN has put in place 
numerous system design review checks, these enforcement measures on Systems Engineering 
development practices are not preventing systems from failing operational criteria associated 
with Operational Test (OT) at the end of their system development cycles.   
Independent Operational Testing organizations can trace their origins to the 1970 Blue 
Ribbon Defense Panel Report.  The report concluded that “There has been, and is currently no 
effective means for conducting productive joint operations test and evaluations.  The fact that 
some such efforts heretofore have encountered difficulties and achieved few useful results does 
obviate the requirements for much needed joint operational test and evaluation (OT&E)” [JT&E 
Handbook, 1996].  The current role of the operational test organizations is to make an 
independent determination of the operational effectiveness and suitability of programs of record 
prior to full rate production and deployment. Prior to the establishment of the independent 
OT&E organizations, individual commands were responsible for all testing prior to delivery of 
systems to the field; which led to many problems after delivery.  Individual commands, 
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specifically the program offices, retain cognizance over Developmental Test and Evaluation 
(DT&E).  
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT  
The current Department of the Navy (DoN) Systems Engineering process has 
documented instances of programs failing to detect critical inter-operational failures prior to 
Initial Operational Test & Evaluation (IOT&E).  “Approximately 50% of programs completing 
IOT&E since 2000 have been assessed as not operationally effective and/or suitable” [Defense 
Science Board Task Force, 2008].  Early detection of problems is critical to prevent cost 
overruns and schedule delays.  The cost and time required to correct a problem are directly 
related to how late in the process the problem is found and these cost and schedule impacts 
increase rapidly as the system nears deployment.  Programs are successfully passing 
developmental testing; however, these tests do not provide adequate assurances that the system 
will satisfy user needs or Concept of Operations (CONOPS) based interoperating requirements 
of the operational community.  Furthermore, requirements that are critical to mission success are 
not being identified in the current SE process, and allocations or dependency on supporting 
resources (systems, sensors, data, etc.) are not being reflected in the Systems Engineering, 
contractor development plans, and testing plans. 
Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 5000.02 and related documents describe the 
Defense Acquisition System used for development of Department of the Navy programs.  
Despite extensive guidance and multiple decision gates, programs are still failing to ensure that 
all requirements critical to meeting the user need are identified and properly tested prior to the 
start of the OT&E process.  Improvements must also be made to the Systems Engineering 
requirements process to ensure that these critical requirements are made visible at key technical 
reviews(s) such as Preliminary Design Review (PDR), Critical Design Review (CDR), Test 
Readiness Review (TRR), and Production Readiness Review (PRR). 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
The following research questions guided the direction of this project’s research and 
analysis and were answered as the work progressed: 
• How are mission critical elements identified and managed using the existing acquisition 
and SE processes? 
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• What are the common failures in the engineering process that result in missing mission 
critical elements?  Where do these failures occur? 
• How prevalent are mission critical failures of programs discovered during OT&E? 
• What kinds of Modeling and Simulation (M&S) can be leveraged to analyze DoN 
Systems Engineering processes? 
• Can process improvements be used to supplement the DoN Systems Engineering 
processes to improve handling of mission critical interoperability elements of programs? 
• What are the cost ramifications and possible benefits of implementing these enhanced 
processes? 
D. INITIAL ASSUMPTIONS  
  It is understood that Systems Engineering involves balancing the often conflicting 
requirements of development costs, development schedules and system performance.  However, 
this a significant oversimplification of the situation due to the interrelations between cost and 
schedule that exist in the budgetary process.  While on the surface, making small investments in 
time and money early in the process in order to save much larger amounts of money in the later 
lifecycles would seem like an obvious choice; this is actually quite difficult due to how funding 
is allocated into the different “colors” of money and how this funding is time phased through the 
program.  The authors do not address these issues in this paper.  The discussions in this paper 
regarding how money should be allocated to various types of testing and when this testing should 
occur do not take into account the reprogramming of funding that must occur to facilitate these 
changes or the levels of approval that these changes would require. 
E. PROJECT GOALS AND DELIVERABLES  
The goal of the project is to analyze the deficiencies of the current Systems Engineering 
process supporting Department of Navy (DoN) Acquisition in the area of requirements critical to 
ensuring mission success.  This includes detailing recommended changes to the Systems 
Engineering (SE) processes in the Defense Acquisition System in order to increase the 
percentage of programs that successfully pass Operational Test & Evaluation (OT&E) and 
therefore decrease the cost and schedule delays associated with programs failing OT&E.  The 
deliverables of this project are a detailed description of the recommended process changes, the 
results of the validation methods used to determine the effect these changes will have on the 
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current SE process, and an assessment of their impact with regard to performance and cost.  It 
should be noted that during the initial research phase of this project the scope was reduced to 
only address deficiencies related to interoperability, and the deliverables listed above reflect the 
narrowed solution space. 
F. TAILORED SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PROCESS  
The authors implemented a tailored Systems Engineering approach that started with the 
identification of the customers’ needs and proceeded through the phases illustrated in Figure 1 
until a recommended solution was generated.  This approach was based on the waterfall model 
introduced by Royce [Blanchard, 2006]and has been tailored to contain elements from Buede 
[Buede, 2009] and lifecycle design to specifically address the goals of the project.  This 
customized process focuses on the development of the system and less on its support, given its 
ideological nature. 
The project consisted of five phases: Process Review and Problem Identification, 
Analysis of Alternatives, Detailed Process Design, Process Validation, and Present 
Recommendations as shown in Figure 1.  Each phase was executed by taking the inputs and 
feedback from later phases.  Once the given outputs were of suitable quality, then each phase 
was considered complete.  A detailed description of each phase is found in the subsequent 




Figure 1. Tailored SE Process 
This Systems Engineering process was developed for studying this problem and development of the solution. 
 
1. Process Review and Problem Identification 
All stakeholder needs and requirements were collected and prioritized based on 
pertinence to the project objectives and stakeholder importance.  Conflicting needs and 
requirements were discussed with the required stakeholders to reach an agreement before the 
authors baselined the requirements. 
The team reviewed the current guidance and instructions on applying Systems 
Engineering in Department of Defense (DoD) acquisitions.  The goal was to examine the 
process’s overall effectiveness at identifying the mission critical requirements and evaluating 
these requirements during developmental testing.  The process was evaluated to determine how 
system level requirements are developed from user needs.  Further investigation was conducted 
to examine how operational tests are developed based upon the system requirements and the 
underlying user needs. 
Research was done to identify recently developed systems that passed and failed 
operational testing.  Each system was examined to determine sources of success and causes of 
failure.  This was accomplished by addressing questions such as: 
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• How are system requirements captured in a Capability Development Document (CDD) 
supported by (or connected to) doctrinally-defined missions? 
• Are appropriate user-centric, solution-neutral metrics identified?   
• Are a system’s external interfaces identified?   
• Are realistic Concepts of Operation (CONOPS) used?  
• Were testers and end users formally involved in the Systems Engineering Technical 
Review (SETR)? 
The system’s ability to meet their requirements and objectives that satisfy the 
stakeholders’ needs were analyzed to determine the mission critical beneficial concepts and 
shortfalls for a system’s engineering process.   
2. Generation and Analysis of Alternatives  
The analysis of alternatives or down-select was accomplished following the identification 
of the source of failures pertaining to requirements critical to mission success within the Systems 
Engineering process.  Key decisive criteria were established at this phase to determine feasible 
alternatives.  The application of decisive criteria was employed to exclude undesirable solutions 
and highlight acceptable alternatives.  Multiple process concepts were developed based upon 
these decisive criteria.  Each concept was evaluated for the relative cost of implementation and 
the cost of execution.  These concepts were also rated based on the quality of process 
improvement, looking at factors concerning thoroughness, traceability, and simplicity.  The 
resulting concepts were evaluated and chosen to develop the best mission criticality process 
based on cost-effectiveness and process improvement in order to prevent the shortfalls identified 
in the previous phase. 
The programs identified in the previous phase were evaluated to determine what program 
was going to be used as the representative example.  This evaluation was done based on 
availability of critical information, team knowledge of the programs, and the representative 
nature of each program.  The representative nature was defined as being of sufficient complexity 
to adequately demonstrate the process and also the likelihood of the problems encountered on 
that program.   
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3. Detailed Process Design 
The selected process concept was used to develop a mission criticality process that can be 
integrated into the DoD Systems Engineering process. The new process included new 
deliverables such as: new exit/entrance criteria, modified documents, new/modified instructions, 
and organizational charts that describe roles and responsibility.  Mission Criticality Process 
Alternatives were used as reference material when encountering detail design issues.  Concepts 
for improvement were taken from the alternatives developed during the AoA phase during the 
detailed design.  While designing the new process, the mission criticality validation criteria were 
developed.  In the next phase, this process was simulated via a model on the representative 
program selected in this phase. 
4. Process Validation 
The new mission criticality process was evaluated on the representative system by 
performing table-top exercises.  The exercises used the validation criteria developed during the 
detailed process design phase to evaluate the process.  Cost data concerning the execution of the 
process was collected while the process/model was validated.  The results from the evaluation 
were analyzed and reported. 
5. Present Recommendations 
Once the process was simulated and analyzed, the findings and recommendations were 
presented to the stakeholders and are reported in this document.  This report includes how 
successful the new process was at addressing the problems encountered on the representative 
system and how other systems examined could have benefited from this new process.  This 
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II. PROCESS REVIEW AND PROBLEM REFINEMENT  
The authors accomplished several tasks concurrently during this initial phase of the 
project.  First, stakeholder needs and requirements were collected and prioritized.  Second, the 
current DoD Systems Engineering process and Operational Testing process were reviewed and 
evaluated to determine how system level requirements are developed from user needs and tested.  
Finally, recently developed systems that had issues arise during OT were identified and 
examined to determine potential sources of failure.  The results of these tasks are discussed in 
more detail in the paragraphs below. 
A. STAKEHOLDER NEEDS ANALYSIS  
The stakeholders’ needs for this project are based on the results of literature research, 
communication with the stakeholders, and team experience.  The stakeholder needs translate into 
derived requirements that capture the system’s capabilities and constraints for performance 
design parameters.  It was important to the team to understand the stakeholders’ needs, as well as 
the mission requirements, to transform them into defined requirements for the Systems 
Engineering detailed design phase of the project [Buede, 2009].  
1. Stakeholder Identification 
The authors produced a list of potential stakeholders for the project.  This list was further 
synthesized to identify additional candidates to ensure that each had an interest in the results of a 
design solution.  Also important to this identification process, was the distinction of which 
stakeholders may be impacted as a result of the project findings and recommendations.  As a 
result of this process, the following stakeholders were identified: 
• 
The Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition Chief 
Systems Engineer’s Office is responsible for Systems Engineering Technical Reviews (SETR) 
for all ACAT programs, regardless of the ACAT designation [ASN(RDA), 2008]. CHSENG 
staffers are interested in the utilization of the possible process changes for incorporation into the 
SETR [SETR, 2009] process.  ASN (RDA) CHSENG also served as the sponsor for this project, 
ASN (RDA) CHSENG 
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the authors were engaged with his representative on a continuous basis to understand and receive 
guidance on the direction of the project.   
• 
The Program Offices and Program Managers for specific development systems may be 
impacted by this project.  The programs may be able to utilize the output of this project to re-
define their Systems Engineering process, requirements definition, test planning and conduct. 
Program Office/Program Managers 
• 
The key stakeholder for this project is the naval war fighter or “user” of the system.  
Although the war fighter does not encounter the identified problem until a system becomes 
operational, the war fighter is left to deal with consequences of an ineffective system that is 
delivered with deficiencies.  The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System 
(JCIDS) [CJCSI 3170.01G, 2009] process describes the Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) as the 
war fighter representative into the acquisition infrastructure.  This representation is flowed down 
from the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) to the user.  The war fighter or “user” is 
defined as: “An operational command or agency that receives or will receive benefit from the 
acquired system” [CJCSI 3170.01G, 2009].   
Naval War Fighter 
• 
The design engineering teams may be affected by the outcome of this project.  This could 
be the prime contractors, working with the Program Office and also the System Commands 
(SYSCOM) field activities charged with the system development efforts.  The criteria identified 
for “mission criticality” may have impacts on the design and development of a system, along 
with the testing requirements identified. 
System Design, Development and Validation Teams 
• 
OPTEVFOR is the independent operational test agent responsible for assessing the 
operational effectiveness and suitability of new and improved war fighting systems and 
capabilities for the military services.  The U.S. Navy has its own specific evaluators when 
reviewing a Navy only system that has no joint services capabilities.  The outcome of this project 
may provide additional information in order to evaluate systems under test. 
U.S. Navy Operational Test and Evaluation Force (OPTEVFOR) 
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2. Stakeholder Initial Requirements 
As a result of the stakeholder identification process, perceived needs were documented 
from the definition of the initial problem statement.  These perceived needs were further 
analyzed to ascertain which ones would have an effect, if any, on which stakeholders.  This 
analysis resulted in the identification of requirements that would be of interest to multiple 
stakeholders.  The stakeholder requirements analysis provided the following:  
A. 
The first requirement, a method to track mission critical requirements was derived from 
the ASN (RDA) Chief Systems Engineer Staffer project proposal discussion [McKinlay, 2010].  
This requirement would also be shared by the program offices and system design, development 
and validation teams.  The outcome for this requirement is to capture and track critical needs 
related to a specific mission or missions.   
Develop a Method to Track Mission Critical Requirements  
B. 
As a continuation of this need, the ASN (RDA) Chief Systems Engineer specifically 
requested the exploration of mission threads with respect to mission critical requirements in 
order to assess the impact to successful completion of OT.  The objective of this is to 
demonstrate how mission critical requirements can be derived from mission threads.   
Explore a Mission Thread with Respect to Mission Critical Requirements 
C. 
The intent of developing a conceptual approach to improve OT results is to allow the 
authors to present findings in a methodology that could be implemented in a system to identify 
and track mission critical requirements.   
Develop a Conceptual Approach to Improve OT Results 
D. 
An inherent need from stakeholders is that the proposed solution offers an improved OT 
success rate when compared to the current process.   
Improve OT Success Rate 
E. 
Finally, the program offices and system design, development, and validation teams 
communicated that they would desire a net reduced development cost as a result of the 
implementation of the final recommendation.  This net reduced cost will be realized by the 
reduction in rework from systems passing the first phase of verification testing known as 
Developmental Testing (DT), but failing to pass the final validation phase of testing, known as 
Operational Testing (OT).   
Reduce Rework Costs 
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The combined results of the stakeholder requirements analysis are provided in Table 1. 
Table 1. Stakeholders Requirements Results 




















A. Develop Method to 
Track Mission Critical 
Requirements • •  •  
B. Explore a Mission 
Thread with Respect 
to Mission Critical 
Requirements 
•     
C. Develop 
Conceptual Approach 
to Improve OT Results • •   • 
D. Improve OT 
Success Rate 
• • • • • 
E. Reduce Rework 
Costs  
•  •  
 
B. PROCESS RESEARCH  
The research process for the Process Review and Problem Identification Phase of the 
project comprised the following research segments: Requirements Process, Operational Test 
Process and Failed Systems research. Each segment required investigating and documenting 
possible root causes for operational test failures.  The authors concentrated on areas in the 
processes that may provide insight into why system were initially passing DT, and then 
subsequently failing OT.  Figure 2 provides an illustration of the segments to the process 




Figure 2. Process Research 
The Process Research Phase of this project was comprised of research into three areas and was directed towards 
determining the root causes of operational test failures. 
 
1. Requirements Process 
a. Research Methodology and Objectives 
A principal goal of the first stage of the project was to conduct research on the overall 
Operation of the Defense Acquisition System [DoDI 5000.02, Enclosure 12, 2008] with respect 
to how requirements are managed throughout the process.  This is much more than merely the 
initial determination of requirements but also includes requirements documentation, validation, 
decomposition, and testing, etc.  This research includes much of the Systems Engineering 
process that is embedded into the Defense Acquisition System process.  The authors focused 
their research efforts on the regulatory guidance to determine how the process is “supposed” to 
work. It is important to note here that the program office development organizations are 
responsible for the generation of the artifacts produced as a result of the acquisition design and 
development process.  These documents are required for incremental delivery to the evaluation 
authorities in concert with the Systems Engineering Technical Review Process [SETR, 2009]. 
The quality, clarity and completeness of this documentation are important in the evaluation of 
systems as it progress through the acquisition process.  
The scope of the process that the authors studied for Process Review and Requirements 
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Identification Phase of this project is shown in Figure 3.  This process starts with the 
determination of system requirements based upon the needs identified by the Capability Based 
Assessment (CBA) process that occurs as part of Joint Capability and Integration Development 
System (JCIDS) [CJCSI 3170.01G, 2009] and includes the overall process of determining how 
well the system meets those requirements over the course of the system development process.  
Additionally, this process includes how these requirements are communicated from the user 


























































































Figure 3. Overview of the Systems Development Process 
This high level overview of the systems development process was adapted from CJCSI 3170.01G. 
 
The end goal of this process is to have confidence that when systems reach Milestone C, 
they will be able to provide the required operational capability in the intended environment.  
Since problems are being encountered during operational test, one can assume that there is a flaw 
in the process or that it is not being followed correctly.  The overall time of interest is from the 
CBA process that is performed prior to the Material Development Decision (MDD), through 
Milestone C, which is essentially the final gate prior to proceeding to Operational Test & 
Evaluation (OT&E).  That being said, official program initiation does not begin until Milestone 
B and the work performed in the early phases is to lay the foundation for the formal Defense 
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Acquisition Program that begins at that point.  The entire acquisition process varies depending 
on the nature of the program.  For example, a newly designed weapons combat system could take 
over 5 years to complete its acquisition cycle, while a system or component already in the fleet 
could take as little as 6 months to integrate since it is already developed.  This acquisition 
timeline varies according to the complexity, technology and funding provided to programs. 
Figure 3 is at too high of a level for any amount of meaningful assessment, so the authors 
developed process maps that were at a lower level so specific steps in the process could be 
identified for potential improvements.  These improvements were viewed from the perspective of 
possible changes that could be made early in the acquisition cycle that would improve the OT 
pass criteria. The depiction of the processes in a graphical representation provides the visual 
insight to understand any inter-dependencies in the processes and associations that may 
otherwise not be apparent.  The authors reviewed Department of Defense, as well as Department 
of the Navy regulations and guides [CJCSI 3170.01G; DoDI 5000.02, 2008; SECNAV 5000.2D, 
2008] to identify the key steps that must occur in order to translate the capability needs into 
system requirements and then ensure that the system is going to meet those requirements.  Inputs 
for these steps were identified including the Initial Capabilities Document (ICD), Capability 
Development Document (CDD), system specification, and other requirements documents in 
addition to additional sources of information that are available [DAU Guidebook, 2010; JCIDS 
Manual, 2009].  Outputs were also identified and consist primarily of the work products that are 
generated, including specifications, architectures, etc.  The authors also determined the key 
individuals that are involved in the SE process.  These included high-level personnel that are 
responsible for signing documents and authorizing actions, along with support staff that perform 
formal or informal assessments which are used as the basis for those high-level decisions [DoDD 
5000.01, 2007; DoDI 5000.02, 2008].  Finally, the authors conducted an initial assessment of the 
regulations to locate potential weaknesses based on sound Systems Engineering principles and to 
isolate what steps in the process had the highest potential for improvement. 
b. Capability Based Assessment Phase 
The Capability Based Assessment (CBA) is the first phase of the process and is 
conducted prior to the decision to pursue a materiel solution.  The key activities and work 
products of this process are shown in Figure 4.  Figures 4 through 7 that follow were adapted 
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from the Life Cycle chart produced by the Integrated Defense Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics Life Cycle Management System, DAU Press, Version 5.3.4 of 15 June 2009 [DAU, 
2009].  The ICD captures the results of the Capabilities Based Assessment if a materiel solution 
is recommended.  Alternatively, a DOTMLPF Change Request (DCR) describes a non-materiel 
solution if one is determined to be feasible.  For Navy systems, Chief of Naval Operations 
(CNO) Code N8 is responsible for acting as the user representative and oversees the CBA 
assessment once the Joint CONOPS has been developed by the Joint Staff.  At this point in the 
process when a materiel solution is required by an approved ICD, the Milestone Decision 
Authority (MDA) determines the scope of the subsequent follow on analysis such as the Analysis 
of Alternatives (AoA) [CJCSI 3170.01G, 2009]. 
MDD
Work Products
CBA - Capability Based Assessment
DCR - DOTMLPF Change Recommendation
ICD - Initial Capability Document




































Figure 4. Capability Based Assessment Process 
The capability based assessment is the initial JCIDS process for determining if a materiel or non-materiel solution 
is required to address a user need. 
 
Based on the documents reviewed, there is a heavy emphasis placed upon the 
performance aspects of meeting the capability needs.  Identifications of constraints was 
discussed in the DAU Guidebook [DAU, 2010]; however, it is unclear how thorough this 
constraint identification process is and the degree to which the constraints are incorporated into 
the AoA plan.  These constraints would include the operational environment, the support 
infrastructure that is expected to be available, and what interfaces would be required to external 
systems.  
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c. Material Solution Analysis Phase 
The Material Solution Analysis phase is built around a traditional V-based SE process, 
starting with an analysis of the system needs.  The major difference in this phase compared with 
the traditional system development V-based SE process is that no real product is produced.  The 
design ideas and concepts are “paper-based” and are produced as desk-top analyses at this point.  
This would also include any modeling and simulation that may be required.  The process 
continues with development of multiple concepts down to a level sufficient for a thorough 
comparison of those concepts, and then testing of those concepts for their relative ability to meet 
the user needs within the constraints.  The key activities and work products of this process are 
shown in Figure 5.   
Figure 5. Material Solution Analysis Phase 
The Material Solution Analysis Phase selects a preferred concept for meeting the identified user need.  
 
The Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) is the major activity in this phase and is an analytical 
comparison based on operational effectiveness, suitability, and life-cycle cost.  However, the 
authors’ review of the Defense Acquisition Guidebook [DAU, 2010] showed a clear bias towards 
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suitability into this analysis.  A system that is not reliable or cannot be maintained will not be of 
use to the war-fighter, even if the theoretical operational effectiveness of the system is very high.  
Logistics, packaging, handling, and other factors were included in the Alternative Systems 
Review checklist but no clear guidance on how much weight suitability factors should carry in 
the selection of the preferred concept. 
In addition, technical risk is not mentioned within the context of the AoA.  The concern 
here is that a concept will be selected that has very promising performance; however, the 
estimated performance is based upon technology that is not yet mature.  If the substitution of 
these technologies becomes necessary due to lack of Technology Readiness Levels (TRL) 
growth, there is a significant risk that the actual delivered performance of a system will be quite 
low even though the program initially offered very good performance.  
Another area of concern is the lack of continued development of the concept for how the 
system will be used.  In the CBA process prior to MDD, mission threads are developed that 
describe how the overall mission will be accomplished and how this system fits into that mission 
thread.  However, at that point in the process, the specifics of the system have not yet been 
defined.  At the end of the Material Solution Analysis phase, a preferred concept for a system has 
been developed.  It would now be possible to specify additional details as to how the system will 
operate within the context of the mission threads that were previously identified.  The authors 
found no indication that a detailed concept of operational use was required as a deliverable for 
Milestone A. It was also noted that although specific documents are required for transition out of 
the Material Solution Phase [DAU, 2010], it was unclear on how these translate into 
requirements and if these requirements would have a level of traceability back to the original 
inputs drivers.  
d. Technology Development Phase 
The primary focuses of the Technology Development phase are to prepare the system and 
its underlying technology ready for formal program initiation at Milestone B.  The key activities 
and work products of this process are shown in Figure 6.  This phase also follows the V process, 
starting with an assessment of the user needs and culminates with demonstrating or modeling the 
system to verify compliance with the specification and finally, demonstrating the system concept 
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Figure 6. Technology Development Phase 
This Technology Development Phase further develops the system design and required technologies. 
 
The first concern is that modeling is considered as a valid alternative to prototyping with 
no caveats as to when it is or is not appropriate to use models as a substitute for prototypes.  The 
use of modeling has been pushed over the years as a way of reducing testing costs and has come 
a long way in terms of being able to provide useful information.  Development and Contractor 
Testing results are used in combination with system models to predict performance of the overall 
system without requiring system level testing.  While this approach has proven to be effective for 
predicting operational effectiveness in many systems, accurate models for operational suitability 
have proven elusive.   
One thing to note here is the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 – 
(WSARA) which requires competitive prototyping prior to Milestone B.  On the surface, this 
looks to be moving in the right direction.  Unfortunately, if the prototypes are only compared on 
the basis of the KPPs and these KPPs do not encompass the full range of requirements including 
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suitability and interoperability, then the full potential is wasted.  No guidance could be found that 
specified the full range of testing that should be done on prototypes prior to Milestone B and 
how this data should be used in a down-select decision.  In addition, this requirement only 
applies to Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs).  MDAPs are defined as ACAT I 
programs which is based on guideline dollar values provided by the USD (AT&L) and decided 
upon by the program office.  Dollar value distinctions for ACAT I programs are total expenditure 
for research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) of more than $365 million in fiscal 
(FY) 2000 constant dollars or, for procurement of more than $2.190 billion in FY 2000 constant 
dollars [DoDI 5000.02, 2008]. For programs with a smaller expected expenditure, the 
Acquisition Categories (ACAT) level is lower.  Lower ACAT levels result in lower Decision 
Authority levels required for acquisition decision-making. 
e. Engineering and Manufacturing Development Phase 
The Engineering and Manufacturing Development phase is focused on implementation of 
the design and developing sufficient test data upon which to ensure that the system is ready to 
proceed to operational test.  The key activities and work products of this process are shown in 
Figure 7.  At this point, the majority of the system level data should be based upon prototype 
testing rather than modeling.   
A key issue in this phase is the level of user involvement.  The authors had some 
concerns as to the ability of CNO (N8) to act as a user representative with respect to issues that 
are close to the actual operational environment.  In the CBA and MSA phases, having CNO (N8) 
act as the user representative was appropriate since the focus was on system level interactions.  
In this phase, user input is needed to resolve operational usage, training, and human interface 
issues.  CNO (N1) has been designated as the lead for Human Systems Interfaces (HSI) although 
their focus is on manpower requirements, rather than human-machine interactions.  The only 
way to do a proper assessment of these issues is to have prototypes of the system or key 
components tested by actual users.  The only formal mechanism for this in the current process is 
the Operational Assessments performed by OPTEVFOR but no across-the-board requirement 
could be found for this 
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Figure 7. Engineering and Manufacturing Development Phase 
This Engineering and Manufacturing Development phase is focused on implementation of the design and developing 
sufficient test data upon which to ensure that the system is ready to proceed to operational test. 
 
This also raises the issue of a lack of an independent assessment of the readiness for 
operational test early in this phase.  An Operational Test Readiness Review (OTRR) is held 
immediately prior to Milestone C and the Assessment for Operational Test Readiness (AOTR) is 
held for some programs after Milestone C and these reviews are focused on assessing if the 
system is likely to achieve the operational suitability and effectiveness goals in OT.  Having a 
preliminary independent AOTR performed early in the Engineering & Manufacturing 
Development phase has the potential to identify problems in the design early enough to make 
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f. Assessment for Change Potential and Ease of Change 
In preparation for the next phase, the authors conducted an assessment of each step that 
was identified for each of these phases for the relative potential for improvement and leverage 
for each step.  The results of this assessment are shown in Figure 8  The color scheme of the 
graph is intended to communicate that steps that are in the upper-right-hand corner are the best 
candidates for change and the lower-left-hand corner indicates poor candidates for change.  This 
initial evaluation was based on the authors’ understanding of the SE process and investigation of 
the researched materials. 
 MSA - Decompose Functional Definitions
 TDS - Design System
 TDS - Develop Technologies
 TDS - Demo Technologies
 EMD - Fabricate, Assemble to Docs
 MSA - Prepare TDS
 TDS - Develop Functional Definitions
 TDS - Decompose Funct. Definitions
 TDS - Demo System vs Specs
 TDS - Establish SFB
 TDS - Establish SAB
 Functional Configuration Audit
 EMD - Develop Build-to Docs
 EMD - Verify Performance to Specs
 EMD - Set Product Support Strategy
 MSA - Analyze Concept Capabilities
 MSA - Verify Concept Performance
 MSA - Select Preferred Concept
 TDS - Approve CDD
 EMD - Individual CI Verification
 EMD - Approve CPD
 MSA - Develop Concept Objectives
 MSA - Develop Functional Definitions
 TDS - Develop System Specification
 TDS - Demo System vs Plan
 TDS - Refine System Specification
 TDS - CDD Joint Staff Review
 EMD - CPD Joint Staff Review
 ITR - Initial Technical Review
 PRR - Production Readiness Review
 MSA - Develop Concepts & Technologies
 PRE - Capability Based Assessment
 PRE - Generate ICD
 MSA - Analyze Component Capabilities
 MSA - Prepare TES
 MSA - Prepare Draft CDD
 TDS - Revise Performance Attributes
 EMD - Verify Functionality Compliance
 EMD - Revise Performance Attributes
 MSA - Analyze System Needs
 MSA - Define Supportability Objectives
 MSA - Evaluate Support Capabilities
 TDS - Analyze System Needs
 TDS - Prepare TEMP
 TDS - Formulate RAM Strategy
 TDS - Refine Supportability Needs
 TDS - Develop Support Strategy
 EMD - Develop Support Plan
 EMD - Demo Support Capability
 ASR - Alternate Systems Review
 TDS - Demo System vs Needs
 SRR - System Requirements Review
 SFR - System Functional Review
 SVR - System Verification Review
 PDR - Preliminary Design Review
 CDR - Critical Design Review
 TRR - Test Readiness Review










Figure 8. Assessment of Potential and Ease of Change 
Each of the steps identified on the previous figures were assessed for their potential for improvement and ease of 
change.  The lower left corner corresponds to steps in which changes are likely to be difficult to implement due to 
high cost or higher levels of approval in addition to having a low potential for improvement.  These steps are 
labeled in red as being poor candidates for change.  The upper right corner is comprised of steps that would require 
relatively lower levels of approval and funding to change and have a high likelihood of making a significant 
improvement to the overall process.  These steps are labeled in green as being excellent candidates for change.  The 
areas in the middle, shown in yellow, are steps that fall in between these two extremes.  
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Potential for Improvement is defined as the importance of the step to the requirements 
process in terms of its ability to predict or prevent problems.  The left-hand column of the chart 
shows steps that do not appear to have many shortcomings from a Systems Engineering 
standpoint.  Also, improvements that are made to these steps will not have a substantial 
improvement upon the overall results of the process, which is defined as ensuring that systems 
pass operational test.  By contrast, the right-hand column shows steps that appear to not be 
working as intended such as the design reviews that are supposed to be ensuring that programs 
do not move to the next stage in the process if they are not ready.  This right-hand column also 
indicates that making improvements to those steps should have a direct improvement on the 
overall process, more specifically, a higher likelihood of passing OT&E. 
Ease of Change is defined as our ability to effect significant change to the step and degree 
to which that change will be consistent for a wide variety of programs.  Steps that have more 
latitude and are tailored to the program are going to be more difficult to improve because 
changes to those steps will affect different programs in different ways.  Changes to a step may 
improve the results of some systems but may actually hurt other systems.  In addition, steps that 
are performed by contractors or other organizations are going to be more difficult to change 
because we have less control over how those steps are performed.  Additionally, changes that 
require additional funding are more difficult.  Therefore, the bottom row is those steps that are 
going to be the most difficult or expensive to change.  The top row is those steps that should be 
easier to change. 
g. Summary of Systems Engineering and Acquisition Process Guidance Research 
One finding concluded from the research was that there is a significant amount of latitude 
built into the Defense Acquisition System.  This latitude or flexibility was intentional in the 
design of the process based on the understanding that the process needed to be tailored to the 
type of system, level of technology development that was necessary and other factors.  That 
being said, there is a limit on the amount of tailoring that is allowed.  One example of this 
limitation is in the checklists that are used for the design and technical reviews.  In the past these 
checklist were modifiable and are now provided as intentionally locked.  This was done to 
prevent the program from changing a wording of a question in order to allow a satisfactory 
response to a question in order to eliminate oversight.  Questions that do not apply to a program 
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can still be marked as being Not Applicable and will not negatively affect the “score” for that 
category; however, marking a question as Not Applicable still allows an oversight body to 
question whether a question is truly outside the system scope.  This does raise the question of 
how are programs using this latitude, and whether programs are using the latitude or flexibility 
allowed by the process or are merely tailoring the process to make it easier for those programs to 
pass through the gates? 
Another finding showed a lot of emphasis was placed on the Defense Acquisition System 
measurable performance parameters.  KPPs are just an example of a high level of these 
parameters that are used for measuring performance of a system; there are many other 
requirements that are derived from those KPPs.  This is done to facilitate testing that can be 
performed at a lower level in order to predict higher-level system performance.  However, some 
requirements are very difficult to quantify and if system engineers only look at the measurable 
requirements and do not take into account the context of those requirements; these developers 
may believe that they are meeting the system requirements, when in fact they are not.  This raises 
the question of whether the intent of the requirement is getting lost as system developers move 
down through the decomposition process. 
Another issue is the lack of communication between the development community, user 
community and operational test communities.  There was little mention of direct operational test 
community involvement prior to the Test Readiness Review even though the planning for the 
Operational Testing starts earlier in the process.  The research indicated that the development 
community and the operational test community essentially work in parallel.  The process by 
which the operational testers develop the testing criteria based upon the user needs is very 
similar to how the system developers derive the system requirements and earlier communication 
between these teams should improve the accuracy of both those processes. 
2. Operational Test Process Research  
a. Research Methodology and Objectives 
As this project is in support of naval acquisition, the research methodology was to review 
the existing Defense Acquisition University (DAU) T&E Management Guide and the existing 
OT&E process of COMOPTEVFOR, the Navy’s OTA.  The objective was to identify the 
existing process steps including inputs and outputs, and to identify participants.  Further, the goal 
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was to critically review the regulations for weaknesses and identify potential areas for 
improvement. 
In order to review the existing OT&E process, the following documents currently 
providing guidance to naval testers were reviewed: 
• Defense Acquisition University (DAU) T&E Management Guide 
• COMOPTEVFOR Instruction 3980.1 Operational Test Director’s Manual 
• COMPOPTEVFOR Policy and Information Notice 05-1A, Mission-Based Test Design, 
The Operational Test and Evaluation Framework, and Integrated Test 
• COMOPTEVFOR Policy and Information Notice 05-2, Critical Operational Issue Risk 
Assessment Reporting Methodology 
• COMOPTEVFOR Policy and Information Notice 10-01, Operational Reporting 
Guidance and Procedure. 
The documents provide information on the role of COMOPTEVFOR, apparent overlap of 
Developmental Test and Evaluation (DT&E) with OT&E, OT&E foundation documents, the 
Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP), and the test planning process.  The overall OT&E 
planning process is documented in Appendix B. 
b. Types of Operational Test and Evaluation 
Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E) can be divided into two phases:  OT&E before 
Full Rate Production (FRP) and OT&E after FRP.  OT&E before FRP consists of Early 
Operational Assessments (EOA), Operational Assessments (OA), and Initial Operational Test 
and Evaluation (IOT&E).  IOT&E is conducted late during low rate production when actual test 
assets are available in support of a full rate decision review.  After FRP, all OT&E is referred to 
as Follow-on Operational Test and Evaluation (FOT&E).  It is conducted using fielded 
production systems with modifications, upgrades or increments fixing issues that were found 
during IOT&E. 
c. Operational Test and Evaluation Planning 
OTAs usually become involved during a system's life cycle during the program's 
evaluation concepts.  It is during this time that OTAs begin to develop strategies for conducting 
operational tests.  The system  Program Manager (PM) working with  the T&E Working-level 
Integrated Product Team (T&E WIPT) providing support, is responsible for producing the Test 
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and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP).  All T&E stakeholders participate early in the T&E 
strategy development and make timely updates.  Stakeholders include representatives from 
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics and Director, Operational 
Test and Evaluation (DOT&E).  For programs on the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) 
T&E oversight list, DOT&E and the Director Developmental Test and Evaluation (DDT&E) 
approve the TEMP [Defense Acquisition Guide, Chapter 9].  For all other programs, the 
Component Acquisition Executive (CAE) or designated representative approves the TEMP 
[Defense Acquisition Guide, Chapter 9].  OTAs are members of the T&E WIPT, working 
together they are responsible for developing Part III (Test and Evaluation Strategy) and Part IV 
(Resource Summary) of the TEMP. Part III identifies Critical Operational Issues, future OT&E 
limitations, and any Live Fire Test and Evaluation (LFT&E).  COIs define operational 
effectiveness and operational suitability for a given program.  Prior to IOT&E, COIs are assessed 
by evaluating risks associated with each COI.  During IOT&E, all COI capabilities and functions 
will be examined.  COIs are resolved as SAT, UNSAT, or unresolved.  UNSAT or unresolved 
COIs will be re-evaluated during FOT&E.  Figure 9 shows the flow as to how COMOPTEVFOR 
plans OT&E for the Navy. 
 
Figure 9. Mission Based Test Design and Integrated Test (MBTD/IT) Process 
Process for how COMOPTEVFOR plans OT&E for the Navy, taken from COMOPTEVFOR Instruction 3980.1, 
2008. 
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COMOPTEVFOR, the Program Manager (PM), and other key participants must complete 
and agree on the product of a mission analysis for the system [COMOPTEVFOR, 2006].  
Mission Based Test Design (MBTD) planning process entry point is between Milestone A and 
Milestone B, but a post Milestone B entry is fine.  Mission analysis enables direct traceability of 
any system enhancement, risk area, or deficiency discovered during testing to a mission or 
missions.  During steps 1-6 of the MBTD, COMOPTEVFOR and the PM conduct a mission 
analysis where they identify the mission COIs of a system.  The mission COIs are identified by 
conducting an analysis of available documents such as the Operational Requirements Document 
(ORD), Capabilities Documents, and the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) to identify the 
mission areas for the system under test.  They analyze each mission area to define tasks required 
to support the mission.  Once the subtasks are identified they then establish conditions for each 
subtask and allocate standards to each task.  The tasks and subtasks are correlated to specific 
capabilities/requirements.  Steps 1-6 of Figure 9 provide the Operational Test Director (OTD) 
with the prerequisites for stand-alone OT planning (Steps 7-11 of Figure 9).  At this point they 
develop additional operational attributes and standards.  Test procedures are then written for each 
standard or qualitative capability considering the tasks, subtask and conditions associated with 
that capability. Using the test procedures, data requirements are derived, test scenarios built, and 
test resource requirements are determined.  The OTD will then look for opportunities for DT/OT 
integrations where they can plan to conduct EOAs and OAs.  Data collected during EOA and OA 
is then analyzed before IOT&E.  During IOT&E, tests are conducted, data is collected and 
analyzed.  Once the analysis is complete an effectiveness and suitability determination is made.  
The key takeaways of Figure 9 are steps 1-11.  The mission analysis (Steps 1-6) is important 
because this is where all of the tasks, subtasks, capabilities, and requirements that a system under 
test will have to meet.  Using the outputs of the mission analysis provides the OTDs the 
information needed for them to plan and execute OT&E (Steps 7-11). 
d. Phases of Operational Test and Evaluation 
OT&E can be conducted throughout the acquisition life cycle of a system.  Before any 
OT can be conducted, documentation for major systems and those designated y the Director, 
Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) for oversight must be sent to the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense (OSD) for approval before the testing can be conducted or the systems can 
 28 
be cleared to proceed Beyond Low Rate Initial Production (BLRIP) [Guidebook, 2010].  Figure 
10 shows how OT&E relates to the Milestone process.  
 
 


















































Figure 10. OT&E Relationship to the Milestone Process 
Process for how COMOPTEVFOR plans OT&E for the Navy, taken from COMOPTEVFOR Instruction 3980.1, 
2008. 
 
During material solution analysis and technology development an Early Operational 
Assessment (EOA) can be conducted.  EOAs are focused on investigating the deficiencies 
identified during the mission area analysis.  OTAs involve themselves during these assessments 
so that they can validate the OT&E requirements for future testing and identify issues/criteria 
that can only be resolved through OT&E.  This helps initiate early test resource planning.  An 
early assessment can provide data to support a decision on whether the technology is sufficiently 
mature to support entry into the next developmental phase [DAU Guidebook, 2010].  In addition, 
EOA can be difficult since testing is done on mock-ups or using models/simulations.  Documents 
are also reviewed and both contractor/government data are evaluated.  This leads to inputs being 
provided into the Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP).  Special logistics problems, program 
objectives, program plans, performance parameters, and acquisition strategy are areas of primary 
influence to the operational tester during this phase and must be carefully evaluated to project the 
system’s operational effectiveness and suitability [DAU Guidebook, 2010].  
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Additional EOAs or Operational Assessments (OA) may be conducted during the 
Engineering and Manufacturing Development phase.  OAs are conducted to facilitate 
identification of the best design, indicate the risk level of performance for this phase of the 
development, examine operational aspects of the system's development, and estimate potential 
operational effectiveness and suitability [DAU Guidebook, 2010].  The data collected during 
these OAs can be reviewed and used to determine whether or not a system is ready to move into 
the development of the Engineering Development Model (EDM).  EOAs and OAs are conducted 
with DT&E testers, contractors and OT&E testers 
During the Production and Deployment phase (P&D), equipment that has been formally 
certified by the Program Manager as being ready for OT&E is tested [DAU Guidebook, 2010].  
Initial Operational Test and Evaluation (IOT&E) is then conducted by user organizations in a 
field exercise to examine the organization and doctrine, integrated logistic support, threat, 
communications, command and control, and tactics associated with the operational employment 
of the system.  After the Full Rate Production (FRP) decision, Follow-on Operational Test and 
Evaluation (FOT&E) is conducted to refine effectiveness and suitability estimates, assess 
performance not evaluated during IOT&E, evaluate new tactics and doctrine, and assess the 
impacts of system modifications or upgrades of issues found during earlier EOAs, OAs and 
IOT&E. FOT&E is conducted by the users in a operational environment.  Overall the OTA is 
required to provide reports of OT&E results in support of Milestone B and C, in addition to the 
IOT&E report required for the Full Rate Production Decision Review (FRPDR) [DAU 
Guidebook, 2010]. 
e. Summary of Operational Test Planning Process Research 
COMOPTEVFOR is an independent agent for OT&E in the Navy’s acquisition process 
whose mission is to “independently and objectively evaluate the operational effectiveness and 
suitability of new and improved war fighting capabilities” [COMOTEVFORINST 3980.1, 2008: 
1-1].  OT&E is to be conducted in as near a real operational environment as possible with fleet 
personnel operating and maintaining the system under test.  As systems are passing 
Developmental Test and Evaluation (DT&E) yet failing OT&E, it is important to understand the 
key concepts pertaining to developmental testing.  DT&E is planned and conducted by the 
Design Agent (DA) responsible for the development of the system and Program Executive 
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Office (PEO) in case of the Navy who assigns a Government agency to conduct DT&E, such as 
the Naval Surface Warfare Centers (NSWC), Naval Air Warfare Centers (NAWC) and Naval 
Underwater Warfare Centers (NUWC). These tests can be conducted at a contractor’s facility, a 
government facility or out in the field.  One finding showed that the viewpoints between DT&E 
and OT&E are different.  They both differ in the way tests are conducted, in what is being tested, 
and in the evaluation criteria.  Table 2 reflects the key differences. 
Table 2. DT&E and OT&E Differences 
This table, taken from COMOPTEVFORINST 3980.1, summarizes the differences between Developmental Test and 
Operational Test. 
How Tests are Conducted 
DT&E testing is properly conducted: 
• In a controlled environment that minimizes the 
chance that unknown or unmeasured variables 
will affect system performance 
• By technical personnel skilled at “tweaking” to 
maximize performance 
• Against simulated threats tailored to 
demonstrate various aspects of specified system 
technical performance 
OT&E testing is properly conducted: 
• In an operationally realistic environment (e.g., high 
seas, temperature extremes, high density 
electromagnetic environments) under conditions 
simulating combat stress and peacetime conditions 
• With Fleet operators and maintenance personnel 
• Against threats which replicate, as closely as possible, 
the spectrum of operational characteristics 
• Using Fleet tactics 
Testing Subject/Topic 
DT&E tests a weapon or a “blackbox,” whatever the 
development program involves.  (Seldom does a 
development program involve a complete weapon 
system) 
OT&E tests total weapon systems.  If a missile is being 
developed, OT&E does not test only the missile itself, but 
rather the missile system, which includes the firing 
platform; that platform’s detection, classification, and 
targeting systems; the people who man it; logistical support; 
interfacing equipment; etc. 
Evaluation Criteria 
DT&E – Technical criteria are parameters measured 
during controlled DT&E tests. 
OT&E – Operational criteria are the CNO-provided 
minimum acceptable operational performance requirements 
(older programs) or measures of effectiveness/suitability 
(newer programs), or thresholds, which quantify the Critical 
Operational Issues (COI). 
Measurement and Frequency 
DT&E 
• The DA generally knows what he/she wants to 
measure (some particular parameter:  launch 
velocity; the number of g’s pulled as the missile 
acquires; time to climb; etc.). 
• DT&E tests are structured to hold many things 
constant, isolate others, and allow measurement 
of one or two parameters of interest. 
• It is generally possible to verify data 
statistically through replication of tests. 
OT&E 
• It is often not possible to specify measurements. 
• The objective is often simply to create combat 
conditions as closely as possible and record data as 
events unfold. 
• For aviation OT&E, with highly time-compressed test 
events and a high cost for OT&E, it is mandatory that 
OTDs know exactly what parameters of their system 
must be examined to resolve the specified COI. 
• OT&E cannot enjoy the luxury of isolating a variable.  
Methods of data capture must be devised during 
operational evolutions or during post-operation 
analysis. 
• It is often not possible to replicate data because 
interactions during tests are unique. 
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One recommendation to improve the test planning process would be for OT&E personnel 
to work with the DT&E personnel so that DT&E can be conducted in more of an operational test 
setting and allow for the planning of test phases that provide the necessary data to satisfy 
common needs of the DA and the OT&E agency.  This would have the effect of reducing the 
differences between DT&E and OT&E cited above, and possibly allow system deficiencies to be 
discovered earlier in the process during DT&E.  
Another possible improvement in the test planning process is in the tracking and review 
of Critical Operational Issues (COIs).  COMOPTEVFOR develops the COIs for each program 
and publishes them in the Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP).  The COIs are linked to 
CNO requirements established in the Operational Requirements Document (ORD), Analysis of 
Alternatives (AoA), Initial Capabilities Document (ICD), Capability Development Document 
(CDD), and Capability Production Document (CPD).  COIs define the operational effectiveness 
and operational suitability for a given system.  They are assessed and will be resolved as SAT, 
UNSAT or unresolved.  COIs need to be defined correctly, otherwise incorrectly defined COIs 
may remain throughout the test planning and test execution.  Another recommendation would be 
for a formal role in the Systems Engineering Technical Review (SETR) for the OT community in 
which COIs are indentified and validated with the users and traced to the system requirements at 
several reviews throughout the development phase. 
3. Operational Test Failure Research 
a. Research Methodology and Objectives 
There were two principal objectives to this task.  First, research was conducted for 
historical information that could give some insight as to why some programs fail operational 
testing.  This was accomplished via a search to find publically available literature applicable to 
operational testing and examining them to identify possible issues or challenges programs in 
general have experienced.  The second objective in this task was to identify actual programs that 
had recently experienced problems during operational test and examine them to determine 
potential sources of failure.  This was accomplished by requesting documentation from programs 
via contacts held by the authors and contacts provided by the project sponsor, ASN (RDA) 
CHSENG.  The overall goal with this combined approach was to locate and study previously 
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performed research on this subject (or similar subject) to identify potential root causes, and then 
compare them to specific programmatic documentation to find any similarities or differences. 
To accomplish the first objective of this task, an extensive search of publicly available 
papers, articles, and reports was complete. These included but were not limited to: 
• Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports 
• Senate Armed Committee reports.  
• Defense Science Board reports 
• Various topic papers from the NPS Library 
Most of the literature found was very general and not program specific, but it provided 
good insight to the historical performance of programs undergoing operational testing.  From this 
research several conclusions could be made regarding the sources of OT failures. These findings 
and conclusions will be discussed in the following sections. 
b. Operational Suitability 
First, while several programs were shown to have failed OT due to a lack of operational 
effectiveness (failure to meet performance requirements, functionality, etc.), multiple sources 
identified a lack of operational suitability as a major cause of failures that is not being adequately 
addressed by programs.  Operational suitability includes requirements such as reliability, 
availability, maintainability, and training.  These operational suitability failures are clearly 
illustrated in the “Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Developmental Test 
Evaluation” [Defense Science Board Task Force, 2008].  This paper gave a good overview of the 
historical performance of various programs during OT from all three services from 2001 to 2006.  






Figure 11. DoD IOT&E Results FY 2001-2003 
This figure, from Defense Science Board Task Force, 2008, shows the Initial Operational Test & Evaluation results 





Figure 12. DoD IOT&E Results FY 2004-2005 
This figure, from Defense Science Board Task Force, 2008, shows the Initial Operational Test & Evaluation results 




Figure 13. DoD IOT&E Results FY 2006-2008 
This figure, from Defense Science Board Task Force, 2008, shows the Initial Operational Test & Evaluation results 
from FY2006 to FY2008. 
 
It can be seen that the majority of the failures in OT between 2001 and 2006 were due to 
a lack of operational suitability.  These were mostly identified as reliability shortfalls, 
maintainability issues, or interoperability problems.  The lack of operational suitability was also 
identified as a major contributor to OT failures by Dr. Charles McQueary, the Director for 
Operational Test and Evaluation, in a 2007 interview: 
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Test results since 2001 show that almost 50 percent of DoD's programs in 
oversight are unsuitable at the time of initial operational test and evaluation--IOT 
& E--because they do not achieve reliability goals [McQueary, 2008: 4]. 
 
The research suggested several underlying causes for the operational suitability failures.  
The first is the inadequate early investment of programs into a robust operational suitability 
program.  This could result in OT failures due to inadequate, unrealistic, or even omitted 
operational suitability tests or simulations performed early in the program that could potentially 
identify shortcomings prior to comprehensive operational testing [Defense Science Board Task 
Force, 2008; McQueary, 2008].  In particular, without a robust operational suitability program, 
modeling and simulation techniques often used in lieu of early testing may not adequately 
measure operational suitability requirements.  Operational suitability can be a particularly 
difficult area to model and simulate, and physical testing can prove to have unforeseen effects on 
systems not shown during simulations.   
Secondly, some research suggested that deficiencies in training methods for both the 
operational use and the maintenance of the systems may be masked during early developmental 
testing.  Contractors are often present during early testing and are readily available to fix any 
problems that come up in early tests due to inadequate user training.  During OT, contractors are 
usually not available to solve problems, and training deficiencies become much more apparent 
[Schrobo, 2010]. 
Finally, many systems are entering OT with operational suitability deficiencies that point 
to inadequacies in the Systems Engineering Technical Review (SETR) process.  All programs 
must demonstrate they meet certain stated operational suitability requirements in order proceed 
through the project phases, yet in some cases the SETR process is either not identifying 
deficiencies in the system or is allowing the system to proceed to OT regardless [Defense 
Science Board Task Force, 2008].   
c. Interoperability and Integration 
Interoperability and integration was another major source of OT failures identified in the 
research [GAO, 2008; DeLaurentis, 2009].  Several potential sources of failure were identified, 
many of which are similar to the issues operational suitability suffered.   
First, it was recognized that incorrect or inadequate requirements may be identified 
during the program’s requirements process.  This may be due to the difficulty of working with 
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large System of Systems (SoS) that have many different Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs) 
amongst its components, especially if a legacy system is incorporated.  TRLs are not adequate as 
a metric to measure system integration, and may mislead the program in assuming that any 
interoperability challenges are minor and easily handled [Sauser et al, 2009].  Incorrect or 
inadequate requirements may also be due to the lack of control the SoS engineer may have over 
the component systems; while incorrect or incomplete information about the component systems 
may be used to formulate unrealistic interoperability requirements [DeLaurentis, 2009].   
Second, it is recognized that there are several root causes identified that were associated 
with interoperability, in particular with regards to early testing and/or simulation.  Similar to 
what can occur with operational suitability, early interoperability testing and simulation could be 
either inadequate or unrealistic, or not being performed at all. Unfortunately in large SoSs, early 
demonstrations of interoperability are usually limited to simulations, which are inadequate and/or 
unrealistic for interoperability tests.  This makes early program testing unfeasible.  In these 
cases, unless the early simulations were accurate in modeling the SoS, deficiencies in 
interoperability will likely not be discovered until comprehensive operational testing. 
Finally, the fact that many systems are entering OT with interoperability deficiencies, 
points to inadequacies in the Systems Engineering Technical Review (SETR) process.  
Assuming the interoperability requirements for the program are correct and realistic, the SETR 
process is either not identifying deficiencies in the system or is allowing the system to proceed to 
OT regardless. 
d. Testing Methodologies 
While reviewing general testing methodologies frequently identified within the 
researched literature, an issue was discovered on how to properly implement early “operationally 
realistic” testing.  Performing early testing in areas such as effectiveness, interoperability and 
suitability is cited many times as a method of alleviating failures in OT; however, it has been 
stressed that such early testing must be as “operationally realistic” as possible in order to 
properly identify deficiencies in the system. As discussed earlier, inadequate or unrealistic tests 
or simulations performed early in the program will not prevent failures from occurring during 
OT. Unfortunately, it is often the case that inadequacies in the early testing are not discovered 
until such OT failures occur. 
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One methodology that needs to be stressed is the involvement of OT personnel early in 
the program [McQueary, 2008].  Early involvement of OT personnel can identify requirements 
that are unrealistic or impossible to test for.  By engaging test personnel early and often, a 
program can ensure that the early testing and simulations they perform are as adequate and 
realistic as possible, and catch any system deficiencies before they enter OT. 
e. Program Research 
To accomplish the second objective in this task, the authors identified actual programs 
that had recently experienced problems during operational test and obtained operational test 
documentation from them to review.  Several of the authors had contacts with applicable 
programs; others were provided by the project sponsor, ASN (RDA) CHSENG.  The 
documentation received from all sources was reviewed and evaluated.  Note that much of the 
program documentation that was received was classified; therefore, no specific (technical) causes 
of OT failures will be discussed in this report.  Appendix B lists references for all 
COMOPTEVFOR reports used during this research. 
Information was provided for a total of 6 separate programs.  All of the programs 
reviewed encountered major problems during OT; the general causes of their failures are 
summarized in Table 3. 
Table 3. Summary of Reviewed Programs 
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The review of the OT reports and other provided documentation identified similar trends 
and issues found during the literature research.  Interoperability and reliability were cited as the 
most frequent deficiencies, with training deficiencies not far behind. The IFF, SSDS and CEC 
programs both cited major problems in interoperability during OT [COMOPTEVFOR (MK 
XIIA), 2009; COMOPTEVFOR (SSDS), 2008; COMOPTEVFOR (CEC), 2001], while the IFF, 
RMS, and CEC programs found major deficiencies in reliability, both with regards to hardware 
and software [COMOPTEVFOR (MK XIIA), 2009; COMOPTEVFOR (RMS), 2007; 
COMOPTEVFOR (CEC), 2001] .  
The program and test community documentation research matched the results of the open 
literature research very well.  While some programs did fail OT due to performance or 
functionality deficiencies, the majority of programs reviewed had greater problems with 
interoperability and operational suitability (reliability and training in particular).   
f. Summary of Open Literature and Program Documentation Research 
Based on the results of the open literature and program documentation research, several 
general conclusions could be made regarding the causes of OT failures.  First, while many 
programs fail OT due to operational effectiveness deficiencies, the bulk of the systems cited in 
the literature and the specific programs that were reviewed have seen failures in OT due to a lack 
of operational suitability or interoperability.  These are mission critical areas of concern; 
however, when compared to standard performance goals these areas can be nebulous, difficult to 
test or simulate in a realistic way, and may be prone to being disregarded due to programmatic 
pressures. 
Secondly, for all areas (effectiveness, suitability, and interoperability), the inclusion of 
OT personnel early in the process is important to ensure adequate, realistic testing or simulation 
is performed prior to OT to discover any deficiencies.  Any simulations that are performed in 
lieu of early testing must also be validated to ensure deficiencies are being properly identified.  
And finally, there may be issues with the SETR process.  In some cases, deficiencies found 
during early testing or simulations have not been identified in the SETR process.  Or if they 
have, programs somehow are proceeding to OT regardless. 
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C. PROJECT RESCOPE 
1. Bounded Problem Statement  
After considering the advice provided by the panel to the authors at the first IPR, it was 
decided to reduce the scope of the project by only considering OT failures that occurred in a 
single mission critical area.  The open literature and program/test documentation research 
performed in the Process Review and Problem Identification Phase identified two major mission 
critical areas where OT failures were likely to occur: operational suitability and interoperability.  
Enough literature and example programs had been identified to support a focus in either area; 
however it was noted that improving the operational suitability of systems had already been the 
focus of several government studies to date that had provided their own conclusions and 
recommendations.  In an effort to avoid repeating previous works, OT failures due to a lack of 
interoperability were chosen to be the focus for the remainder of the project. 
The definition of “interoperability” was very important to gain this focus on the project.  
It was determined by the authors that a comprehensive definition of interoperability would need 
to be agreed upon for use during the remainder of the efforts.  Research into the available 
literature revealed a wide variety of interoperability definitions [Carney, 2005; Morris, 2004; 
Brownsword, 2004; Ford, 2010].  Furthermore, it was discovered that the definition of 
interoperability often overlapped definitions of the related concept of “integration,” creating 
confusion between the meanings of the two terms.  Clarification of the terms was also requested 
from the project sponsor. The sponsor suggested the definitions of: “Interoperability is putting 
two or more systems together in any way, seamless or not and that connection allows 
performance of a new requirement for the systems or an enhanced requirement in one of the 
existing systems.  Integration
Taking into consideration the researched definitions [Carney, 2005; Morris, 2004; 
Brownsword, 2004; Ford, 2010], the recommendation from the sponsor [McKinlay, 2010] and 
the definition called out in the Department of Defense Joint Publication [DoD JP 1-02, 2008]; it 
was determined that the definition in the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and 
Associated Terms [DoD JP 1-02, 2008] would be the best definitions to use for this project.  The 
authors wanted to comply with the standard military definitions such that this meaning would be 
 is simply putting two or more components together in a seamless 
way so the system operation meets required performance” [McKinlay, 2010].  
 41 
common across military applications and understandable to engineers and analysts working on 
military systems.  These definitions are sufficient for the purpose of this project because they 
provide for a common understanding for the elements that make up a System-of-System.  The 
definitions provided in JP 1-02 and used in this project are:  
The condition achieved among communications-electronics systems or items of 
communications-electronics equipment when information or services can be exchanged directly 
and satisfactorily between them and/or their users.  
Interoperability 
The arrangement of military forces and their actions to create a force that operates by 
engaging as a whole. 
Integration 
The expected deliverables of this project remained the same: recommended changes to 
the Systems Engineering (SE) processes in the Defense Acquisition System in order to increase 
the percentage of programs that successfully pass OT&E and therefore decrease the cost and 
schedule delays associated with programs failing OT&E.  However, with the decreased scope to 
focus on only one mission critical area, the recommended changes would now only focus on 
improving interoperability performance during OT&E. 
2. Requirements of the Bounded Problem  
Once the scope of the project had been narrowed, it was necessary to revisit the initial 
requirements to review their applicability and add additional requirements that were discovered 
during the first phase of the project.  The following requirements were indentified early in the 
Review and Problem Identification Phase and were described in detail in Section A above: 
A. Develop a Method to Track Mission Critical Requirements 
B. Explore a Mission Thread with Respect to Mission Critical Requirements 
C. Develop a Conceptual Approach to Improving OT Results 
D. Improve OT Success Rate  
E. Reduce Rework Costs 
These requirements still apply after reducing the scope of the project to focus on the 
interoperability mission critical area.  Requirements C, D and E could remain as written, 
however the first two requirements were refined as: 
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A. Develop a Method to Track Interoperability Requirements 
B. Explore a Mission Thread with Respect to Interoperability Requirements 
Additionally, a number of deficiencies were identified by the authors as described in the 
research section and these deficiencies must be taken into consideration in the design of any 
solution.  These requirements were added to form an expanded requirements list of the bounded 
problem: 
A. Develop a Method to Track Interoperability Requirements 
B. Explore a Mission Thread with Respect to Interoperability Requirements 
C. Develop a Conceptual Approach to Improving OT Results 
D. Improve OT Success Rate  
E. Reduce Rework Costs 
F. Improve Visibility of System Performance Throughout the Process and Earlier 
Detection of Problems 
G. Improve Alignment of Developmental Testing to Operational Testing 
H. Improve Alignment of OT&E Critical Operational Issues and System Design 
Requirements 
I. Minimize Time and Cost Required to Implement the New Process 
3. Value System Design  
The value of a new process for the various stakeholders is a function of the ability of the 
new process to minimize cost, improve schedule, and improve the performance of the system in 
addition to meeting all required regulations.  Additionally, the ease and speed of implementing 
the changes will increase the customer value by allowing the benefits of the new process to be 
achieved earlier.  There are several components of each of these five primary factors as shown in 




Figure 14. Value System 
This figure shows the hierarchy of values for this process based upon a study of the stakeholder needs. 
 
Each stakeholder would assign different preference weightings on the relative importance 
of each of these factors based upon their point of view and underlying role in the process.  For 
example, the war-fighter would likely put maximum importance upon the performance of the 
system and would also place significant importance upon schedule performance since delays in 
system delivery will deny the war-fighter the benefits of the new system.  Alternatively, the 
program office is primarily focused upon meeting the schedule and cost requirements in addition 
to meeting all regulatory guidance.  That is not to say that the program office places no 
importance on system performance; however, they must balance the needs of the war fighter 
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III. ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES 
Following the completion of the first phase of the project and the subsequent re-scope to 
focus on OT failures due to interoperability, the down selection or Analysis of Alternatives 
(AoA) phase was begun.  The term AoA is used throughout the remainder of this report and is 
synonymous with the term down selection. Several tasks were completed during this phase.  
Alternative solutions were developed by utilizing a multi-step brainstorming process.  
Alternative solutions were compared and the one with the greatest potential to be successfully 
developed and integrated into the existing SE process was selected for further development in the 
Analysis of Alternatives Phase.  The results of these tasks are discussed in more detail in the 
paragraphs below. Last, a representative system that had recently encountered problems during 
OT was selected for use during the remainder of the project as a baseline system.   
A. CREATING DESIGN ALTERNATIVES 
1.  Generation of Alternative Solutions 
In order to begin the Analysis of Alternatives phase of the project, the authors conducted 
brainstorming sessions.  The focus was to come up with ideas that could affect the Systems 
Engineering process, resulting in successful demonstration of interoperability requirements 
during operational testing.   
Each brainstorming session generated and discussed various ideas for solutions, ensuring 
that each member understood the concepts.  Sources of ideas included the research conducted 
during the first phase and also real-world experiences of the authors.  The ideas were refined 
throughout various discussions and documented.  While some ideas are not as conventional, 
practicable or feasible as others; all ideas were accepted during this process to promote creativity 
and ensure as many possible solutions were considered as possible.  Each idea was assessed by 
the group to ensure it had the potential to fully meet the requirements outlined in the previous 
chapters.  As the ideas developed more fully, this assessment continued throughout the down 
selection process, aiding in the decision to eliminate some of the proposed idea.   
At the completion of the brainstorming, a single list of potential solution concepts was 
created.  These ideas were then reviewed and compared.  The authors took this opportunity to 
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modify some ideas, combine similar ones and improve the description of others based on similar 
ideas provided.  The ideas varied greatly, using various approaches that affected the Systems 
Engineering process at different phases; however all ideas addressed methods to reduce 
interoperability failures in OT.  Once these potential solutions were finalized and compiled, the 
next step was for the authors to rank the relative effectiveness and potential cost of each solution. 
2. Initial Solution Comparison  
While most of the suggested processes were worth considering, it was decided that a 
much smaller number of ideas should be selected and refined for inclusion in the Analysis of 
Alternatives.  To accomplish this, the initial solutions were subsequently reviewed, categorized, 
and consolidated based on two criteria factors: cost and effectiveness.  Cost at this step is defined 
as the additional financial burden of implementing and sustaining a potential solution in the 
process.  No dollar values were calculated; rather, the relative cost of each solution was predicted 
as compared to the other solutions.  Similarly the relative effectiveness or positive impact on the 
OT&E pass rate was predicted for each solution as compared to the other proposed solutions.   
This initial evaluation was a qualitative measure that was used to drive the decision 
making process.  With little detail developed for each solution at this point, the originator(s) of 
each solution explained each potential solution and the group discussed the benefits for each and 
the effectiveness it would have on decreasing OT&E failures. The authors once again relied on 
personal lessons learned, previous technical experience, expert technical knowledge, and 
information gathered as a part of the research phase to make these qualitative selections.  No 
actual costs or effectiveness measures were generated at this point, but rather the 63 ideas were 
compared amongst each other, searching for a reasonable “bang for the buck.”  It was 
determined that at such a high level as this initial comparison, cost and the effectiveness of 
reducing OT failures would be the most important factors for the stakeholders.  Figure 15 shows 
these relative comparisons plotted on two axes: Effectiveness vs. Cost.  Of the 63 original ideas, 
some were determined to be duplicative and were combined with the redundant counterparts 
while others were determined to be unachievable or unrealistic.  However their usefulness for 
sparking creativity and generating new lanes of thought and ideas during the brainstorming 
process made them relevant up until this point.  This resulted in 41 ideas being considered to be 
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relevant and were graphed.  A full listing of the ideas that were generated during the 
brainstorming sessions can be found in Appendix C.  
 
  
Figure 15. Scatter Plot of Solutions, Effectiveness Vs Cost 
Each of the ideas was graphed based upon the expected effectiveness of each change and the projected total 
lifecycle cost impact.  
 
3. Down Selection of Refined Solutions   
Once the original list of 63 ideas had been consolidated to 41 distinct options and these 
options graphed for relative effectiveness and cost, the authors then selected a subset of concepts 
that had a high probability of success and effectiveness while managing total ownership cost.  
Location on the graph was not the exclusive selection criteria; rather, it was a means of screening 
out options that clearly did not have a high rate of return relative to the expected implementation 
cost.  After reviewing the 41 options individually, each author had an opportunity to provide 
input into the first down selection; either from the list or new options conceived during the 
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review process.  There were a total of eight proposals put forth by various authors for further 
consideration; these are listed in Table 4.  
 
Table 4. Solutions for Improving Interoperability 
This table summarizes the down-selected solutions that were determined by the authors to have a high probability of 
success and manageable total ownership cost.  
 
Solution # Description 
1. Incorporate backwards compatibility in standards for OT 
2. DT exit criteria to include OT pass criteria 
9. & 10. Standardization of DT simulation and modeling 
13. Use of mission threads for interoperability tests 
15. Create a new color of money for testing 
16. Consider Interoperability at all milestone reviews 
21. Develop Interoperability Readiness Levels (IORL) 
57. Reevaluate the passing criteria for interoperability 
 
As shown in Table 4, potential solutions #9 and #10 were combined as one process.  
Most of the processes selected have a relatively high expected effectiveness rating while the cost 
ratings range from low to high meaning that the anticipated cost to implement these proposed 
improvements varies significantly.  
After reviewing the suggested solutions, the authors then discussed each of these options 
to determine if there was sufficient interest in pursuing each solution and to further reduce to a 
manageable number of solutions (five or less). To achieve this, a democratic process of 
elimination was used.  Each of the authors chose three proposals they would like to see 
considered in the AoA based on engineering judgment.  It was quickly evident that five of the 
eight proposals had interest from at least 40% to 90% of the group, while the remaining three 
were only selected by one or two of the authors.  These three with only limited support were 
eliminated, and no further reduction was required.   Table 5 summarizes the final five processes 
that were selected for AoA. 
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Table 5. Final Alternative Solutions   
This table summarizes the final alternative solutions that were selected for the Analysis of Alternatives.  
 
Solution # Solution Description Effectiveness Cost 
2 DT exit criteria to include OT pass criteria Very Effective High 
9 & 10 Standardization of DT simulation and modeling Very Effective Medium 
13 Test to Mission Thread at interoperability OT Effective Medium 
16 Consider interoperability @ all milestone 
reviews 
Effective Low 
21 Develop Interoperability Readiness Levels Very Effective Low 
 
4. Refinement of the Alternatives  
At this point the final down selection could be made in the AOA.  While the full 
development would only be completed on the final alternative selected, all of the authors did not 
fully understand each other’s ideas at this point to make a final decision.  Therefore each of the 
five alternatives was further defined, by the originating author.  This was each author’s 
opportunity to advocate their option as the best alternative to the body of authors.  The following 
five alternative descriptions were used as frame of reference to choosing the one alternative that 
would be developed;  they were not intended to be fully developed solutions and are provided 
here solely to illustrate another step in the progression toward the final solution.   
a. DT Exit Criteria to Include OT Pass Criteria 
The first alternative was focused on preventing programs from entering Operational Test 
and Evaluation (OTE&E) despite known problem areas in the Critical Operational Issues (COI).  
This option utilizes the TEMP to define COIs to which the system is tested to and evaluated 
against.  During the early stages of development the TEMP has not been fully developed, thus 
the effectiveness of this approach is limited during early phases of a program.  However as the 
TEMP is refined it is possible to align the DT exit criteria to the OT pass requirements by 
including Operational Testing pass criteria during Development Testing.  OT and DT viewpoints 
are often completely different as discussed in Chapter II of this report, specifically Table 2; 
however, this does not mean they cannot work together. OT and DT usually differ in what is 
being tested, the way tests are conducted, the test measurements and the evaluation criteria. DT 
generally involves testing using a black box concept or a component as a part of the basic system 
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with little to no testing of the complete system; in contrast to OT which is always at the system 
level.  Under this concept, the final testing in DT would include testing of the complete system. 
The current process for DT only tests technical criteria under a controlled environment. 
DT should be able to measure the quality of a basic combat condition. The current process 
measures particular parameters (i.e. the number of g’s pulled as the missile acquires; missile 
launch velocity; etc...).  In addition to technical specifications, DT should test performance 
capabilities (continuing with the same missile example, the successful tracking of the target by 
radar, etc).  DT is performed by the Development Contractor and can be witnessed by 
Independent Verification and Validations (IV&V), and/or any other designated representatives.  
Exit criteria or successful completion of DT testing requires that all the test documentation has 
been approved, all test scripts have been executed and trouble reports are generated for each 
failure or anomaly, all trouble reports have been resolved all changes made as a result of trouble 
reports have been tested, and the test report has been reviewed and approved.  DT is mainly 
conducted at the development contractor’s facility and usually does not have physical interface 
with external systems.  By including OT pass criteria to DT exit criteria; it will require early 
involvement of the Operational Test Community (OPTEVFOR) to ensure the interoperability 
requirements are included in the DT&E process.   
For this solution, the development agent and OPTEVFOR will work closely to develop 
the T&E Master plan at the early program development cycle.  The Critical Operational Issues 
(COIs) that relate to operational effectiveness and operational suitability need to be defined and 
examined to determine the system’s capability to perform its mission.  The system integrator will 
implement and incorporate the COIs into the development test (DT) plan.  If there are 
interoperability issues identified during the DT, the issues need to be documented and changes to 
system detailed design may be required.  A simple functional flow block diagram of this process 











Figure 16. Basic Process Diagram for the “DT Exit Criteria to Include OT Pass Criteria” Option 
Functional Flow Block Diagram of the “Exit Criteria to Include OT Pass Criteria” Alternative. 
 
Implementing OT passing criteria into DT will increase the cost of the program in order 
to conduct the basic operational test. This would also require additional personnel, training and 
test equipment (hardware and software), as well as a considerable increase in coordination with 
other systems or organizational entities.  This increases both the DT schedule and cost, while 
potentially decreasing the amount of money and time spent at OT.  However, by preventing re-
work and re-testing and delivering a quality product when scheduled, this concept could 
potentially save money and time over the life of the program.   
Program schedules would be affected by implementing these changes in the process. 
However, these schedules could be affected even worse if the product doesn’t meet the basic 
requirements. If the process is included in the schedule from the beginning of the project, the 
overall impact would likely be minimal.  An advantage would be that the longer schedule would 
be known from the beginning and unexpected delays due to OT failure would be significantly 
less likely. 
Implementation of this change would be difficult. In order to test in a basic operational 
environment it would require coordination with other systems. Deciding who is paying what 
would make the implementation difficult. Other systems schedules would need to be taken into 
consideration. 
 Implementing this process would have a positive impact on the final product. It would 
improve the OT schedule and success. The final product would be more reliable and less likely 
















to encounter delays as a result of failing OT. This would lead to cost savings and product 
satisfaction.  
b.  Standardization of DT Modeling and Simulation 
The standardization of Developmental Testing (DT) and Modeling and Simulation 
(M&S) is a second possible solution to this problem. M&S should be used during DT as a 
method for predicting system performance, identifying technology and performance risk areas, 
and the ability to support determining system effectiveness and suitability.  Currently, with DoD 
programs failing to detect critical interoperability failures prior to operational level testing after 
successfully completing DT, there is a need for standardization of DT and M&S procedures and 
pass criteria.  The use of quality M&S within the DT process could greatly enhance the 
achievement of effective and efficient test and evaluation of the system all the way through to 
OT&E.  M&S is currently used within programs to demonstrate system integration risks, 
supplement live testing with M&S stressing the system, assist in planning the scope of live tests 
and data analysis, and prediction of system performance and possible risk areas. None of the 
current M&S strategies are standardized and most model and simulations are tailored for their 
specific system, but the following list from the Defense Acquisition Guidebook [DAU, 2010] 
contains some areas that could be considered for an overall standardized M&S method that leads 
to a successful DT: 
• Document the intended use of models and simulations 
• Describe the data standards and verification, validation, and accreditation standards with 
which the models and simulations and associated data must comply 
• Identify the modeling and simulation data needed to support T&E 
• Define the methodology for establishing confidence in the results of models and 
simulations 
• Provide descriptive information for each model and simulation resource: Title, acronym, 
version, date, support organization (the organization with primary responsibility for the 
model or simulation),  
• State assumptions, capabilities, limitations, risks, and impacts for the models and 
simulation 
• Project the schedule and availability of M&S for T&E support 
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M&S capability encompasses many software tools, middleware, networks, security 
features and encryption capabilities that will have to be standardized to some degree. Without 
standardization, the credibility of M&S becomes an issue. If M&S cannot provide trustworthy 
insights into the system then the program will be ill-served and the M&S investment will be 
wasted. 
Costs and the development schedule are two other areas of consideration that need to be 
examined when looking into DT and M&S standardization. The associated schedule and costs 
with implementing a comprehensive set of standards for M&S within the DT cycle could prove 
to be extensive. Estimates could be determined from previous standards and process 
implementations as well as the projected time taken to complete those processes. Putting 
standards in place for M&S and DT can have lasting effects for system integration and system 
interoperability. The potential for cost saving during the test cycle can best be captured 
qualitatively. M&S standardization will trim down DT cost and schedule by introducing 
complete and proven models and simulations, however it is likely that not all aspects of the 
standard will be applicable to every system and therefore some unnecessary costs will be 
incurred.  If standardized M&S methods are used across all programs this could lead to cost and 
schedule savings, however time and funding will be required to develop and validate the 
standards prior to implementation.   
To improve the systems engineering process, M&S enables better planning of live test 
events, representing system attributes that cannot be examined realistically in live testing.  
However, without standardizing the M&S process, the system may suffer increase of cost, 
inadequate discipline in planning or applying M&S, incoherent plan and no information sharing 
among community.   
To achieve a successful DT which eventually leads to a successful OT, the M&S process 
should be standardized in the following areas: 
• Document the intended used of models and simulation 
• Standardized Verification, Validation, and Accreditation (VV&A) process to ensure 
development of correct and valid simulation 
• Identify the M&S data needed to support DT 
•  Define the methodology for establishing confidence in the results of models and 
simulations 
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• Provide descriptive information for each model and simulation resource 
• State assumptions, capabilities, limitations, risks, and impacts for the models and 
simulation 
• Project the schedule and availability for DT support 




Figure 17. Basic Process Diagram for the “Standardization of DT Modeling and Simulation” 
Option 
Functional Flow Block Diagram of the “Standardization of DT Modeling and Simulation” Alternative. 
 
Implementation of standard M&S methods and processes during DT will be a moderately 
difficult task to accomplish. New and existing methods will need to be blended to ensure 
flexibility and completeness are captured in the M&S process to make certain all programs will 
have confidence in the new standardized approach. New and current M&S documentation should 
be modified and streamlined for concise understanding of how M&S will integrate with the DT 
cycle.  Further, there is always risk involved with developing standards.  As standards are 
rewritten they are hardly ever loosened, but rather tend to become more and more stringent with 
Document the 
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time.  This could eventually lead to time and money wasted testing to standards that have 
become unrealistic (outside the mission thread requirement) or archaic (outdated and irrelevant).   
c. Test to Mission Thread 
The term mission critical thread is being used more and more often throughout the DOD.  
The Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 6212.01E states:  “The joint critical threads are 
determined by the sponsor’s analysis of the system’s required operational capabilities and other 
Key Performance Parameters.”  The CJCSI 6212.01E goes on to give a formal definition of a 
Joint Mission Critical Thread as “an operational and technical description of the end to end set of 
activities and systems that accomplish the execution of a joint mission” [CJCSI 6212.01E, 2008].  
For the purposes of developing this option the authors have chosen to use this CJCSI 6212.01E 
definition of a mission critical thread.   
Mission threads should be developed early in the acquisition process.  Mission threads 
could be taken from a previously developed list or developed specifically for the system under 
development; either way the mission threads must reflect the operational requirements of the 
system.  These mission threads must be designed specifically to quantify a system’s response to a 
series of scenarios.  These threads can then be applied as a guide for building the system 
architecture, where it can help identify the architectural risk early in the process.  When applied 
to the SoS, mission threads can be used as inputs for building the SoS architecture, and can also 
serve as a tool for system in-progress design review and system architecture evaluation. The 
mission threads will need to be applied to the interoperability tests performed during system 
development.  As acquisition progresses, mission threads will be applied to testing, gradually 
increasing the number of systems involved.  While it may push the schedule to the right, it will 
greatly reduce the risk of severe delay due to integration issues. 
  As the system matures and begins to interact with other systems the mission thread 
should be reevaluated to encompass the mission threads of these respective systems.  In this 
manner the system and its mission thread evolve to encompass a larger and larger view with the 






Figure 18. Basic Process Diagram for the “Test to Mission Thread” Option 
Functional Flow Block Diagram of the “Test to Mission Thread” Alternative. 
 
The biggest challenge facing the implementation of mission threads is the fact that each 
system is normally operated and managed independently.  Each system has its own program 
office responsible for its own system development.  However, each system may interact with 
different joint programs, resulting in a complex combination of systems.  The combination of the 
multiple mission threads must be tested during OT in order to have interoperability for the entire 
SoS evaluated.  The mission threads test will be required at a system level and would need to be 
started as early as the architecture design phase.  Then as the integrated system matures, the 
combined mission threads will be verified through simulations or tabletop exercises at each 
milestone.  Failures will need to be corrected before moving onto the next stage of the process.  
An example of a mission thread for a combat system might be to engage (acquire, track, and 
destroy) 10 incoming threats, each of these threats would be defined in detail as part of the 
mission thread.  This high level approach is much different from a technical requirement such as 
display 200 simultaneous air targets or process data at a rate of 60Mb/sec.  Completing the 
mission critical thread is based on mission completion, not on meeting a system specification.   
The cost and schedule of the program may increase when mission thread testing is 
involved in the early phase of the process. However, it avoids the risk of an even greater impact 
to cost and schedule later in the program.  The problems that were not detected until systems 
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d.  Consider Interoperability at Milestone Reviews 
It is understandable that most systems are used as part of a larger system.  It is important 
that each system can be fully integrated into a system of systems (SOS).  A successful 
integration of systems involves the performance of all systems working together to achieve the 
desired tasks.  The integration requires that each system inter-operate with one another to meet 
the designed capability of the system of systems.  The interoperability of systems must be 
considered early and applied continuously across the system of systems life cycle.   
Considering interoperability at each milestone review is one such way to ensure that all 
systems work together to achieve the desired tasks.  It allows system engineers to periodically 
evaluate the interoperability of the system.  This evaluation is carried out as part of the milestone 
reviews.  The generalized process will need to be tailored for each program and each review.  
For instance, during Milestone A much of the consideration will be based on the conceptual 
design of the system, while at Milestone C interoperability will be assessed based on the results 
of testing.  The general process for evaluating interoperability consists of:  
• assess the system 
• evaluate interoperability results 
• take appropriate action 
• proceed to the next milestone 
During the milestone review, a panel of experts will assess the system to determine 
systems, components, and sub components to evaluate for interoperability.  They will then assess 
the interoperability of these components and identify any that have a low interoperability.  The 
program manager will then be responsible for addressing any identified interoperability issues, 




Figure 19. Basic Process Diagram for the “Consider Interoperability at Milestone Reviews” 
Option 
Functional Flow Block Diagram of the “Consider Interoperability at Milestone Reviews” alternative. 
 
By considering interoperability at each milestone review, one can gain a sense of the 
level of interoperability of the system.  This will allow the program manager to act accordingly.  
Allowing for the detection of low levels of interoperability at each of the milestones enables 
systems to avoid the high costs of failing OT.  Thus considering interoperability at each 
milestone review has the potential to have significant cost savings. 
It would be relatively easy to implement a process to consider interoperability at each 
milestone review given the fact that subject matter experts are on hand during the milestone 
reviews.  As such this approach would be cost effective to implement and moderately effective at 
preventing OT failures.  
e. Define and Apply Interoperability Readiness Levels (I/ORLs) 
The last potential solution would be to develop and implement a system of 
Interoperability Readiness Levels (I/ORLs) to quantify the maturity of the system interfaces.  
Implementing I/ORLs is a way to use metrics to assess the maturity of a system's interoperability 
before proceeding to Operational Testing (OT).  Using metrics allows for a quantitative 
judgment of a system's readiness for OT, removing some of the subjectivity of humans.  This 
allows for more consistency in determining when a system is ready for OT. 
Assessing a system with differing pieces of integrated technology based on I/ORLs 
reflects an evaluation of integration and readiness; it gauges the maturity of the interfaces or 
interoperability of systems.  I/ORLs can be applied to connections between legacy systems, 
legacy and new systems, or between integration of new systems.  Each interface will have a 








unique I/ORL value, thus it is possible for a system to be assigned multiple I/ORLs.  Further, 
assessing a system based on I/ORLs can be performed on technology insertion or on new system 
development. 
To gain a frame of reference for the creation of interoperability readiness levels (I/ORLs), 
the authors started with open literature research.  This research yielded several articles on the 
subject of integration
Table 6. An Example of Integration Readiness Levels (IRLs) 
 readiness levels (IRLs).  The reference frame provided in A Systems 
Approach to Expanding the Technology Readiness Level within Defense Acquisition [Sauser, et 
al, 2009] provides a conceptual basis from which the authors could develop IRLs.  The 
integration readiness levels summarized in Table 6 illustrate the basic concept of an Integration 
Readiness Level system which is similar to an Interoperability Readiness Level system.  If this 
option is selected a more appropriate set of I/ORLs would be developed by the authors after the 
AOA is complete.   In practice a team would assess the system based on a criteria of agreed upon 
levels, if the system scored at a level below the agreed upon level, the system would not proceed 
to OT but rather continue further development. 
This table summarizes the Integration Readiness Levels that were identified by Sauser, 2009.  
 
IRL Definition Description 
9 
Integration is Mission Proven 
through successful mission 
operations. 
IRL 9 represents the integrated technologies 
being used in the system environment 
successfully. In order for a technology to move to 
the TRL 9, it must first be integrated into the 
system and then proven in the relevant 
environment; thus, progressing IRL to 9 also 
implies maturing the component technology to 
the TRL 9. 
8 
Actual integration completed 
and Mission Qualified through 
test and demonstration in the 
system environment. 
IRL 8 represents not only the integration-meeting 
requirements, but also a system-level 
demonstration in the relevant environment. This 
will reveal any unknown bugs/defects that could 
not be discovered until the interaction of the two 
integrating technologies was observed in the 
system environment. 
7 
The integration of technologies 
has been Verified and 
Validated with sufficient detail 
to be actionable. 
IRL 7 represents a significant step beyond IRL 6; 
the integration has to work from a technical 
perspective, but also from a requirements 
perspective. IRL 7 represents the integration 
meeting requirements such as performance, 
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IRL Definition Description 
throughput, and reliability. 
6 
The integrating technologies can 
Accept, Translate, and 
Structure Information for its 
intended application. 
IRL 6 is the highest technical level to be 
achieved; it includes the ability to not only 
control integration, but to specify what 
information to  exchange, to label units of 
measure to specify what the information is, and 
the ability to translate from a foreign data 
structure to a local one. 
5 
There is sufficient Control 
between technologies necessary 
to establish, manage, and 
terminate the integration. 
IRL 5 simply denotes the ability of one or more 
of the integrating technologies to control the 
integration itself; this includes establishing, 
maintaining, and terminating. 
4 
There is sufficient detail in the 
Quality and Assurance of the 
integration between 
technologies. 
IRL 4 Many technology-integration failures never 
progress past IRL 3, due to the assumption that if 
two technologies can exchange information 
successfully, then they are fully integrated. IRL 4 
goes beyond simple data exchange and requires 
that the data sent is the data received and there 
exists a mechanism for checking it. 
3 
There is Compatibility (i.e., 
common language) between 
technologies to orderly and 
efficiently integrate and interact. 
IRL 3 represents the minimum required level to 
provide successful integration. This means that 
the two technologies are able to not only 
influence each other, but also to communicate 
interpretable data. IRL 3 represents the first 
tangible step in the maturity process. 
2 
There is some level of 
specificity to characterize the 
Interaction (i.e., ability to 
influence) between technologies 
through their interface. 
IRL 2 Once a medium has been defined, a 
“signaling” method must be selected such that 
two integrating technologies are able to influence 
each other over that medium. Since IRL 2 
represents the ability of two technologies to 
influence each other over a given medium, this 
represents integration proof-of-concept. 
1 
An Interface between 
technologies has been identified 
with sufficient detail to allow 
characterization of the 
relationship. 
IRL 1 This is the lowest level of integration 
readiness and describes the selection of a medium 
for integration. 
 
To conduct the recommended assessment, one must select a review at which the 
assessment will take place.  This review may be conducted a single time; however it is 
recommend that multiple reviews be conducted.  Regardless of the number of reviews selected 
the process will be the same each time.  First a review is selected in which the necessary subject 
matter experts are available.  The system is then assessed to determine its I/ORL value in a 
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manner similar to that presented in Table 6.  These I/ORL ratings are then evaluated to determine 
if the system is progressing at an acceptable rate with respect to interoperability.  Based on the 
results of this evaluation appropriate action may be taken to improve interoperability 
functionality.  If multiple reviews are conducted, relative progress may be tracked.  To gain a 
visual understanding of these high level functions, a top level functional flow block diagram has 
been provided in Figure 20.  The detailed definitions of an I/ORL will be provided in Chapter IV 




Figure 20. Process Diagram for “Define and Apply I/ORLs” Option 
Functional Flow Block Diagram of the “Interoperability Readiness Levels” alternative. 
 
Implementing I/ORLs on a system is an assessment of the system.  It does not require 
development or testing.  As such, the cost to implement this assessment is small.  The impact to 
cost is based on the time it takes to evaluate the system against a set of I/ORLs and the 
administrative cost to document this evaluation.  During the course of an acquisition cycle 
stakeholders and subject matter experts (SMEs) meet on a regular basis for development and 
other assessments.  Assessing a system for interoperability can be performed during any or 
several of these existing meetings rendering the cost minimal.  Implementing I/ORLs can 
potentially save a significant amount of money.  By preventing a system with immature 
interfaces from proceeding to OT and failing, money spent on unnecessarily testing an immature 




























Implementing I/ORLs, can impact schedule but the impact can be minimal.  As noted, the 
I/ORL assessment can be implemented during one of the many existing pre-Milestone C 
meetings.  The expected impact on the schedule would be one or two days per meeting.  If these 
few days save the time it takes for the system to go through OT testing and fail, the result could 
be a savings in schedule. 
Implementing this change, functionally, is not difficult.  Systems are routinely assessed 
during development.  I/ORLs can be one additional standard by which to measure a system.  The 
I/ORL assessment can be performed during one or many of pre-Milestone C events.  It can be 
performed once or several times to see a progression of interoperability maturity.  One event in 
particular in which an I/ORL assessment can be performed is during a Post-Critical Design 
Review Assessment which ends Integrated System Design during Milestone B. 
Implementing I/ORLs can improve OT success.  Assessing a system based on I/ORLs 
can prevent the system which is not sufficiently interoperable from proceeding to OT, saving the 
system from failing.  This assessment can inform on specific areas of development needing 
further development.  In the end this would make a system having undergone an I/ORL 
assessment more stable and dependable. 
B. PUGH MATRIX  
The method selected for down selecting from these five alternatives to a single proposed 
solution was a Pugh Matrix.  Evaluation criteria were developed based on the process 
requirements developed in the previous phase, the authors evaluated each alternative against 
these criteria and the results of the individual Pugh Matrix responses were tabulated.  The results 
of the Pugh Matrix were discussed and validated by the authors and were used as the major tool 
for the group selection of the final alternative to the current SE process that would be developed 
in detail during the third phase of the project 
1. Pugh Matrix Comparison Criteria 
 Concurrent with the refinement of the five alternatives discussed previously, the authors 
developed the evaluation criteria for assessing and ranking these five alternatives.   The simple 
cost versus effectiveness comparison was determined to be insufficient.  Nine criteria were 
developed in all based upon the requirements and value system that were developed in the 
previous phase and documented in Chapter II of this report.  Effectiveness was divided into the 
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increase in the percent of OT passed as well as how early in the program an issue was likely to 
be detected with the given alternative.  Additionally, cost was analyzed more closely and 
encompassed not just financial cost but also schedule cost and risk.  These costs were also 
addressed both as upfront cost for implementing the new system and the reoccurring costs that 
would negatively or positively impact each program. 
 The nine criteria: 
• Change in OT % Pass:  This rates each alternative’s increased or decreased chance of 
passing OT over implementing Alternative 1.   
• Change in the program phase in which problem detection occurs:  This rates when each 
alternative allows the detection of issues prior to OT.  How much sooner are those 
problems predicted and mitigated or avoided compared to Alternative 1?   
• Upfront cost of implementing the new process (upfront $):  This is a comparison of the 
estimated costs to develop the new SE process compared to Alternative 1.  Exact cost is 
not required, this is a relative comparison.  Is the alternative to be more or less expensive 
to implement that Alternative 1? This is the one-time financial costs for starting the new 
process.   
• Per program (reoccurring) costs for the new process (per program $):  This is a 
comparison of the estimated costs of using the new SE process compared to Alternative1.  
Exact costs are not required, this is a relative comparison.  Is the alternative likely to be 
more or less expensive for each project to use then Alternative 1?  This is the recurring 
costs of the new process that will affect each program.   
• Approval Level (getting the new process approved for DOD use) (upfront risk and time):  
This is the comparison of each alternative with Alternative 1’s time and risk of getting 
approval for the new process. For example, one alternative might be at the USD (AT&L) 
while another may only be at the NSWC CO level.  (Approval of the new process is only 
needed once, not for each program.) 
• Coordination required between agencies to implement the new process (upfront time):  
This is a comparison of the one-time “time” expense required for developing the new 
processes (Alternative compared to Alternative 1.) 
• Time to develop, train, and implement the new process (upfront time and money):  This 
is a comparison of the one-time “time” and financial cost of developing training and 
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transition to the new process across program offices (complexity of change required for 
the alternative compared to Alternative 1.)   
•  Impact to individual program schedules (per program, time):   Comparison of how the 
alternative affects each program schedule compared to the effects of Alternative1. 
• Change in documentation for each program (per program time and $):  Comparison of the 
increase or decrease in time and financial cost of documentation of the alternative 
compared to Alternative 1. 
2. Pugh Matrix Data Acquisition 
Figure 21 is a representative sample of the Pugh Matrix completed by each member of 
the team; Table 7 is the legend used by the team members in developing their Pugh Matrices. 
The authors choose to do individual Pugh Matrices so that each group member had an equal say 
in the further development of the project.    
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Pugh Matrix Comparison Criteria
D















Develop Interoperability Readiness Levels 
(IRLs) (Alternative 4)
Develop Standards of all DT Testing and 
Sim
ulations (Alternative 5)
Change in OT % Pass 0 - - 0 -
Change in the program phase in which problem 
detection occurs 0 + - - + 0
Upfront cost of implementing the new process  
(upfront $) 0 + 0 - -
Per program (reoccuring) costs for the new 
process (per program $) 0 + + + + + + +
Approval Level (getting the new process approved 
for DOD use) (upfront risk and time) 0 + - - -
Coordination required between agencies to 
implement the new process (upfront time) 0 0 - - - -
Time to develop train and implement of the new 
process (upfront time) 0 - - - - -
Impact to individual program schedules (per 
program, time) 0 + + + + + + +
Change in documentation for each program (per 
program time and $) 0 0 0 0 0  
Figure 21. Sample Pugh Matrix from one of the fourteen group members. 
The authors evaluated each option using a Pugh Matrix and the nine criteria identified above. 
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Table 7. Pugh Matrix Legend  









Major increased burden/loss compared to Alternative 1( Include OT pass criteria in DT 
exit)(significant increase in time, cost, performance or risk)
Major improvement compared to Alternative 1( Include OT pass criteria in DT exit) 
(significant decrease in time, cost, performance or risk)
Some improvement compared to Alternative 1( Include OT pass criteria in DT exit)(some 
decrease in t ime, cost, performance or risk)
No difference from current process (doing nothing)
Some increased burden/loss compared to Alternative 1( Include OT pass criteria in DT 
exit)(some increase in time, cost, performance or risk)
 
 
Since it is assumed that our alternative will be an improvement over the current system, 
there was no “do nothing” alternative.  This is important because the use of a “do nothing” 
alternative will always score higher than any changes when it comes to any upfront 
developmental costs (there is no cost for making no change) and may often have some reduced 
reoccurring financial, schedule and risk costs within each program.  This could give the “do 
nothing” alternative a favorable outcome in any AOA.  However, the problem being addressed is 
rarely solved by “doing nothing” and an AOA is generally not performed unless a change is 
thought to be necessary.  Therefore DT Exit Criteria to include OT Pass Criteria (Alternative 1) 
was chosen as the baseline alternative.  The other four alternatives were compared to this and 
each group member used their engineering and project management judgment to determine if the 
other alternatives were “better” or “worse” then Alternative 1.   
3. Pugh Matrix Analysis 
With each member completing their own Pugh Matrix, the total +, 0, and – were summed 
in Figure 22, Pugh Matrix Results.  When analyzed, there is no single criterion that stands out as 
being irrelevant; had any one criterion been equal or nearly equal across the five alternatives then 
considering that particular criterion would not have provided any substantial decision making 
capability when choosing between the alternatives.  It was quickly noted however, that the two 
highest ranked alternatives were closely related.  That is to say that the highest rated alternative, 
“Define and Apply I/ORLs,” could possibly fulfill the second highest ranked alternative.   
Further, each system was analyzed with all 14 group members’ data, as well as without the 
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highest and lowest score provided to each system by any one group member (middle 12 group 
responses).  Similar to judging at Olympics and other competitions, this method allowed the 
group to reduce any biases that may arise from a member who may have authored or been 
endeared to any one alternative.  No significant bias appeared to be present, as the score of each 




riteria to include O
T                     
Pass Criteria
Consider interoperability @




ission Tread at                           
interoperabability O
T                                      
(instead of requirem
ents)
Develop Interoperability Readiness                         
Levels (IRLs)
Develop Standards of all DT                               
Testing and Sim
ulations
Delta in OT % Pass 0 -2 11 5 -8
Delta in phase of problem/issue detection 0 3 8 10 1
Upfront cost of new process  (upfront $) 0 3 -1 3 -4
Per program (reoccuring) cost (per program $) 0 10 5 9 0
Approval Level (upfront risk and time) 0 7 1 -2 -4
Coordination required to implement change (upfront time) 0 3 -6 3 -7
Time to develop, train, implement the new process (upfront time) 0 -2 -2 1 -7
Impact to program schedule (per program, time) 0 6 3 10 4
Change in documentation for programs (per program time and $) 0 -4 0 2 -10
System Sum (the entire group) 0 24 19 41 -35
Average for each Alternative (the entire group) 0 1.71 1.36 2.93 -2.50
0 28 21 42 -31
Average for each Alternative (drop highest and lowest) 0 2.33 1.75 3.50 -2.58
System Sum (drop the highest lowest vote)
 
Figure 22. Pugh Matrix Results 
This figure summarizes the results of the AoA. 
 
C. SELECTION OF PREFERRED ALTERNATIVE 
Once the Pugh Matrix results were tabulated, the authors discussed the results based upon 
the value system discussed in Chapter II.  The majority of the discussion focused on the three 
alternatives with the highest “score” in the Pugh Matrix: “Define and Apply Interoperability 
Readiness Levels (I/ORLs)” had 41 pluses, “Consider Interoperability at all Milestone Reviews” 
had 24 pluses and “Test to Mission Thread at Interoperability OT” had 19 pluses.  The Mission 
Thread alternative had the most pluses in the two measures of effectiveness, but at a much higher 
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anticipated cost.  Initial discussions with the project stakeholders, specifically with an ASN 
(RDA) CHSENG staffer, had identified a concept based on Mission Threads as being desirable.  
As this alternative most reflected the original Project Proposal, it was a hard decision to choose 
another path, however, the authors discussed the Pugh Results and agreed with the analysis that 
this alternative would be harder to coordinate between organizations and would have a greater 
negative impact on each program’s schedule and budget than the other two alternatives.  These 
impacts would be due to the change in requirements development process up front as well as a 
change in how OT process and procedures are developed, carried out and documented.  On the 
other hand, I/ORLs and the evaluation of interoperability at each milestone were projected to 
require less significant changes to the current OT process.   
The remaining two alternatives were viewed by the authors to be similar, as it was agreed 
that the implementation of I/ORLs would likely involve the evaluation of I/ORLs at key 
technical reviews and would therefore be inputs to the milestone decisions.  It was also felt that 
specifying that interoperability be assessed at each milestone was difficult without developing a 
system by which interoperability of a system would be quantified.  Therefore, the authors 
concluded that developing I/ORLs was the best alternative and every effort would also be made 
to meet the basic objectives of “Considering Interoperability at each Milestone Review”.   
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IV. DETAIL PROCESS DESIGN 
Upon completion of the Analysis of Alternatives, Detailed Process Design began.  A 
more detailed functional analysis kicked off this phase in which functions were defined.  After 
expanding on the functional analysis, synthesis of the process commenced.  I/ORL Development 
and Process Design comprised the synthesis portion of the detailed process design; in an iterative 
fashion, I/ORL Development and Process Design further refined the system.  Consequently, a 
more thorough discussion on activities in the functional analysis is presented in this chapter.  
During this phase it became apparent that the preferred solution of "Develop Interoperability 
Readiness Levels" implies one activity only, yet, this process involves much more than simply 
developing I/ORLs.  A more suitable name for this solution is "I/ORL Assessment Process" 
which reflects the use of Interoperability Readiness Levels as a mechanism to assess the maturity 
of the design of a system with regard to how well it interoperates with other systems in support 
of mission critical threads, and as a means to predict a system's ability to pass operational testing 
with regard to interoperability. 
A. DETAILED FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS 
To assess interoperability readiness levels, it was determined that I/ORLs would need to 
be evaluated at multiple reviews.  A more detailed approach to evaluating a program's I/ORL 
involves evaluating interoperability at each review leading up to a milestone review.  The top 
level of the detailed process to developing I/ORLs considers how this process will be 
implemented and includes the functions of: 
• Evaluate I/ORLs at selected reviews 
• Assess system I/ORL performance 
• Evaluate interoperability results 
• Take appropriate action 
• Continue development 
• Conduct milestone reviews  
This functional analysis is reflected in Figure 23.  These actions will be discussed briefly 





















Figure 23. Functional Analysis of Interoperability Readiness Level Process 
This figure summarizes key functions in the I/ORL Process. 
 
1. Evaluate at Selected Reviews 
Several reviews take place during the development of a system as prescribed by the 
SETR [SETR, 2009].  Interoperability should be considered at many of these reviews.  However, 
some reviews are not technical and interoperability is not a factor in these reviews.  The authors 
considered all of the reviews leading up to milestone reviews and selected the reviews in which 




Figure 24. Selected Technical Reviews for I/ORL Evaluation 
The Evaluate at Selected Reviews reflects a choice of technical reviews in which I/ORLs should be considered. 
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2. Assess System I/ORL Performance 
In order to assess the system performance I/ORL levels were selected and described, and 
a quantitative value was assigned to each level.  Lower values reflect less mature interoperability 
levels and increasingly higher values reflect progressing maturity in a system's ability to pass 
information at interfaces.  This is the scale against which interoperability will be measured; 
interoperability of each interface of a system must be considered and assessed. 
3. Evaluate Interoperability 
Once interoperability assessment data are available, values are evaluated.  I/ORL values 
are measured against a threshold and objective level designated for a particular review.  The 
values have been assigned based on the purpose of the review.  An objective is a quantitative 
level that should be met.  A threshold is a minimum value, a level that must be met.  
4. Take Appropriate Action 
Upon evaluating interoperability, appropriate action must be taken.  This action can be 
one of several depending on the evaluation.  If an I/ORL value meets the objective, it proceeds 
through the system development process as usual.  If the I/ORL obtains a value between the 
objective and threshold value, a system interoperability performance review must be performed.  
If the system fails to meet the threshold value it must undergo a mini re-view or repeat the 
review in order to rectify interoperability issues. 
5. Continue Development 
The system must proceed with development per their tailored system's engineering 
process.  The system must continue to consider interoperability as it progresses with maturing 
interoperability readiness.  
6. Conduct Milestone Review 
A milestone review is conducted as usual with the inclusion of interoperability 
consideration.  Findings from the I/ORL reviews performed at technical reviews leading up to a 
milestone review are considered, this may include I/ORL evaluations and mitigations.  Further, 
concurrence on issues and I/ORL decisions should be obtained during the milestone review. 
 72 
B. I/ORL DEVELOPMENT 
I/ORL Development began with examining all of the reviews outlined in the SETR 
handbook [SETR, 2009].  Reviews containing an interoperability component were selected.  The 
authors then created an I/ORL standard outlining I/ORL levels, values, and descriptions.  Finally 
threshold and objective values were assigned to relevant reviews based on outputs of each review 
gleaned from the SETR handbook.  
1. Applicable Reviews 
I/ORLs are intended to assess the state of system interoperability using the systems 
engineering process within the existing DoD framework.  Consequently, reviews from the SETR 
handbook were chosen.  After inspecting the reviews in the SETR handbook the authors arrived 
at a list of reviews that should include an I/ORL assessment.  Table 8 reflects the selected 
reviews, their purpose, and a brief explanation on why interoperability should be considered at 
the chosen review. 
Table 8. Technical Reviews for I/ORL Assessment  
This table shows the technical reviews in which an I/ORL assessment is applicable. 
 




Reviews results of Material 
Solution Analysis phase and 
assesses technology development 
plan and preferred system 
concept. 
This is an early technical review, 
interoperability should be considered 
from the early stages of development in 





Assesses technical readiness to 
enter Engineering & 
Manufacturing Development 
Phase. 
This review establishes requirements 
and assesses the developing system to 
ensure a likely expectation that the 
ultimate system will be operationally 
effective; interoperability must be 





Assesses System Functional 
Baseline and readiness to begin 
functional allocation. 
This review is a technical assessment to 
establish that the system functional 
baseline will likely be deemed 
operationally effective, interoperability 
must be considered in functional 
specification for success. 
Preliminary 
Design Review 
Assess System Allocated 
Baseline and readiness to begin 
This review is a technical assessment to 
establish that the physically allocated 
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Review Purpose Rationale 
(PDR) detailed design. baseline will likely be deemed 
operational effective, interoperability 
must be considered in the physical 
architecture for successful passing of 




Assesses completeness of 
software specification. 
This review is a technical assessment to 
establish that the software requirements 
baseline of the system and its 
preliminary design will likely be 
deemed operationally effective, 
interoperability must be considered in 
software for successful passing of data. 
Critical Design 
Review (CDR) 
Assesses System Product 
Baseline and supports Design 
Readiness Review. 
This review is a technical assessment to 
establish that the build baseline likely 
be deemed operational effective, 
interoperability must be considered in 




Assesses system readiness to 
initiate and conduct flight tests 
and flight operations. 
This review is a technical assessment to 
establish that the configuration used in 
flight testing will likely be deemed 
operational effective, interoperability 





Assesses readiness of software 
systems. 
This review is an assessment to ensure 
that the hardware and software are 
ready to begin integrated configuration 
item testing, interoperability must be 
considered in the configuration for 





Assesses system readiness to 
proceed into Operational Test 
and Evaluation (OT&E). 
Interoperability maturity must be 
considered to ensure that the system 
can proceed into OT&E with a high 
probability that the system will 





Assesses system compliance with 
functional baseline. 
This review is an assessment to ensure 
that the system under review can 
proceed into Low Rate Initial 
Production; interoperability must be 




While most of the reviews outlined in the SETR are applicable to interoperability and 
subsequently an I/ORL assessment, some reviews are neither technical nor appropriate for I/ORL 
consideration.  Table 9 reflects the reviews excluded from I/ORL assessment with a brief 
explanation as to their rejection. 
 
Table 9. Technical Reviews Excluded From I/ORL Assessment  
This table shows the technical reviews in which an I/ORL assessment is not applicable. 
 
Review Purpose Rationale 
Initial Technical 
Review (ITR) 
Supports technical basis for initial 
cost estimates and POM budget 
submissions. 
This review focuses on cost and 




Assess risk areas in contract.  
Produces Performance Measurement 
Baseline to ensure technical scope 
of work is realistically and 
accurately scheduled, has proper 
resources, utilizes correct 
techniques, and employs appropriate 
management processes. 
This review focuses on earned 





Assesses system readiness to begin 
Developmental Test and Evaluation 
(DT&E). 
This review coincides closely with 
the CDR, there will be a desire to 





Assesses system to enter production. This review is conducted after 





Assesses the as-delivered system for 
compliance with the produce 
baseline and supports full-rate 
production decision. 
This review is conducted after 




Assesses the in-service technical 
health of a fielded system from a 
risk, readiness, and resources 
perspective. 
This review is conducted after 
Milestone C and operational 
testing. 
 
Once the appropriate reviews were selected, the authors developed I/ORL values and 
their meaning. 
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2. I/ORL Values 
I/ORLs are to be used similarly to Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs) throughout the 
SETR process [SETR, 2009].  After selecting reviews in which to assess I/ORLs, meaningful 
I/ORL values were assigned.  It should be noted that a reference frame for IRLs is available in A 
Systems Approach to Expanding the Technology Readiness Level within Defense Acquisition 
[Sauser, 2009].  However, Sauser, et al, inappropriately applied mathematical operation on non-
ratio scale numbers in their paper.  A discussion of the issues with the methodology applied by 
Sauser, et al, can be found in The trouble with the System Readiness Level (SRL) index for 
managing the acquisition of defense systems [Kujawski, 2010].  The authors wanted to ensure we 
did not duplicate that error.  Therefore, the authors decided to develop our own I/ORL level 
designations to tailor them to our process.  In order to keep the process simple and consequently 
practicable, levels of 1 to 9 were chosen.  A value of 1 is considered the least mature as it 
pertains to interoperability, and a value of 9 is the most mature as it pertains to interoperability. 
It is important to note that the authors are choosing to describe the acronym I/ORL as 
Interoperability Readiness Level versus IRL as Integration Readiness Level example presented 
in the AoA section.  The authors chose to use “interoperability” as it aligns more closely with the 
issues in this project.  Further, the authors are expanding upon the example presented in the AoA 
and are tailoring I/ORLs to the issue of systems failing operational testing.  As a result, the 
interoperability readiness levels appointed by the authors are outlined below: 
 
I/ORL 1 
1) The physical interfaces and software scope of the preferred system solution are 
sufficiently understood to begin development with low technical risk.  
2) The Program has determined which legacy and other development systems the new 
system must interface with.  
Any other systems that interface with the developing system must be identified.  This 
includes systems that physically connect to the new system as well as software and data sharing 
communications.  The details of the connections do not have to be explicit.  This I/ORL simply 
states that a connection will be needed.  Completing this I/ORL will aid in the development of a 
full list of mission critical interoperability requirements which will be evaluated individually 
during successive reviews.   
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I/ORL 2 
1) A design/technology maturity risk analysis has been completed.  Interoperability issues 
that could impact cost, schedule or system performance have been identified.   
2) An AOA is complete and addresses interoperability between the new system’s interfaces 
and other applicable systems that require interoperability with the new system. 
An assessment of current technology is complete; the risk analysis provides the Program 
Manager with valuable insight into whether the new system will be fully interoperable with 
existing systems.  Schedule and funding changes can be made early to address any high risk 
system interfaces.  The AOA is used to determine if the various interfaces are being used 
optimally; there may be alternative configurations that are succinct then the originally planned 
new System of Systems. The AOA can further reduce risk by ensuring the optimal system 
interoperation configuration is chosen and may identify unnecessary redundancy, reduce the 
quantity of interfaces or maximize the efficiency of the interfaces that interoperate.   
I/ORL 3 
1) The hardware interface specification is sufficiently detailed to include requirements such 
as MIL-STD, ISO, IEEE, etc. 
2) The software interface specification is sufficiently detailed to include requirements such 
as programming languages, protocols, and standards. 
 
I/ORL 3 does not evaluate the new system’s interface but rather focuses on the 
documentation of the interface requirements and design generation.  All of the connections, 
physical and electronic must have documented standards.  A large portion of this I/ORL is 
completing sufficient research on the other systems that the new system’s interfaces will 
interface with in order to determine what standards those systems already use/require and ensure 
that the standards required for the new system’s interfaces are backwards compatible.  Further, 
any upgrades required to legacy systems that are based on obsolete standards should be 
identified at this point, for early development.   
I/ORL 4 
1) The interoperability of the interface shall be demonstrated using its respective 
standards. 
I/ORL 4 represents a transition from a conceptual interface to one that has been realized 
and is a combination of research and testing.  The objective of this evaluation is to demonstrate 
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that the interface is mature.  It is not intended that development of any portion of the system be 
finished at this point.  This is just a technology demonstration or documentation of technology 
demonstration performed elsewhere using this technology to demonstrate that interoperability is 
achievable without regard to the test conditions, thus this can be done in the lab or in the field.   
I/ORL 5 
1) Interface design is complete and has undergone an independent review for 
interoperability deficiencies.  
As a system approaches its product baseline each interface must be complete and have 
undergone a review for interoperability deficiencies.  As a prerequisite of this review the 
interface shall have been reviewed by an independent party, not the SE team or contractor 
developing the new system, to ensure interoperability has been addressed.  This evaluation is 
critical to ensuring that time and money is not wasted on building a design that is incomplete or 
unachievable. 
I/ORL 6 
1) Interface test article components have successfully completed Developmental Test 
and Evaluation for interoperability. 
The individual components have been developed and have successfully completed DT&E 
(bench or lab testing); DT&E must include evaluation of the interoperability requirements of the 
interfaces being tested.  The interfaces are ready for integration into larger sub-systems and 
eventually into the full system.   
I/ORL 7 
1) All interfaces have been tested between the new system and the legacy system(s) it 
interacts with. 
2) Interface interoperability with all other systems has been verified through simulated 
operational scenarios. 
I/ORL 7 must be accomplished prior to entering OT&E.  Modeling and Simulation may 
be used to verify that interoperability of the entire system should work during actual testing.  
Furthermore, each interface has been verified through interoperability testing to ensure it 
functions properly with other system’s components, such as completing fit testing for physical 
interconnections, completing radio communication checks for systems with RF or wireless 
communications, and connecting computers in the new system to those in legacy systems to 
ensure data transfer is correctly established, etc.   
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I/ORL 7F (only for system requiring flight based testing) 
1) Interoperability with all other interface has been verified through ground based 
verification testing. 
I/ORL 7F is an additional requirement for I/ORL 7 for any system that will undergo 
flight based testing, either as an aircraft, new flight system, rocket, weapons system on an 
aircraft, etc.  I/ORL 7F is intended to eliminate interoperability failures during flight testing, 
which could potentially lead to loss of the test system, air frame or human life in the event of a 
failure and crash.  Completing I/ORL 7F is accomplished by simulating the entire flight test on 
the ground.  It ensures that all interfaces and sub-systems of the new system are functioning 
properly with each other as well as other systems.  It ensures that all communications lines with 
other systems are functional.  While numerous ground tests are currently performed prior to 
flight testing, achieving I/ORL7F ensures that interoperability is addressed and something is not 
overlooked before the system is actually engaged in flight operations off of the ground.   
I/ORL 8 
1) All interoperability issues discovered during OT&E have been mitigated (or none 
were present).  The system and its interfaces are now mission qualified. 
I/ORL 8 is achieved by either having no interoperability issues during OT&E or by 
documenting the steps taken to mitigate any interoperability deficiencies.  Interoperability issues 
that are below requirements, but do not cause system failure; such as slower than required 
(desired) data exchange rates, or physical connections outside of expected tolerance must either 
be corrected or the program manager may accept the deficiency and reduced capability from the 
initial requirements.  I/ORL 8 is an important milestone for the system as I/ORL 8 indicates that 
there are no remaining interoperability issues that have not been corrected or accepted and the 
system is ready for use on the battlefield. 
I/ORL 9 
1) The system has been proven to be interoperable during operational use (Mission 
Proven) 
I/ORL 9 is achieved once a system is deployed and has demonstrated successful mission 
completion (either actual or a training mission) in the fleet/field.  Any deficiencies discovered in 
the field/fleet previously not experienced during other testing have been mitigated or accepted 
(just as in I/ORL 8).  If OT&E is completed in the field/fleet and not at a test command or test 
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range then the system may achieve I/ORL 9 simultaneously with I/ORL 8 once any 
interoperability issues discovered have been mitigated.  An I/ORL is intended to signify that the 
system and all its interfaces have been proven to be interoperable. 
3. I/ORL Values for Reviews 
After selecting reviews in which to assess I/ORLs, and those values were developed, 
I/ORL levels were assigned to applicable reviews.  For each applicable review an objective 
I/ORL value and a threshold value was assigned.  The objective value is the level that should be 
met at a particular review.  A threshold value is the minimum value that the interface must meet 
at the review.  These values are based on the outcome of the review as described in the SETR 
handbook.  If this value is not met, the system cannot proceed without further action.  The 
process or appropriate action to take after failing to meet a threshold value is described in the 
Process Design section. 
Some reviews have a hard minimum I/ORL requirement or threshold that must be met 
with no objective beyond that.  Consequently these reviews have the same threshold and 
objective value in the table.  The applicable reviews, exit criteria as they pertain to 
interoperability, objective, and threshold values are outlined in Table 10.   
Table 10. I/ORL Values for Each Review 
This table shows the I/ORL levels and values needed at each review [SETR, 2009]. 
  
Review Exit Criteria Threshold Objective 
ASR 
-Is/Are the preferred system solutions(s) sufficiently 
detailed and understood to enable entry into Technology 
Development with low technical risk? 
-Is the system software scope and complexity 
sufficiently understood and addressed in the Technology 
Development plan to enable low software technical risk? 




-Are the system requirements sufficiently detailed and 
understood to enable system functional definition and 
functional decomposition? 
-Is the architecture adequately structured to support both 
explicit and implied system attributes? 
-Are the risks known and manageable for design and 
development? 
-Are the Family of System/System of Systems 
2 3 
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Review Exit Criteria Threshold Objective 
(FoS/SoS) requirements properly allocated and 
approved? 
-Did the Technology Development phase sufficiently 
reduce development risk? 
SFR 
-Are the system functional requirements sufficiently 
detailed and understood to enable system design to 
proceed? 
-Are adequate processes and metrics in place for the 
program to succeed? 




-Does the status of the technical effort and design 
indicate OPEVAL success (operationally suitable and 
effective)? 
-Has the system allocated baseline been established and 
documented to enable detailed design to proceed with 
proper configuration management? 
-Are adequate processes and metrics in place for the 
program to succeed? 
-Are the risks known and manageable for DT/OT? 
3 4 
SSR 
-Inputs, processing, and outputs are defined and 
accepted for all functions 
-All interfaces between the software configuration item 
and all other configuration items both internal and 
external to the system are defined and accepted as stable. 
In particular, interoperability requirements are fully 
identified and defined, accepted, and correlated to 
mission requirements and scenarios. 
-All interface-level data elements are defined and 
accepted, including data type, size, format, units, range 
of values, accuracy and precision 
-SW development processes are fully defined in the SDP 
or equivalent document (e.g., Software Standards and 
Procedures Manual (SSPM)), and are accepted as 
appropriate for coding and unit test. 
-Risks are identified in a Risk Database and have 
mitigation plans in place that are compatible with the 
SW development schedule. 
4 4 
CDR 
-Does the status of the technical effort and design 
indicate OPEVAL success (operationally suitable and 
effective)? 
-Has the system product baseline been established and 
documented to enable hardware fabrication and software 
coding to proceed with proper configuration 
5 5 
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Review Exit Criteria Threshold Objective 
management? 
-Are adequate processes and metrics in place for the 
program to succeed? 
-Are the risks known and manageable? 
IRR 
- The IRR is considered complete when all draft RFAs 




-The FRR is considered complete when all draft RFAs 
are signed off, and an acceptable level of program risk is 
ascertained. 
7 & 7F 7 & 7F 
OTRR 
-The OTRR is considered complete when all 
requirements for Navy Certification of Readiness for OT 
are complete. 
-For programs employing software, there are no 
unresolved priority 1 or 2 software problem reports 
(SPR), and all priority 3 problems are documented with 
appropriate impact analyses. 
7 7 
SVR 
-Does the status of the technical effort and system 
indicate operational test success (operationally suitable 
and effective)? 
-Are adequate processes and metrics in place for the 
program to succeed? 
-Are the risks known and manageable? 
-Are the system requirements understood to the level 
appropriate for this review? 
8 8 
 
C. I/ORL PROCESS DESIGN 
Once the authors had generated the definition of the I/ORLs at each level, the process for 
assigning and evaluating I/ORLs was generated.  In developing this process, the authors 
researched the history of interoperability measurement and keyed in on the most widely used 
interoperability measurement systems.  The most notable one was the i-Score methodology 
[Ford, 2007; Ford, 2008]: an interoperability measurement technique for generating a system-
wide interoperability value based on a numerical analysis of mission threads.  While i-Score 
approaches interoperability from a different perspective, the authors leveraged certain core 
concepts in the I/ORL system. 
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The overall process that was generated was split into two major phases: work done before 
the milestone review process and work done at each of the milestone reviews.  The steps 
included in each of the phases are shown in Figures 25 and 26. 
 
 
Figure 25. I/ORL Process Steps – Pre-Review 




Figure 26. I/ORL Process Steps – Each Review 
These are the key steps that occur at each Technical Review. 
 
Detailed descriptions of the steps involved with assigning and evaluating a system for 
I/ORLs are listed in the sections below. 
1. Identify and Analyze Mission Critical Threads 
Prior to conducting the analysis of Interoperability Readiness Levels (I/ORLs), it is 
important to understand the critical interfaces of a system.  To outline those critical interfaces, 
one must first analyze the critical mission threads that are involved with accomplishing the 
mission. 
The team’s concept of initializing the necessary mission thread and defining the 
necessary interfaces are shared with i-Score’s methodology, [Ford, 2007].  The i-Score 
methodology diagrams an operational thread, and from this diagram identifies the systems that 
require interoperability.  These systems are then numerically assessed for interoperability and 
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recorded in a matrix, which is used to generate a score.  The team’s method varies from the later 
part of their process, but share a similar methodology for identifying interfaces. 
Before any mission threads are analyzed, a review team consisting of key stakeholders 
and program managers must identify the critical mission threads out of the many mission threads 
that may exist for the system.  This narrows down the scope of the analysis to something more 
manageable while still maintaining a high degree of fidelity.  The review team should use the 
following or similar definition of mission criticality as their guide for selecting the appropriate 
threads for analysis.  The following definition is provided in Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 
(CJCSI) 6212.01E: 
An operational and technical description of the end to end set of activities 
and systems that accomplish the execution of a joint mission [CJCSI 
6212.01E, 2008].  
 
The review team for the mission and the system involved must make a joint 
determination that the thread in question meets the above definition. 
Similar to the i-Score methodology’s Step 1 [Ford, 2007] of diagramming the operational 
thread and defining the set of supporting systems, the mission threads involved with the system 
are evaluated for mission criticality then diagramed for analysis.  This involves all of the various 
steps in the functional flow of the system to accomplish that mission thread.  Once completed, 
the functional flow elements must be traced back to their individual system components and the 
interfaces between components must be identified.  This method is different from the i-Score 
methodology in that our process tracks the interfaces between systems, not the actual systems 
themselves.  The interfaces outlined here are the interfaces associated with the mission thread. 
The interfaces between mission functions, components, and organizations are then cross-
referenced with the mission thread to determine their criticality towards the mission thread.  If an 
interface is not deemed critical, then that interface will not be considered at this level of review.  
The interfaces that are deemed critical will then be identified as Critical System Interfaces 
(CSIs).  These interfaces will be then documented as the interfaces at which the I/ORLs of the 
system will be evaluated during each review.  All other interfaces are recognized and should be 
scrutinized prior to each milestone review, but the I/ORL determination will only be made on the 
CSIs to focus the attention on the aspects that are important to mission success. 
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2. Identify Required Personnel / Research 
After the Mission Critical Threads and their respective CSIs are identified, the respective 
Subject Matter Experts (SME) / organization representatives for each of the critical system 
interfaces meet with an unbiased third party (either government or contractor) to assess the 
validity of the mission thread and interfaces.  This team of SMEs and 3rd party representatives 
will eventually assign the I/ORLs prior to the System Engineering Technical Review.  Each 
SME or organization representative must review the mission thread and interfaces, and be ready 
to discuss each aspect of the interface.   
3. Review Mission Threads and CSIs 
As the systems move through the acquisition cycle, the critical threads may change as 
well as the various system interfaces that are involved.  This means that the above analysis for 
determining the CSIs should be revised prior to each I/ORL determination in support of 
milestone reviews.  It is not necessary to start the mission thread analysis from scratch, but 
verifying that all of the analysis is still applicable in light of any major system changes should be 
completed.  Each SME/ organization representative must discuss the interfaces in order to 
approve, remove, or add to the given critical system interfaces. 
4. Discuss Interfaces 
Each of the CSIs must then be analyzed for interoperability problems.  While there are 
many different ways to accomplish that, a list of suggested evaluation criteria is described in 
Table 11. 
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Table 11. Suggested Evaluation Criteria 
This table describes the suggested evaluation criteria for I/ORLs 
 
Topic Criteria 
Physical Interfaces Ensure physical connections are adequate. 
Data Type Ensure data from one system/organization is compatible with 
the other system/organization. 
Data Amount Ensures that the amount of data transferred can be 
utilized/stored properly within the other systems. 
Bandwidth Ensure systems can accommodate the rate at which data is 
received.   
Hardware/Software 
Requirements 
Ensure hardware and software is compatible. 
Data Security Ensure data is correctly secured. 
Human System Interface Ensure usability with software / hardware. 
 
Physical interfaces would be discussed during the meeting to ensure the connections 
between the systems are correctly designed and compatible.  This is to ensure that the interface is 
adequate to meet the requirements of data transfer.   
The type of data is an important factor to consider during these discussions to ensure that 
the data transferred from one system is compatible with another system.  SMEs will provide data 
requirements for their system and ensure that the system will receive all the information required 
to complete its own task.  It is important to consider the quality of data type that is transferred 
and if the data type will always be readily available.  Data translators can be discussed if 
required.   
The amount of data must be considered by each system.  Systems must account for the 
amount of data being transferred to ensure that the systems are capable of storing and utilizing 
the amount of data received.   
Bandwidth must be considered to ensure each system can accept the rate at which data 
flows.  The systems must consider the rate at which data is transferred at, and the rate at which 
data is received.   
Hardware and software are often built as separate elements.  This topic must be discussed 
to ensure the hardware meets the required specifications to adequately run the software.  As 
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software development proceeds, requirement changes forces alteration of the code.  This step 
will ensure hardware adapts to these software alterations. 
Data security must be considered during these meetings as well.  The data be within the 
correct classification, and ensure that the data is not leaked into an improper classification.   
Human System Interfaces is important when considering how different organizations 
interface with software or hardware.  These interfaces must be considered in order to create, 
perform, and support the mission thread. 
Any issues must be recorded and discussed during the risk mitigation steps.  Mitigations 
steps for these issues will be created after identifying the appropriate I/ORL levels for the 
system.  At this point, each of the CSIs will have an individual I/ORL value assigned for 
evaluation at the associated milestone review. 
5. Compare TRL/I/ORL Values to Prescribed Threshold and Objective Values 
As a system progresses through its various reviews, a program that is on track should 
progress in a predicable manner.  Given assigned threshold and objective I/ORL values for each 
review, each interface of the system can be evaluated to see if it is on or behind schedule for its 
I/ORL requirements.  
Should a system or any of its components fail to meet the required threshold at a given 
review, it will need repeat the review or conduct a mini re-review.  The decision to repeat the 
review or conduct a mini re-review will be up to the individual program; however it should 
consider the degree to which the system failed to meet the thresholds. 
In the event that the I/ORL review yields results between the objective and threshold 
values the program manager will need to demonstrate a risk mitigation plan.  The purpose of this 
is to address potential trouble areas in more detail before they delay the system.  This approach 
highlights potential system interoperability issues allowing them to be resolved earlier in the 
system development. 
Components or systems that exceed the objective I/ORL requirement for a given review 
do not require further action.  These systems or components will be evaluated at the next review.  
Ultimately it is desirable that all components in a system meet or exceed the objective 




Figure 27. Milestone Evaluation Criteria 
These are the decision criteria for I/ORLs at Each Milestone. 
 
6. Perform risk mitigation on interfaces that do not meet objective values 
For interfaces that fail to meet the objective values for the assigned review a system 
interoperability performance review will need to be performed.  The objective of this review is to 
develop a mitigation plan to improve the I/ORL levels of interfaces that failed to meet the 
objective I/ORL values.  It also provides a means to track the cost and schedule impact of 
interfaces that failed to meet the objective I/ORL values.  This is shown in Table 12. 
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Table 12. System Interoperability Performance Review 
This table describes two examples of the I/ORL evaluation process A3 shows an example of an interface that is 
lower than the objective and greater than the threshold.  To pass, it must be at the objective or above the threshold 










objective Mitigation Cost Schedule 
Anticipated 
I/ORL value Pass 
A1 Example 1 4 2 4     Yes 
A3 Example 2 3 2 4 
Establish 
common 
standards $20K 3 weeks 4 Yes 




requirements $60K 5 weeks 4 No 
 
In the first block the system or component interface is identified.  This identification is 
intended to be a shorthand notation that is used to track a particular interface.  The second block 
provides a description of the interface.  This is intended to augment the information in the first 
block and provide sufficient information to understand the function of the interface.  The third 
block is the current I/ORL value for the given interface.  The fourth block, I/ORL threshold, 
denotes the minimum required I/ORL value at the given review and is intended as a reference 
value.  An interface can still pass the review if it is above the threshold value; however, it must 
have a mitigation plan approved by the SETR review board in order to pass.   The fifth box is the 
objective I/ORL value for the given review.  Together, boxes three through five provide a picture 
of how well the system’s interface has been developed.  The sixth box is intended to provide a 
mitigation strategy.  It will be the responsibility of the PM to develop a strategy to improve the 
I/ORL of this interface.  The objective of the mitigation plan is to outline how the given interface 
will improve its interoperability.  The seventh box is intended to capture the costs associated 
with the mitigation plan.  This will be used to track the cost of improving interoperability and 
may be useful for justifying changes to the budget.  The eighth box captures the impact to the 
schedule as a result of implementing the proposed mitigation.  Boxes seven and eight measure 
the impact of considering interoperability throughout the design and development process, while 
it may appear to that this process has the potential to add significant costs and delays, one must 
consider the impact of not addressing these issues early.  The ninth box provides an anticipated 
I/ORL value, this is the I/ORL value that the PM anticipates achieving after completing the 
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mitigation described in box seven.  The last box, box ten, indicates if whether the given interface 
passed the review.  An interface will pass a review provided the I/ORL value (box 3) is greater 
than the threshold I/ORL value (box 4) and a mitigation plan (box 6) with a favorable anticipated 
I/ORL value (box  9) are provided.  Should an interface fail to meet this, it will be marked as 
failing, meaning that further development is required prior to the system passing the review.   
As discussed previously, components or systems with interoperability failures will need 
to repeat the review or conduct a mini review of the interoperability failures.  The decision to 
repeat the review or conduct a follow-up review will be up to the individual program; however it 
should consider the degree to which the system failed to meet the thresholds and the risk 
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V. PROCESS VALIDATION 
To determine the effectiveness of the I/ORL design, the authors developed a two-pronged 
methodology.  The first method used was a tabletop exercise designed to demonstrate the 
functional details of the I/ORL Process as it tracks the interoperability of a fictitious system.  
Although a tabletop exercise will not show general applicability to all systems, it will 
demonstrate the functionality of the approach presented in this paper.  The second method is a 
mathematical simulation designed to track the effectiveness of the I/ORL Process if applied 
across the Navy and DoD.  The application of I/ORLs and the progression of the system as it 
moves through the SE process is abstracted, but overall effectiveness can be determined. 
A. TABLE TOP EXERCISE 
The authors simulated the I/ORL Process on a system using a Table Top Exercise (TTX), 
illustrating how the I/ORL Process could be performed at System Engineering Technical 
Reviews.  This validated the process and improved on gaps within the process.  The TTX 
included real-world scenarios and role-plays that demonstrated knowledge of policies and 
procedures of the I/ORL.  The TTX consisted of developing scripts to guide the exercises, 
separating the team into role players, and executing the I/ORL Process.  Further, the team 
identified shortcomings in the I/ORL Process, created solutions, and applied improvements to a 
following TTX. 
1. Development of the Table Top Exercise 
A TTX is a discussion-based walkthrough of a proposed process [Radow, 2007].  It is a 
method used to review and test a plan, allowing for interjection of unexpected scenarios or 
events in order to vet many aspects of the proposed process.  A TTX facilitates process 
improvement and training.   
a.  Selection of Reviews 
As Chapter IV of this report describes, the I/ORL Process is to be performed at 11 
reviews, which are outlined in the SETR [SETR, 2009].  Ideally the new I/ORL Process would 
be validated via a TTX on all of these reviews; however, the team selected a subset of reviews 
due to time constraints: ASR and OTRR.  These reviews are in different phases of maturity for a 
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system under development and allowed for “lessons learned” to be implemented in at least one 
subsequent review. 
b. Selection of a Program 
The authors investigated actual DoD systems and fictional systems on which to exercise 
the I/ORL Process.  By choosing an actual system, it would allow the team to compare the data 
from the TTX to real data, showing how the process can actually improve a system’s chances of 
passing OT.  Upon investigating actual DoD systems, the authors discovered that data was not 
readily available, in part due to the classification of data.  As a result, the authors turned to 
hypothetical systems to use for the TTX.  Due to a theoretical system’s flexibility, it gave the 
authors the ability generate and find data more readily and constrain a system’s complexity; 
however, it meant the loss of the ability to compare the system to real data.  A list of pros and 
cons in comparing an actual system to a theoretical system is presented in Table 13. 
 
Table 13. Comparison of Actual versus Theoretical System for TTX 
This table describes the benefits and shortfalls of using a theoretical system rather than an actual system for the 
Table Top exercise. 
 
Actual System Theoretical System 




knowledge on a system 
Information readily 
available 
Unable to verify data 
in an actual system 
 Not all information is 
readily available 
System can be 
constrained 
 
 Information may  be 
classified 
Faster to obtain data  




Based on the pros and cons, the authors decided to use a theoretical system.  The system 
used was the Advanced Combat Integrated Helmet (ACIH) [ACIH, Garcia et al.], which is a 
helmet with integrated communications, night vision, thermal vision, navigation, and mapping 
tools.  It includes many internal and external interfaces used for communication, and uses many 
commercial off the shelf (COTS) components, which facilitated information gathering.  As this 
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system is fictional, data for the ACIH could be quickly generated.  An executive summary of the 
ACIH is provided in Appendix D. 
c. Creating Artifacts 
Artifacts are required to assess I/ORLs and to perform a SETR review.  For 
implementing the TTX at the reviews, the team noted entrance criteria outlined in the SETR 
[SETR, 2009] and other additional documents/graphics to determine the necessary artifacts.  The 
artifacts created for the ASR includes: an AoA, High Level Operational Concept Graphic (OV-
1), Risk Assessment/Risk Management Plan, requirements, a notional schedule, and a 
Technology Development Plan.  The artifacts created for the OTRR includes: Operational 
Requirements Document (ORD), Operational Test Plan, DT&E Results and test report, and 
Training Plan.  These artifacts are provided in Appendix D. 
d.  Planning for the I/ORL Process TTX 
All participants of the TTX were of members from the overall project team.  The TTX 
team was separated into the following three categories with their respective responsibilities: 
• Scripter/Facilitator 
- Design the table top exercise scenarios and script 
- Lead discussions 
• Role Players 
- Perform the process using procedures and protocols 
- React to situations 
• Observers 
- Take notes on the events 
- Provide overall suggestions for improvements 
 
These key participants were required to review the I/ORL Process and perform the 
necessary steps as outlined in Chapter IV of this report.  Participants were reminded that the goal 
was to assess the I/ORL for each interface in the context of executing the mission thread.  The 
role players required for the ACIH TTX were:  
• SETR Lead/Board 
- Responsible for conducting the review and is the decision authority for the pass/fail 
judgment of the interfaces. 
- SETR Handbook documents exactly how the SETR lead is identified for each review. 
• System Integrator 
- The System Integrator is responsible for integrating the system to ensure readiness for 
OT.  They will ensure the system is ready for integration testing by providing 
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feedback to the SMEs at each iterative review.  They can also provide testing results 
to the SMEs to help assess I/ORLs at certain reviews. 
- Within the Army, the System Integrator would be identified from Program Executive 
Office Soldier (PEO Soldier).  The System Integrator role can also be contracted out 
by the PEOs. 
• System/Element SMEs 
- SMEs are identified from the owners of the system.  SMEs can either be Government 
or contractor personnel.  Example organizations include: In-Service Engineering 
Agent, Developer, Contracted support, etc. 
- ACIH Mission Thread Specific: Display, Core HW/SW, and Audio/Video 
• Operational Test Agency Representative 
- The representative is responsible preparing the Operational tests.  The representative 
will also ensuring the system is testable during the OT process by providing feedback 
to the SMEs at each iterative review. 
- The representative would come from COMOPTEVFOR 
• 3rd Party Representative  
- The representative would be responsible for fostering SME discussion and to support 
the assigning I/ORL values as an unbiased 3rd party. 
- The representative is assigned by the program office and can be either a contractor or 
government personnel.   
 
Due to time constraints, the TTX was designed to explore only one mission thread.  The 
team selected the ACIH System Mission Thread pertaining to audio and visual communication.  
This thread integrates various audio, visual, and system components within the helmet to a core 
computing system.  The helmet will enable the user to communicate with other ground troops 
and headquarters both visually and verbally through direct air transmission and/or via satellite 
communication, increasing the user’s situational awareness.  This thread must include the 
organizations responsible for fielding the equipment, and the organizations responsible for 
ensuring the logistical infrastructure to support the use of the helmet throughout the lifecycle.  
This thread was chosen because many of the components used within the thread are COTS, 
allowing the team to easily find data. 
e. Goals of the TTX 
The TTX addressed the following questions about the I/ORL Process: 
• How effective is the new process at ensuring programs pass Operational Testing? 
 
• What areas in the I/ORL Process are missing or require more definition and clarification? 
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2. Performing the Table Top Exercise – ASR 
The team performed the I/ORL Process using the ASR as the first review; however, some 
procedures were not executed as expected.  This resulted in the team discussing issues and 
generating solutions following the exercise. 
a. Performing the I/ORL Process 
The team began the I/ORL Process by defining the given Mission Critical Thread.  The 
SMEs attempted to discuss what interfaces were relevant.  The following is a list of interfaces 
selected: 
• Audio and video needs to be encrypted 
• Communications prevent jamming 
• Coverage to satellite/SATCOM 
• Encryption key needs to change 
• The software should interface all individual components together and provide 
communication 
• Requirement for 3 dimensional display 
 
As the Mission Critical Thread was not clearly defined by the team, the team improperly 
identified interfaces for the system.  The team complicated matters further by discussing where 
the program should be in respect with the ASR, versus using the given artifacts to help identify 
interfaces.  While the items in the list above are not actually interfaces, the discussions that 
ensued occasionally highlighted actual interfaces, such as the hardware-to-hardware interface 
between the helmet and the satellite, and the software-to-hardware interface between the core 
software and other various components.  
With the team in technical discussions on these identified “interfaces”, the team began 
assigning I/ORL values to each interface based on the I/ORL Values as defined in Chapter IV of 
this paper.  These values were then compared to the I/ORL threshold and objective value 
requirement for the review.  If an I/ORL did not meet its objective as outlined in Table 10, a risk 
mitigation plan was generated.  The assessed values and required mitigation steps were later 
presented to the SETR Lead and OTA Representative for approval.  The results are presented in 
Table 14. 
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Table 14. ASR TTX Results 














2 1 2 N/A Pass 






2 1 2 N/A Pass 
Power 2 1 2 N/A Pass 
Software 2 1 2 N/A Pass 
3D Display 2 1 2 N/A Pass 
 
b. Assessing the ASR TTX 
Once the TTX was completed, the assigned facilitators and observers discussed their 
comments on the exercise.  Issues noted upon completion of the TTX for the ASR included an 
unclear definition of Mission Critical Threads, unclear definition of an interface, and a failure to 
identify critical interfaces.  Additionally, I/ORL ranking levels were vague and no procedure 
existed for ranking I/ORLs.  Finally, cost applicability and goals of reviews needed to be 
outlined.  The following solutions were generated to clarify the process based on lessons learned 
from the ASR: 
Issue:  A major issue from the table top exercise was detailing how to represent the 
mission thread topic.  The exact definition of mission criticality was not understood and the 
method in representing the mission thread in a manner to help the I/ORL Process caused 
confusion among the team. 
Mission Criticality Thread Representation 
Solution:  In order to remedy this issue, appropriate diagrams are required to define and 
accurately represent the mission critical thread. A flow chart can be used as an important tool to 
describe the mission thread.  It can visually show how mission threads flow from start to finish.  
This allows the team to identify critical system interfaces to be used in the I/ORL Process.  These 
interfaces can then be assessed during criticality assessment.  The flow chart becomes a valuable 
tool in representing the mission thread to help identify the interfaces.  A top level flow chart can 
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become the main diagram, which can further refined as other diagrams such FFBDs and IDEF0s 
emerge.   
Issue:  During the table top exercise, it was realized that interface definition was not 
clearly characterized. 
Interface Definition 
Solution:  To address the lack of an interface definition that was identified during the 
table top exercise, the team must define interfaces associated with the mission thread and assess 
the I/ORL.  Defining each interface of a system prior to and during the interface design process 
is essential to the success of system interoperability.  Interface definition includes defining 
external interfaces with other systems, defining interfaces of system end items with each other, 
and defining interface objectives. 
The mission thread flow chart and other available diagrams can be used to help identify 
interfaces.  These interfaces can be human, hardware, and software aspects of a system.  These 
interfaces can be categorized as software-to-software, software-to-hardware, and hardware-to-
hardware.   
Issue:  Key players failed to identify critical interfaces as part of the I/ORL Process.   
Critical Interface Identification 
Solution:  While all interfaces are important in the SE process, certain interfaces must be 
distinctly considered to carry out the I/ORL Process.  The critical interfaces should be 
highlighted and brought to attention in the program review.  The focus on critical interfaces prior 
to the review will allow the system designer and developer to closely plan and lay out the system 
interfaces to satisfy the mission requirements.  Early consideration and planning of critical 
interfaces will make certain that system interoperability is integrated into the design and 
development of the system. 
Prior to the review, a team of engineers are required to identify critical interfaces for a 
critical mission thread in order to test the I/ORL Process.  The engineers identified the applicable 
interfaces for the critical mission thread but failed to identify the interfaces that have the most 
impact in the thread, the critical interfaces.  They did not assess the interface criticality prior to 
assigning the I/ORL objective and threshold.  The mistake was discovered when the engineers 
had difficulty assigning I/ORL values to an interface that was not critical in the I/ORL Process.  
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If the non-critical interfaces had been identified earlier, the team would have recognized that the 
interfaces did not have significant roles in the process. 
Issue:  The definitions for each I/ORL as described in Chapter IV of this report are not 
universal and it is difficult to apply to various interfaces. 
I/ORL Ranking  
Solution:  One way to clarify the I/ORL descriptions and make them more universal is to 
provide a brief, high-level summary of the I/ORL ranks to be used in addition to the detailed 
explanations.  It is important to note that the brief descriptions are useful for clarification of 
I/ORL values, however, the complete definition of an I/ORL must be used when making as 
assessment.  This summary of I/ORL values is outlined in Table 15. 
 
Table 15. High-Level Description of I/ORL Values 
This table describes the brief, high-level summaries developed for each of the I/ORL values. 
I/ORL High-Level Description 
9 In Operational Use 
8 Passed OT&E 
7 Component Interoperability Successful & Operational Scenarios Simulated 
6 Passed DT&E 
5 Component Design Complete & Reviewed for Interoperability Deficiencies 
4 Technology Demonstration of Interfaces 
3 Interfaces Requirements Documented 
2 AoA Addressing Interoperability Complete 
1 Identification and Exploration of Interfaces 
 
Another solution to help clarify I/ORL levels is to develop a training program.  Although 
the I/ORL Process is fairly simple, understanding I/ORL definitions is not trivial.  A curriculum 
could be established that expands on these definitions and provides examples on how to use 
them.  This could be offered via the Defense Acquisition University as an online class. 
Having more tools available to aid in understanding will allow those involved in the 
I/ORL Process to more accurately assess I/ORL values for interfaces.  This in turn will help the 
interfaces and consequently the system to perform better during operational testing. 
Issue:  No procedure was provided in the I/ORL Process for ranking I/ORLs. 
I/ORL Ranking Procedure 
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Solution:  A clearly defined process for ranking or assigning values to interfaces would 
assist the team in the I/ORL Process.  By outlining the ranking procedure, evaluators have a clear 
"means of attack" and can more accurately assess I/ORL values for interfaces.  Ultimately this 
will help the system interfaces to be more robust during operational test and evaluation. 
Once data is available to determine the maturity of critical interfaces, I/ORL values are 
assigned to each interface as part of the I/ORL Process.  In order to assign I/ORL values in a 
consistent way, a ranking procedure must be developed.  The process for ranking I/ORLs is 
outlined briefly below: 
• Review Interoperability Assessment Data: Prior to a review, subject matter experts 
have determined Critical System Interfaces as outlined in Chapter IV of this report.  
These are the interfaces on which an I/ORL assessment is to be made.  SMEs will 
provide technical specifications required to assess the CSIs.  Personnel responsible for 
assigning I/ORL values must review this data. 
• Understand I/ORL Values:  Evaluators are responsible to ensure they understand the 
meaning of I/ORL values.  These values are described in Chapter IV in the section titled 
"I/ORL Values".  Additionally, Table 15 is provided with increasing I/ORL values and 
hence maturity is presented.  Both sets of data can be used to understand the meaning of 
each I/ORL value.  Evaluators should attend training if it is available. 
• Discuss Maturity of Interface: All parties involved in assigning interfaces must 
thoroughly discuss critical interfaces.  The team must fully confer about the I/ORL data 
in order to fully comprehend the level of maturity of each interface. 
• Assess Maturity of Interface:  Once discussion has occurred evaluators must assess the 
interoperability data presented by SMEs.  Evaluator should assess the maturity or 
interoperability of each interface bearing in mind the I/ORL values and their meaning. 
• Assign I/ORL Values:  Upon assessing the interoperability maturity of an interface, 
evaluators assign an I/ORL based on the designated values in Chapter IV. 
• Repeat For Each Interface:  Repeat this process for each interface until I/ORLs have 
been assigned to each CSI. 
 
Issue:  The process of allocation of cost with respect to system interfaces and their 
interoperability within the overall system design from programmatic, life cycle cost (LCC), and 
implementation viewpoints was unclear. 
Cost Application 
Solution:  There are many factors in the SE process and cost should always be a 
consideration during this process.  The I/ORL Process can be used to help focus on 
interoperability areas that are known to, or could present possible cost application risks to a 
system’s design and development.  Program engineers and budget analysts need to consider the 
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various stages of the I/ORL Process and evaluate the cost associated with ensuring that the 
interoperability of the system is in line with the system’s respective stage of development. 
Implementation of bringing an interface to the appropriate I/ORL level can present a 
severe strain on the overall budget of a program if programmatic cost and LCC are not kept in 
check.  Programmatic costs can seem small at first, but these costs must be reviewed and vetted 
through the whole program to capture the true nature of how much it might cost to mitigate a 
potentially low I/ORL during a review cycle.  This cost does not just stop with trying to mitigate 
an interface to the next appropriate interoperability readiness level, but can extend well beyond 
the system engineering and design phase.  The cost application should be considered even into 
the out years with the entire life cycle cost for the program due to modifications made during the 
early development stages. 
The table top exercise demonstrated with the ranking of interfaces with I/ORLs where the 
interfaces were not at the threshold I/ORL value for the associated review; cost considerations to 
get the interface to the threshold level should be thoroughly investigated by the PM. The PM 
must then weigh all the factors involved to determine the way forward.  This type of exercise can 
give great insight into how the design team and program managers should work hand in hand 
during early development to ensure the right systems and interfaces are getting the correct 
attention, and the system is progressing at a suitable pace so as to avoid interoperability failures 
later in the operational testing phases. 
Issue:  The Alternative System Review (ASR) is a technical review that demonstrates the 
preferred concept is cost effective, affordable, operationally effective and suitable; and can be 
developed to provide a timely solution at an acceptable level of risk.  The ASR ensures that the 
resulting set of requirements satisfies the customers' needs and expectations, the system’s 
concepts align with the external environment, and the system under review is mature enough to 
proceed into the Technology Development phase.  These are the textbook definitions as defined 
in the Defense Acquisition Guidebook (DAG) but the goals are not clear in terms of interfaces 
(hardware and software) or Interoperability Readiness Levels (I/ORLs). 
Goals of Review 
Solution:  The ASR provides an agreement on the proposed material solutions, hardware 
and software architectural constraints or drivers to address all key performance parameters 
(KPPs).  As assessment of the full system software concept, a comprehensive rationale for the 
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proposed material solutions, a comprehensive assessment of the relative risks, and a 
comprehensive risk assessment for the Technology Development phase are performed.  The ASR 
also provides results of trade studies, technical demonstrations, joint requirements, refined 
thresholds and objectives, and a draft system requirements document all in terms of cost 
effectiveness, affordability, and providing an acceptable level of risk.  During the ASR, key 
system components and interfaces (both physical and functional) need to be identified across the 
entire system and interface design.  As seen during the TTX, I/ORLs need to be assigned to 
system interfaces where I/ORL objectives and thresholds are identified.  During the ASR, I/ORL 
values are assessed to the interfaces and if the I/ORL threshold is not met then mitigation steps 
are identified.  This will help identify any issues in regard to interfaces and system requirements 
prior to going to the Technology Development phase.  Changing requirements or interfaces later 
in the program development will usually produce cost increases and schedule slips.  The overall 
goals of the ASR should be entrance criteria for a system going into the Technology 
Development phase and System Requirements Review (SRR). 
3. Performing the Table Top Exercise – OTRR 
This review ensures that the production configuration system can proceed into Initial 
Operational Test and Evaluation (IOT&E) with a high probability of success.  The 
interoperability goals of the OTRR are to verify interoperability of the system with all other 
systems has been verified through laboratory testing, simulated operational scenarios, ground 
based testing, and under operational environmental testing (desert urban environment in the day 
or night using military special forces executing a planned representative task or rescue mission) 
(I/ORL 7). 
a. Performing the I/ORL Process 
The I/ORL Process was performed by the team while leveraging off the lessons learned 
from the ASR TTX.  The OTRR focused on Developmental Test and Evaluation (DT&E) results 
of the ACIH program, a provided artifact.  The team reviewed the goals of the OTRR to ensure 
the team shared a common general understanding of the objectives and to ensure a successful 
outcome of the review. 
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Before starting the TTX, the team regenerated the Mission Critical Thread definition and 
the respective Critical System Interfaces.  The Mission Critical Thread definition was supported 































Figure 28. Communications Mission Thread for the ACIH System 
This figure depicts the communications mission thread for the fictional ACIH System. The left side of the diagram 
represents the main internal components of the ACIH required for the mission thread and organizations that support 
the ACIH.  The right side of the diagram represents the external components that the ACIH must be interoperable 
with: satellite, T/R Headquarters, and other Helmet T/Rs.   
 
Using this diagram, the team was able to identify interfaces within the mission thread and 
discuss which interfaces were critical.  The following is a list of the CSIs:  
• Microphone-to-Core SW/HW 
• Speakers-to-Core SW/HW 
• Core-SW/HW-to Display 
• Core SW/HW-to-Transmit/Receive (T/R) 
• T/R-to-Satellite 
• Satellite-to-T/R Headquarters 
• User Interface-to-Core SW/HW 
• User-to-User Interface 
• Support Activity-to-HW Equipment 
• Support Activity-to-Software 
• Support Activity-to-Developer 
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• OS-to-Encryption SW 
• User-to-Headquarters 
 
The interfaces above identify the various hardware and software components within the 
helmet that must be interoperable to ensure the fulfillment of the mission thread.  Also identified 
are the various organizations/people vital to using, developing, and maintaining the hardware and 
software throughout the helmet’s life cycle.   
Experience from previously completing the ASR TTX essentially provided training the 
team required.  This resulted in a smoother execution of the process.  The team referred to the 
process and artifacts more, and utilized the revised I/ORL procedure to help assign I/ORL 
values.  This resulted in less confusion in assigning I/ORL values, and allowed the team to 
effectively find issues with the system.   
Upon completing the improved I/ORL Process, the team generated interface assessments, 
evaluated these assessments, and issued a Pass or Fail designation.  Results are presented in 
Table 16.   
Table 16.  OTRR TTX Results 








Mitigation Step Pass/Fail 
Microphone-to-Core 
SW/HW 
7 7 7 N/A Pass 
Speakers-to-Core 
SW/HW 
7 7 6 Re-evaluate requirement for 
audio frequency/Find cause 












7 7 7 N/A Pass 



















Mitigation Step Pass/Fail 
User-to-User Interface 7 7 6 Perform DT user-to-user 




7 7 7 N/A Pass 
ISEA-to-Software 7 7 7 N/A Pass 
ISEA-to-Developer 7 7 7 N/A Pass 
OS-to-Encryption SW 7 7 7 N/A Pass 
User-to-Headquarters 7 7 6 This issue is dependent on 
other issues to be resolved. 
Fail 
 
 As shown within the results, the TTX was successful in identifying critical system 
interfaces not ready for Operational Testing.  By identifying these failures ahead of time, the 
I/ORL Process will have prevented a failed Operational Test.  
b. Assessing the OTRR TTX 
The TTX for OTRR benefitted greatly from the initial ASR TTX.  However, while 
performing the TTX the team discovered a few minor issues; one dealing with the tracking table 
used during the review, and the other concerning timing of events.   
Issue:  While the team performed the second phase of the TTX, the team discovered one 
minor issue in the table used to keep track of the interfaces.  When the SETR Board was 
deciding whether or not the mitigation step was acceptable or not, there was no column to input 
their decision. 
Additional Column: Mitigation Step Accept/Disagree 
Solution: An additional column is required to keep track of whether or not the mitigation 
step is acceptable to the SETR Board.  This is an important option for the SETR Board in case 
the suggested mitigation step is unacceptable due to cost, schedule, or relevance.  The mitigation 
step can be updated and accepted at the review or at a later time.   
Issue: During the discussions of mitigation steps with the SETR Lead and the 
OPTEVFOR Representative, one concern that was brought up was that the time between the 
I/ORL assignment meeting and the actual technical review was not defined in the process.  The 
concern was brought up when minor ACIH issues from the first phase (I/ORL Meeting) were 
Time Between I/ORL Assessment and the SETR 
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discussed in the second phase, questioning whether issues found would be fixed by the time the 
review occurs.   
Solution:  While the amount of time between the assessment meeting and the review is 
ultimately determined by the program manager based on the status of the program, the team 
suggests the meeting be held anywhere from a month to two weeks before the actual review.  
This will allow enough time to mitigate any small issues found during the assessment meeting.  
However, any major issues costing the program additional funds and/or affecting the schedule of 
the system must be approved by the SETR Board.  
4. Summary of Table Top Exercise Results 
The goal was to perform the TTX at different sections of the System Engineering Process 
and gradually improve the process as the authors progressed through the reviews.  The I/ORL 
Process was assessed by going through an ASR and OTRR for a fictitious program.  Upon 
completion of validating the I/ORL Process via a TTX, several valuable lessons emerged from 
this exercise.   
a. The Need for Training 
The I/ORL Process is most effective when participants fully understand the process and 
are able to use their knowledge and skills to apply it to a program.  All involved personnel 
should have a common understanding of the I/ORL Process to collectively apply it to a system.  
It is important that the participants are provided with training and guidelines to increase their 
understanding and improve the application of the process. 
 The need for training was highlighted by the difference in performing the I/ORL Process 
between the ASR and the OTRR.  In the ASR, the team neglected to identify critical interfaces.  
The lack of understanding the I/ORL Process among key participants led to confusion and 
lengthy program reviews.  Performing the ASR effectively provided the team training.  With a 
greater understanding of the process and I/ORL values, the team executed more efficiently.  The 
OTRR TTX demonstrated that improvement in understanding the I/ORL Process enhanced and 
expedited execution. 
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b. Skipping a Review Can Lead to Problems 
Performing the TTX proved challenging due to the fact that the team only performed two 
reviews to validate the I/ORL Process.  The team noticed that issues found within the OTRR 
TTX would have been caught in earlier reviews.  If the TTX consisted of more SETR reviews 
earlier in the system lifecycle, these issues would likely have been caught earlier, resulting in 
fewer issues at OTRR. 
This TTX lessons learned can be applied to the I/ORL Process.  It demonstrates the need 
to apply the I/ORL Process to all the relevant reviews throughout the lifecycle of a system.  If the 
I/ORL Process is skipped, it is possible that the system will progress through reviews with some 
immature interfaces.  This could in turn lead to a system failing operational testing. 
c. The I/ORL Process Worked 
After conducting the OTRR, the team found critical interfaces that were not at the proper 
I/ORL in order to proceed.  The team found that the I/ORL Process worked well with regard to 
identifying interoperability issues before the system proceeds to formal Operational Test.  If 
these issues had not been caught by applying the I/ORL Process to the system, the system would 
have proceeded into OT&E and would likely have failed at some point. This would have had a 
major impact on cost and schedule for the program and would have ended in considerable 
amounts of follow-on testing in order to verify and secure the proper corrections 
By performing the TTX at two reviews, the team validated that the I/ORL Process is 
effective at ensuring that programs will likely pass operational testing.  Further, the team 
identified areas in the I/ORL Process that require more definition and clarification, and areas that 
were missing. 
 
B. MODELING AND SIMULATION 
The second part of the validation is a mathematical and computer model designed to 
demonstrate the high-level effectiveness of an I/ORL implementation.  The model stochastically 
simulates the interoperability work done throughout the SE process by assigning I/ORL values to 
system components and compares the assigned value to the required values at each of the 
decision gates.  If the system does not meet the prescribed I/ORL threshold for the technical 
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review, the system is reworked to meet the threshold at an additional cost that is assessed 
according to the development phase. 
If the system reaches operational test and does not meet the prescribed I/ORL threshold, 
the system is deemed to have failed.  This process is automated and repeated for a large number 
of systems and the number of failures is counted as well as total cost of failures incurred to the 
program. 
  To generate a meaningful comparison, the simulation performs two parallel models: one 
of the current SE process and one of the modified I/ORL Process.  Prior to each review, the 
interoperability is increased for each system in both models.  For the new process, if the system 
does not meet the I/ORL threshold values, it is reworked until it matches the threshold. 
Ultimately, the model takes random inputs simulating the size of the program and data 
outlining the effectiveness of the current SE process, and outputs relative OT pass rates and cost 
impacts.  The simulation compares the results of the two processes to draw conclusions on the 
effectiveness of adding the I/ORL measurement process.  See Figure 29 for a generic flow 




Figure 29. Flow Diagram for Modeling and Simulation 
This diagram shows the basic model structure.  Each system (represented by the red dot), moves through a series of 
decision gates.  As the system moves across each arrow in the diagram, the system is being worked on and the 
interoperability improves.  In the I/ORL Process, the system is evaluated at each of the technical reviews (A, B, and 
C in the above diagram), and, if the system does not meet the review requirements, it is reworked until it does.  
During the current SE process, the interoperability is not rigorously and consistently evaluated against a defined 
criteria and the system never incurs any rework.  At OT, the system has its interoperability field tested and it is 
determined to either pass or fail. 
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1. Model Assumptions  
Given both the time constraints and available data, the authors made the following 
assumptions to facilitate the model creation process.  The authors made the determination based 
on engineering judgment that none of the assumptions made would significantly alter the 
conclusions drawn by the model in a negative manner. 
● The maturity of an interface’s design can accurately be represented by a single number 
reflective of the interface’s interoperability 
a. Interoperability can be modeled as a real number despite I/ORLs only being 
integers. 
b. For the purposes of this model, the maturity of an interface design is represented 
by a single number on an interval scale, which is a constraint on those values not 
included in the I/ORL definitions provided earlier. 
● As a system design matures, the work done between technical reviews is represented by 
an increase in the I/ORL level.  That increase will not always be the same for each 
interface and nor from system to system.  Therefore, a random number generator was 
included in the I/ORL model between simulated reviews to represent design maturation 
in a realistic way.  Furthermore this assumes that 
○ There is an equal probability to be above or below the mean 
○ Interoperability work is well behaved, i.e. the standard deviation is significantly 
smaller than the mean 
● The total amount of interoperability work is the same between each review 
● The cost incurred to correct a design flaw is a fixed cost based on the milestone at which 
the problem was discovered 
● The amount of interoperability tracking in the current SE process is minimal 
2. Model Structure 
The model is a procedural program written in the MATLAB language.  MATLAB was 
chosen for its familiarity to the authors and due to its ease of processing array operations.  The 
full code is included in Appendix E. 
The model is designed to run a series of evaluations on a single system and record the 
results. That process is repeated a number of times (~10,000) and statistics are gathered from the 
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results.  As mentioned above, the model runs two concurrent models, one for the current SE 
process and one for the modified SE process, on an identical system. 
The model sequence is broken down into the following phases: 
● Data Initialization 
● Interoperability Work 
● I/ORL Measurement 
● Review Decision 
● Interoperability Rework 
● Operational Test Evaluation 
● Data Storage 
The description of each phase follows. 
a. Data Initialization 
During the data initialization phase, the simulation configures the variables for a new 
system.  This involves zeroing and recreating the interoperability arrays and other variables used 
in the simulation.  Since the constants do not change from run to run, they are defined up front 
and just referenced each time. 
During data initialization, the system generates anywhere from 5-20 interfaces to track 
using a uniform distribution.  The interface parameters are stored in an array structure and 
modified using MATLAB’s array operations throughout the simulation.  Given the probabilities 
involved, the quantities of interfaces for each system will alter the overall OT pass rate.  Through 
a series of test cases, the authors demonstrated that the effect of increasing the number of 
interfaces was minimal.  In addition, model parameters were calibrated based on the number of 
interfaces to match literature data, so if at a later point in time it is determined that the interface 
number should be adjusted, other model parameters can be adjusted to maintain model validity. 
b. Interoperability Work 
The simulation keeps track of the interoperability of each of the system’s interfaces 
throughout the acquisition process.  During an actual implementation on a real program, the 
details of the interfaces are critical to the evaluation of the I/ORL levels, but for the purposes of 
the model those details are abstracted away.  The model keeps track of interface quality 
independent of any details of the system/subsystem to which it is attached.  These interface 
 110 
interoperability values are stored in two separate arrays throughout the model: one for the current 
system and one for the new I/ORL system.  
Prior to each review, each of the critical interfaces had their interoperability increased 
based on a random amount.  The amount of interoperability is a distinct, normally-distributed 
random variable.  Although it is unique for each of the interfaces for the system, the amount of 
interoperability increase between technical reviews is identical between the current process and 
the new I/ORL Process (i.e. interface 1 current = interface 1 new, interface 2 current = interface 
2 new, etc.).  As mentioned in the assumptions, the math behind the model fundamentally 
assumes that interoperability is a number on an interval scale.  This assumption was made by the 
authors because the level of interoperability was an abstraction of a measurement of design 
maturity, and that measurement was defined to be on an interval scale.  It should be noted that 
because the system is interval does not imply linearity (i.e. the amount of effort, cost, schedule, 
etc. to go from an interoperability value of 1 to 2 may not be the same as from 2 to 3). 
c. I/ORL Measurement 
Once the new interoperability values are generated, the simulation models the 
measurement error for assigning the I/ORL values.  The process model used is a simple 
probabilistic model for assigning correct values, false positives, and false negatives.  If a correct 
result is generated, the system rounds the I/ORL value and uses that.  If either a false positive or 
false negative result is generated, the I/ORL value is rounded and the result is either added to or 
subtracted from the actual interoperability.  Note that this process is distinct for each of the 
system interfaces. 
d. Review Decision 
The I/ORL values are then compared to the threshold values for the technical review in 
question.  If the measured value for a given interface is above the threshold, it passes and if it is 
below it fails and heads for rework.  The technical reviews evaluated are ASR, SRR, SFR, PDR, 
CDR, IRR, FRR, and OTRR. 
e. Interoperability Rework 
Each system interface that fails a review has its interoperability reworked at an additional 
cost proportional to its developmental status. Since the cost data associated with the failures 
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tracks a fully fixed problem, the amount of rework done is assumed to be exactly equal to the 
work necessary to pass.  In other words, any interface that is reworked at a technical review has 
an interoperability equivalent to the threshold. 
If a system is reworked as described above, additional cost is incurred to the program.  
This cost is review-based and is determined by a table lookup.  The cost is incurred on a per 
interface basis (i.e. the cost to fix two interfaces is twice as expensive as the cost to fix a single 
interface) and does not factor how much rework needs to be done (i.e. if the system is deficient 
by .01 or .1 interoperability units, the cost is the same).  Note that given a false negative result, 
the system could be sent back into a rework state (and thus incur cost) even though there is no 
problem to fix. 
f. Operational Test Evaluation 
At this point, the system is now ready to enter operational test.  If all of the system's 
actual interoperability values are above the threshold of 7, the system passes operational test.  
While the perceived I/ORL value is used to determine if the system is ready to enter OT&E, the 
system’s actual interoperability is being tested during the OT&E phase and therefore is used as 
the pass criteria.  If a single interface is deficient, the system is considered to have failed for the 
purposes of the simulation and is sent to the final rework phase. Similar to the rework stage, if a 
system fails operational test, rework costs are incurred based on the number of interfaces that 
failed OT. 
g. Data Storage 
During the data storage phase the results are synthesized and stored for future analysis. 
After the simulation is complete, the total number of failures are tallied and descriptive statistics 
for the current and new systems are printed to the screen.  The statistics of key importance are 
the average minimum I/ORL value for each of the systems, the OT pass rate, and the total cost 
overrun which could be correlated to schedule slip. 
In addition to the table, a histogram is generated summarizing each of the systems.  The 
histogram shows the differences in minimum I/ORL value for the current process and the one 




Figure 30. MATLAB Model Output 
This figure displays the model output from MATLAB.  The simulation outputs two primary pieces of data.  The first 
is a table that displays the three primary model statistics: the average minimum I/ORL value for the systems, the OT 
pass rate, and the percentage cost overrun.  The second output is a histogram of the minimum I/ORL value for each 
of the systems (blue) compared to the minimum I/ORL pass criteria (red). 
3. Verification, Validation, and Accreditation 
Once the model structure was created, the underlying parameters had to be gathered such 
that the model generates valid results.  The three fundamental pieces of data that the authors 
determined were necessary to validate the model were interoperability work done between each 
review phase, costs of reworking an error, and the accuracy with which a team can apply 
I/ORLs. 
Because of a lack of access to the necessary data, the authors ended up “reverse 
engineering” a majority of the unknown parameters.  To accomplish this, the authors gathered 
data on the high level SE process results (for example OT pass, cost overruns, etc.) and adjusted 
the underlying model parameters until the model output matched. 
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a. Interoperability Work 
As mentioned previously, the simulation tracks an abstract interoperability value for each 
of the interfaces in the system.  In between each of the reviews, the interoperability of the system 
interfaces increases: this increase is termed “interoperability work.”   For the sake of simplicity, 
this interoperability work is defined to be a random number for each interface at each review 
based on a positive normal distribution with a particular mean and standard deviation. 
There were many particular random distributions to choose from, but, as mentioned in the 
assumptions, there were a series of characteristics that drove the decision.  The first was that the 
distribution would be well behaved.  The authors made the assumption that most programs 
would only enter a milestone review if all of their interfaces were deemed passing or, at the very 
least, near passing.  This obviously is not always the case, but that variation is accounted for by 
the randomness in the distribution.  The next one was that there would be an equal probability for 
the work to be above or below the mean.  The last factor in choosing the distribution of choice 
was ease of programming.  The authors wanted to make sure that the simulation could be run a 
statistically significant number of times to provide good results.  Given these assumptions, the 
authors chose a normal distribution.  Given more time and research, other alternatives could be 
found that better fit the assumptions and literature research on interoperability. 
To determine the mean and standard deviation of the random interoperability work done, 
a literature search was conducted but few direct sources could be found. The method that the 
authors ultimately decided upon is to manually create the model parameters to fit existing data.  
Because the model compares the current SE process to the new I/ORL system, the output of the 
current SE process portion of the model should match data from existing processes.  These 
parameters were then used for the I/ORL system as well to determine the relative change.  
Leveraging the work done by Eric Honour on the effectiveness of the SE process, the authors 
matched the model results to failure rates found in large engineering projects [Honour, 2004].  
By assuming that an equivalent amount of work is done between each of the reviews, the 
parameters were adjusted until the failure rate for the current SE process, as calculated by the 
model, matched the literature. 
The values that were ultimately chosen were a mean of 1.115 and a standard deviation of 
.215.  When these values are implemented in the model, the majority of the interfaces on a given 
 114 
system demonstrated sufficient design maturity to pass each review, but it is relatively common 
for one or more to fail and have to be reworked at each review. 
b. Rework Costs 
The most important parameter for determining the cost-effectiveness of the I/ORL system 
is the improvement to the cost and schedule of the programs involved.  The theory dictates that 
catching problems early in the SE process is more cost effective and saves time, and the I/ORL 
Process is designed to track problems such that they can be taken care of early. 
The authors were familiar with the general rule of thumb that as the system moves 
through the different phases of systems engineering (requirements definition, detailed design, 
developmental test, operations, etc.), the cost of finding and making changes increases an order 
of magnitude between each review.  The authors determined that if actual data could be acquired 
(rather than rough approximations), it would give the model the necessary inputs to accurately 
calculate the total normalized program cost. 
The authors returned to Eric Honour’s work on the ROI of Systems Engineering which 
compiled a list of past studies to provide an accurate approximation for the relative cost 
differences between the costs of changes at different phases of a software engineering project 
[Honour, 2007].  Unfortunately, Honour only provides relative rankings of the data and does not 
provide a reference for the absolute cost of a change, so it is only of limited use on its own. 
To accommodate this, the authors developed a baseline for the relative data.  Rather than 
trying to determine the absolute cost of one of the changes at a particular review and 
extrapolating for the remainder, the authors decided to use a similar approach to the OT pass rate 
and match total cost overrun for the model’s output for the standard SE process to actual data.  
Upon revisiting the Value of Systems Engineering work, Honour’s graphs indicated that the cost 
overrun of an average system was about 40-50%, so the authors scaled each of the relative costs 
to generate a total average cost overrun of 40-50% [Honour, 2004]. 
The authors were also interested in finding schedule slippage information in addition to 
the cost data.  Unfortunately, no schedule slippage data was available as a function of time.  
Although this assumption does not hold for all systems, one can assume that the bulk of the costs 
will be labor and thus the average schedule slippage savings would be approximately 
proportional to cost savings. 
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c. I/ORL Application Accuracy 
With any system of evaluation, the accuracy at which that system can be applied is 
paramount to its success and effectiveness.  Obviously there is no actual data on I/ORLs, so the 
authors began looking for the effectiveness of TRLs, assuming that the results would be 
reasonably similar.  Unfortunately, data outlining the application accuracy of TRLs was unable 
to be found.  To tackle this problem, the authors developed three potential options: 
● Assume 100% accuracy 
● Assume a rough accuracy (<100%) and document the assumption 
● Generate an accuracy model based on well-founded Human Reliability Analysis 
equations. 
The first option, while the easiest, was not a viable option given that, without 
measurement inaccuracy, systems would never fail OT&E.  In other words, if the evaluators 
always knew ahead of time that a system would fail OT&E, the system would never enter 
OT&E, and thus never fail. 
The third option would provide the most validity, but it would also be the most complex 
model to generate.  It would give the authors the ability to compare the accuracy rates of 
experienced versus inexperienced operators, at different reviews, etc., but fundamentally those 
effects were deemed to be minor, if any, when the simulation was run for upwards of 10,000 data 
points. 
Therefore the second option was the only one that was feasible given the project’s 
constraints.  The authors were not comfortable inventing numbers without some basis behind 
them, so a literature search was conducted.  No papers were found for the effectiveness of 
technical evaluation methodologies, but there is a broad and extensive field studying the 
accuracy of medical diagnoses.  While this was not generally applicable for the application in 
question, it did give validity that the numbers chosen were accurate within an order of magnitude 
[Bagnato, 2004]. 
Ultimately the accuracy of the measurement was defined to be 80% accuracy with a false 
positive rate of 15% and a false negative rate of 5%.  These numbers do not change the ultimate 
validity of the model and, as more data becomes available, the analysis can be modified to 
incorporate more accurate findings. 
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4. Model Results and Conclusions 
The model was run for 100,000 cycles and the following results were generated. 
 
Table 17. I/ORL Model Statistics 
(100,000 Samples) Current SE Process I/ORL Process 
Minimum I/ORL 6.9554 7.4565 
% OT Pass 46.13% 93.73% 
Rework Costs 44.26% 37.97% 
 
The minimum I/ORL values is the lowest I/ORL value of all of the systems’ interfaces at OT averaged over all of the 
number of runs; the % OT pass is the percentage of the time that the systems had all of the interfaces above the 7 
I/ORL limit for passing OT; and rework costs is the average of the total amount of additional costs generated 
because of failures to meet the required thresholds. 
 
Table 17 indicates two major facts about the model.  The first is that the model results for 
the current systems engineering process matches data gathered from real systems in the actual 
DoD acquisition process.  This gives the authors significant confidence that the model itself is 
valid.  
Given that the first point indicates that the model is valid, the second point is that the 
proposed process is significantly better than the current SE process at developing systems that 
pass OT on the first try.  Assuming that the technical review decisions are abided by, systems in 
the new process will pass more than 90% of the time on the first OT attempt.  The system should 
also reduce the total cost overrun for the programs implementing I/ORLs by an average of 6.29% 
of program cost.  Although these cost savings seem minor, there is the potential to save millions 
of dollars across DOD in the course of a fiscal year.  Additionally the model does show that 
I/ORLs will improve the chances that systems will meet their interoperability goals the first time. 
5. Model Areas of Improvement  
Although the authors deemed the model sufficient to make a decision on the overall 
effectiveness of the I/ORL Process, there are many areas in which the simulation can be 
improved. 
 117 
a. Programming Efficiency 
MATLAB was the programming language of choice due to the experience of the authors 
and the ease of use.  MATLAB is an interpreted scripting language and by default that is less 
efficient than compiled languages.  Moving the model to something less processor intensive will 
allow for a greater number of data samples and thus better statistical accuracy. 
In addition, increased efficiency would allow for greater model complexity without 
sacrificing the required statistical accuracy.  This would allow the model to make fewer 
assumptions and therefore provide a more accurate understanding of the true effects. 
b. Improved Data Sources 
As mentioned in the previous section, the authors had difficulties finding data to exactly match 
the model structure.  If improved sources can be found, the model’s code found in Appendix E 
can be refined to provide more accurate results. 
c. Study Effects of Program Size 
As discussed in the section on model assumptions, the amount of interoperability work 
done between technical reviews was assumed to be a normal distribution with a fixed mean and 
standard deviation.  Although the model was validated based on a normal distribution, there may 
be a better distribution that would provide more realistic results. 
By setting the number of interfaces, the program can simulate a large or small program 
moving through both the current SE and modified I/ORL Processes.  The authors feel that an 
interesting avenue of study for future work may be to analyze the effects of program size on the 
model’s outputs for OT pass rate and rework costs.  I/ORL methods may work well for large 
engineering programs, but their effects may not be as cost effective on smaller programs with 
fewer interfaces to track.  
d. Explore other distributions for interoperability work 
The authors made a simplifying assumption that the interoperability work done to the system 
interfaces could be modeled by a normal distribution.  There are many other distributions that 
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could have been chosen instead, and choosing a better distribution may be able to improve the 




VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
This project originated with a need to determine why systems are failing OT.  Mission 
criticality was a recurring topic throughout the preliminary research.  The sponsor had other 
groups studying various aspects of mission criticality; the authors were specifically asked to 
determine if OT failures could be reduced, through the application of mission critical threads.  
This project was not a typical SE design process as there is no physical hardware or software to 
design; rather, a Systems Engineering approach was applied directly to improving the Systems 
Engineering process.  
The project was focused and narrowed as it progressed from one stage to the next.  There 
was not sufficient time or resources for the Capstone Team to address every cause of OT failure.  
The data available for systems failing OT indicated that every system that failed, did so for 
multiple reasons, the most prevalent being interoperability, followed by reliability and training.  
Interoperability was prevalent in each of the OT failures, with concurrence of the Sponsor and 
the Capstone Advisor; interoperability became the sole focus of the new process’s detailed 
design.  Many processes were proposed by the authors, but ultimately the implementation of 
I/ORLs was determined to be the most appropriate method of addressing interoperability issues 
in mission critical threads.  An I/ORL rating and application process was developed by the 
authors; it was then validated and improvements made through computer based modeling, as 
well as a pair of table top exercises.  
Based on the modeling and the table top exercise, the authors believe that the current 
DoD Systems Engineering process could benefit from the implementation of I/ORLs.  The 
modeling estimates a savings of approximately 6.29% over the current System Engineering 
process.  This seems like a reasonable result for implementing I/ORLs.  Further, the new process 
does not eliminate the need for rework; rather it identifies deficiencies earlier in the design 
process so they can be corrected before further development occurs.  Additionally, the proposed 
process has the potential to reduce the amount of failures during OT&E (often highly visible) 
and allow for earlier assessments and adjustments to programs.  Such adjustments might be 
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reorganization, reevaluation of requirements, increased funding, and / or cancellation of a failing 
program.   
Expectedly the hardest aspect of the process to model is the human factors.  Factors such 
as a lack of or varied understanding of the processes and definitions, personal biases and 
opinions, political agendas, and human error are just some of the aspects that are difficult to 
model.  These human factors were considered and assumptions were included in the computer-
based model, as discussed in the I/ORL Application Accuracy Section of Chapter 5.  The human 
factors were more clearly evident during the Table Top Exercises.  Valuable data was collected 
for further refinements to potentially improve both the current process, as well as the proposed 
addition of the I/ORL process.  The complexity of the SE process, along with the volume of 
sources (government, academia, and commercial) providing guidance, interpretation and 
instruction, leads to variations in the human understanding of the SE process.  The authors 
concluded that a simplified SE process, with clear concise and standardized definitions would 
help to improve the process, with or without the implementation of I/ORLs. 
All of the research and new process design and validation were then used to answer the 
Research Questions posed at the beginning of the project development:   
 
Research Question 1
Mission critical elements are not currently being identified in the Systems Engineering 
process, and allocations or dependency on supporting resources (systems, sensors, data, etc.) are 
not being reflected in the contractor development plans, and testing plans.  To some extent they 
can be found in a more general form as KPPs, or COIs.  However, not all of these are critical to 
perform a given mission and the mission requirements may need to be more specific. 
.  How are mission critical elements identified and managed using 
the existing acquisition and SE processes? 
 
Research Question2
The authors conducted research on both the system engineering process and on systems 
that experienced difficulties during operational test and evaluation.  This research indicates that 
significant emphasis is placed on the Defense Acquisition System measurable performance 
parameters.  The result is an over emphasis of measurable parameters, which in some cases, 
.  What are the common failures in the engineering process that 
result in missing mission critical elements?  Where do these failures occur? 
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results in a loss of the intent of the requirement, thus resulting in complications later in 
development.  A lack of communication between the development community, the user 
community, and the operational test and evaluation community was noted.  This may result in a 
duplication of effort with regard to testing the systems, but more importantly because of the lack 
of communication, the testing conducted varies between DT and OT, between different test 
agencies performing the same/similar testing and from one system to the next.  This means that a 
system is evaluated according to one interpretation of the requirements during developmental 
testing (DT) and another during Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E).  These failures were 
observed in the form of problems with interoperability, reliability, training, suitability, and 
effectiveness.  For the purposes of this report, the authors have chosen to address the issue of 
systems passing DT but failing OT&E as a result of a lack of interoperability.  This is a mission 
critical area; however, when compared to standard performance goals it can be nebulous and 
difficult to test or simulate in a realistic way. 
 
Research Question 3
Mission critical failures are a serious problem.  Systems are failing to meet their 
operational effectiveness or suitability requirements at a rate of approximately 50% [Defense 
Science Board Task Force, 2008].  The high rate of failures and the cost associated with 
reworking these systems necessitates that an approach to track and monitor mission critical 
elements be identified.  While the failure rate included much more then interoperability, the 
authors did find that interoperability was the most prevalent.  Additionally, a secondary effect of 
fixing interoperability issues earlier in the design and development process is that it will allow 
for resources to be re-allocated and cost savings to be applied to other critical areas of system. 
.  How prevalent are mission critical failures of programs 
discovered during OT&E? 
 
Research Question 4
There are many M&S techniques available. For this project we found two techniques 
useful; both a Table Top Exercise and statistical/mathematical analysis through software 
simulation.  Table Top Exercises are a good method for evaluating single steps within the DODI 
5000.02 process; these exercises allowed us to focus on deficiencies in both the current process 
.  What kinds of Modeling and Simulation (M&S) can be leveraged 
to analyze DoN System Engineering processes? 
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as well as the recommended improved process.  In addition to finding flaws in the systems, the 
Table Top Exercises allow for the intentional introduction of specific events, challenges, missing 
or incorrect data and allow the observers to see how the process proceeds when the human 
element is included.  Unfortunately, running a table top exercise to simulate the whole of the 
DODI 5000.02 requirements process is too costly and time consuming.  The cost and time issues 
significantly outweigh any benefit from conducting such a large exercise.  For this reason, the 
entire process was simulated as a mathematical process.  While numerous modeling and 
simulation software programs are capable, MATLAB was chosen based on the skill sets of the 
Research Project authors.  MATLAB was used to simulate the higher level steps of the overall 
process, both current and proposed.  The analysis included a comparison of estimated costs for 
both processes, as well as assessing the quality of the interoperability readiness of the simulated 
products for both processes.  To achieve this, I/ORLs were assigned to the simulated products in 
accordance with the proposed process.  For comparison the simulation evaluated the output of 
current process and assigned an I/ORL after the current process was complete.  These two 
I/ORLs were used to compare the two processes.   
 
Research Question 5
The authors developed a process to assess the interoperability maturity of a system.  To 
accomplish this, the authors developed I/ORLs as a tool to assess the maturity of interoperability 
throughout the design process of a system.  This improvement evaluates the developmental status 
of capabilities and interfaces that allow the system to interoperate with other legacy and new 
systems in support of mission critical threads.  I/ORL values are assigned throughout the process 
and are used to predict the system's ability to pass operational test and evaluation with regard to 
interoperability.  This report outlines the proposed process and provides a list of possible 
improvements. 
.  Can process improvements be used to supplement the DoN System 
Engineering processes to improve handling of mission critical elements of programs? 
 
Research Question 6
As demonstrated by the modeling, by identifying problems earlier, these enhanced 
processes have the potential to decrease developmental costs by 6.29%.  The earlier problems are 
.  What are the cost ramifications and possible benefits of 
implementing these enhanced processes? 
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addressed, the less rework is required in both time and money.  Equally importantly, the model 
shows an increased OT&E pass rate through an increase in systems engineering efficiency; 
leading to decreasing costs (both time and money).   
 
B. RECOMMENDATION 
 It is the recommendation of the authors that DOD included the I/ORL proposed 
process as part of an improved SETR process.  While introducing additional I/ORL requirements 
and simultaneously streamlining the process may seem contradictory, they are mutually 
beneficial.  The streamlining suggested is a more concise, articulated set of rules and definitions 
for program managers, systems engineers, contractors, users, and financial personnel.  This 
streamlining includes providing clear definitions and guidance on the use of mission criticality. 
The current process is improved upon by introducing I/ORL’s.  However, the integration of the 
human into the SE process still requires improvement, as is expected in any process where 
humans are involved. The additional information provided to programs in the form of I/ORL 
requirements and clarifying definitions will help to improved interoperability in system 
development. 
 
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
Throughout the process, the authors realized there were numerous areas that could not be 
studied by the authors do to a lack of resources and time.  Early on in the project, it was realized 
that the scope of the project needed to be reduced to a more manageable size.  The initial 
research pointed to three common causes of OT failure: interoperability, reliability, and training 
issues.  The authors chose to study interoperability, as every system studied in the research failed 
OT with some interoperability issues, while only 75% failed with reliability and training issues.  
No further investigation was made into the cause of reliability or training failures after the down 
scoping of the project.  These have the potential to become separate projects in and of 
themselves.   
Another area that was briefly discussed during the down select is the cost of 
implementing the new process.  The authors are aware there are costs associated with training, 
implementing, and maintaining process; no analysis was done to estimate the actual cost of 
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implementing the new system or the administrative burden.  Despite any possible increased costs 
during initial implementation it is assumed during the down selection that: 
 
● All of the new processes considered have training and implementation costs. 
● The long term savings of implementing a new process will far outweigh the cost of 
process implementation. 
● The new process would result in better OT results than the current process. 
It is suggested that an additional study be done to determine the actual cost of 
implementation and training on the new processes.  It is likely that these costs can be mitigated 
to some degree by combining with other proposed changes to the SE process; however, the 












I.  Introduction 
This is the Capstone Project Management Plan (PMP) for the Naval Sea Systems Command 
(NAVSEA) Cohort 311-092S, hereto after referred to as the Mission Critical Team.  As part of 
the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) Master of Science in System Engineering (MSSE) 
Capstone Project, the Mission Critical Team will investigate changes to the requirements 
identification and management processes that a system will utilize during the Department of the 
Navy System Engineering process. 
1.1 Problem Statement 
The current Department of the Navy (DoN) system engineering process has documented 
instances of programs failing to detect critical inter-operational failures prior to operational level 
testing.  Programs are successfully passing developmental testing; however, these tests do not 
provide adequate assurances that the system will satisfy user needs or CONOPS-based 
interoperating requirements of the operational community.  Furthermore, requirements that are 
critical to mission success are not being identified in the current SE process, and allocations or 
dependency on supporting resources (systems, sensors, data, etc.) are not being reflected in the 
system engineering, contractor development plans, and testing plans. 
DoDI 5000.02 and related documents describe the Defense Acquisition System used for 
development of Department of the Navy programs.  Despite extensive guidance and multiple 
decision gates, programs are still failing to ensure that all requirements critical to meeting the 
user need are identified and properly tested prior to the start of the Operational Test and 
Evaluation (OT&E) process.  Improvements must also be made to the system engineering 
requirements process to ensure that these critical requirements are made visible at key technical 
reviews(s) such as Preliminary Design Review (PDR), Critical Design Review (CDR), Test 
Readiness Review (TRR), and Production Readiness Review (PRR). 
1.2 Research Questions 
The following research questions will be answered as the project progresses: 
 How are mission critical elements identified and managed using the existing acquisition 
and SE processes? 
 What are the common failures in the engineering process that result in missing mission 
critical elements?  Where do these failures occur? 
 How prevalent are mission critical failures of programs discovered during OT&E? 
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 What kinds of Modeling and Simulation (M&S) can be leveraged to analyze DoDI 
5000.02 processes? 
 Can process improvements be used to supplement the DoDI 5000.02 processes to 
improve handling of mission critical elements of programs? 




The key stakeholder for this project is the naval war fighter.  Although the war fighter 
does not encounter the identified problem until a system becomes operational, the war 
fighter is left to deal with consequences of an ineffective system that is delivered with 
deficiencies.  The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) 
process describes the Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) as the war fighter representative 
into the acquisition infrastructure. Commander, US Fleet Forces Command (CFFC) is the 
approval authority for the Capability Development Documents (CDDs) and Capability 
Production Documents (CPDs).   
Naval War Fighter 
 
The Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition Chief 
Engineer’s Office is responsible for System Engineering Technical Reviews (SETR) for 
all ACAT programs, regardless of the ACAT designation ASN (RDA) CHENG will be 
interested in the outcome of this project as our sponsor.  We will be engaged with their 
representative on a continuous basis to understand and receive guidance on the direction 
of the project.  They will also be interested in the utilization of the possible process 
changes for incorporation into the SETR process. 
ASN (RDA) CHENG 
 
The Program Offices and Program Managers for specific development systems may be 
impacted by this project.  The programs/systems may be able to utilize the output of this 
project to re-define their systems engineering process, requirements definition, test 
planning and conduct. 
Program Office/Program Managers 
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 
The design engineering teams may be affected by the outcome of this project.  This could 
be the prime contractors or the SYSCOM field activities charged with the system 
development efforts.  The criteria identified for “mission criticality” may have impacts on 
the design and development of a system, along with the testing requirements identified. 
System Design, Development and Validation Teams 
 
OPTEVFOR assesses the operational effectiveness and suitability of new and improved 
war fighting systems and capabilities.  The outcome of this project may provide 
additional information in order to evaluate systems under test. 
U.S. Navy Operational Test and Evaluation Force (OPTEVFOR) 
1.4 Project Proposal 
Based on the need to address this deficiency in the current system development process, 
the current DoDI 5000.02 process will be analyzed by investigating methods to improve 
capturing, monitoring, implementing and testing the requirements critical to ensuring mission 
success.  Improvements to the DoDI 5000.02 processes will be developed to ensure that these 
requirements are identified and promulgated through key program documents and design 
reviews.  The objective of this capstone project will be to develop enhanced processes 
supplementing DoDI 5000.02 to improve the handling of these requirements.  These enhanced 
processes will be simulated on a DoD system in a tabletop exercise to provide an example of 
how this modified process should be performed.  The enhanced process and the demonstration 
will be documented in the capstone final report.  
System engineering principles and methodologies will be used to propose changes to the 
requirements processes in the DoN acquisition system to ensure that requirements that are 
critical to mission success are identified and ensure that these requirements are integrated into 
the system development plans and testing plans.  These requirements must be aligned with the 
user needs and system requirements and must be testable at the system and interoperability 
levels.  This process is initiated at the system needs analysis phase and continues through the 
operational testing phase.  Development of these requirements requires the early involvement 
and support of the users and testers in order to ensure that operational testing accurately 
represents the needs of the users and to align the system development process with the user 
needs.  In addition to ensuring that these requirements are included in the original requirements 
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baseline, this process will ensure that these requirements are included in the appropriate 
development and testing plans and all applicable design reviews.   
A DoN program will be selected to use as a demonstration of the enhanced process.  This 
program will be selected based upon availability of critical information and the knowledge, 
interest, and experience of the capstone team.  The critical information necessary will be system 
requirements as tested during operational testing and the history of how the requirements were 
determined from the user needs and how those requirements changed over the development 
cycle.  This demonstration will entail performing the key steps of the requirements process as a 
tabletop exercise.  The results from these steps will be documented in the final capstone report. 
In addition, the team will perform a cost/benefits analysis of the enhanced process, including an 
assessment of how the requirements and/or testing of the program would have changed if this 
modified requirements process had been performed. 
1.5 Organization 
The Mission Criticality team is made up of 15 members located in three different 
geographical locations: NSWC Indian Head MD, NSWC Dam Neck VA, and NSWC Port 
Hueneme CA.  The cohort’s project orientation is functionally organized between Project 
Management and Systems Engineering, as indicated in Figure 1.  The roles and responsibilities 




Figure 1  Organizational Chart 
1.5.1 Roles and Responsibilities 
Table 1. Roles and Responsibilities 




♦ Provide guidance throughout the project 
Program Manager ♦ Interface with the sponsor, stakeholders, instructor, 
and advisor 
♦ To monitor project progress and ensure schedule 
and documentation requirements are met 
Editor (Project Control) ♦ Edit and compile all documentation 
♦ Ensure format structure is maintained throughout 
all documentation 
Librarian/Webmaster(s) ♦ Maintains copies of all submitted drafts and final 





















(Project Control) stakeholders (through SAKAI) 
♦ Maintains organization of SAKAI group webpage 
♦ Takes minutes for all meetings involving the entire 
Capstone Team 
♦ Collects and maintains meeting minutes from the 
leads of each small group 
Scheduler (Project Control) ♦ Responsible for developing and updating the 
schedule and tracking all due dates for the project 
Systems Engineering Team ♦ All group members will participate in the System 
Engineering Process.   
♦ Ensure the appropriate Systems Engineering 
approach is utilized throughout the project 
♦ Perform all system engineering tasks as required 
♦ Break into smaller teams to perform parallel system 
engineering tasks as appropriate 
 
1.5.1 Team Member Assignments 
The initial team member roles are listed in Table 2.  As previously stated, most members 
are a part of the systems engineering team.  Their specific assignments will change as the project 
progresses.  Several systems engineering team members have additional aptitude in specific roles 
(e.g. modeling and simulation); these will be taken into account during task assignment 
 
Table 2. Team Member Roles and Responsibilities 
Name Initial Roles & Responsibilities  
Kyle Foley Co-Program Manager 
Michael Thrift Co-Program Manager 
Eric Hawley Lead Editor 
Janet Holt Librarian/Webmaster 
Alex Guerao Scheduling Lead 
Peggy Rogers Systems Engineering (Backup Editor) 
Chirana Pimsarn Systems Engineering (Backup Librarian/Web)  
Tien Phan Systems Engineering (Backup Scheduler) 
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Steve Tegtmeyer Systems Engineering  
Steven Possehl Systems Engineering  
Jesus Garcia Systems Engineering 
Phong Trinh Systems Engineering 
John-Anthony Gorospe Systems Engineering  
Theodore Schindler Systems Engineering  
Mark Cavolowsky Systems Engineering  
 
1.6 Project Advisors 
Dr. Paul Shebalin is Director of the Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering and 
a Senior Lecturer of Systems Engineering at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA.  
Mr. Gregory Miller is a Lecturer of Systems Engineering at the Naval Postgraduate School in 
Monterey, CA.  These two professors will be our project advisors for the duration of the capstone 
project. 
1.7 Risk Management 
Risks affecting the success of the development of an improved process will be identified 
throughout the project.  In identifying the risks, the probability of occurrence and the potential 
consequence will be quantified by initiator of the risk, on a scale from 0 to 1.  A risk rating will 
be given (probability of occurrence times potential consequence), which will be used to prioritize 
the risks.  Once the risks are properly identified and prioritized, mitigation strategies and 
contingency plans can be developed in order to reduce the risk rating.  These strategies and plans 
will be brought to the team as a whole for approval before taking action on the risks.  Once these 
mitigation strategies and/or contingency plans are approved, the risk will be monitored as the 
mitigation steps occur, up until the risk will be at a point that the program is willing to assume.  
The risk matrix shown in Figure 2 will be used to visually display the risk. 
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Figure 2. Risk Matrix 
1.7 Risk Management 
Below are the initial risks to this project as identified by the project team.  As the project 
progresses, additional risks will be added as they are identified. 
1.8.1 Personnel Risk 
Description:
 Risk Rating: 0.48 
 If the project is not properly scoped to the amount of personnel on the team, then 
the project schedule may slip to the right, missing the due date. 
 Probability of Occurrence: 0.6 
 The problem statement for the team has been established, and the project 
management plan contains an attainable schedule.  The team must meet the 
deliverables and milestones in order to stay on schedule to meet the due date.  
The probability will reduce as the project progresses according to schedule. 
 Potential Consequence: 0.8 
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 If the team over-estimates what can be accomplished, then it can affect the 
successful completion of this project on time.  This can result in having an 
uncompleted project at the due date. 
 Mitigation Steps: 
 Keep the team engaged by scheduling regular meetings. 
 Ensure scope of the project does not increase to the point where the team cannot 
realistically accomplish the goals. 
 Properly decide when to move onto the next phase of the project. 
1.8.2 Resource Risk 
Description:
 Risk Rating: 0.35 
 If the project lacks the resources to collect data from past and current systems, then 
the proposed process (deliverable) may be inadequate. 
 Probability of Occurrence: 0.7 
 The lack of data for this project is potentially high due to the difficulty of 
obtaining historical information from past and current ACAT acquisition 
programs.  As the project progresses and more data are received, this rating 
can be reduced. 
 Potential Consequence: 0.5 
 While this will unlikely prevent the completion of the project, the amount of 
data is directly related to the quality of the project.  The more data that can be 
studied, the better the quality of the project. 
 Mitigation Steps: 
 Talk to various points of contacts to obtain historical data on ACAT Acquisition 
programs. 
 Analyze data to ensure its quality. 
.8.3 Changing Requirements/Scope 
Description:
 Risk Rating: 0.64 
  If the requirements for the project continuously change/grow, then the project 
schedule may slip to the right, missing the due date. 
 Probability of Occurrence: 0.8 
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 The project is currently still being defined through the PMP.  Requirements 
for the project have not been written down.  Probability of occurrence can be 
reduced throughout as the project progresses. 
 Potential Consequence: 0.8 
 The consequence of allowing requirements to change while unmanaged can 
increase the scope of this project, affecting the successful completion of this 
project on time.  While a product can still be turned in at the due date, the 
product would be incomplete. 
 Mitigation Steps: 
 Ensure the scope/requirements of the task are within the team’s capability. 
 Baseline the requirements to prevent requirements creep. 
 Manage requirements change. 
2   Systems Engineering Approach 
The approach outlined below provides the overall systems engineering process that will be 
used during this project. 
2.1    Overview 
The goal of the project is to analyze the deficiencies of the current systems engineering 
process supporting Department of Navy (DoN) Acquisition in the area of requirements critical to 
ensuring mission success.  This will likely include creating an addendum to the current systems 
engineering process.  
2.2    Process Phases 
The project will consist of five phases: Process Review and Problem Identification, Analysis 
of Alternatives, Detailed Process Design, Process Validation, and Present Recommendations 
(Figure 3).  Each phase will be executed by taking the inputs and feedback from later phases.  
Once the given outputs are of suitable quality, then each phase can be considered complete.  A 
detailed description of each phase is found in the subsequent sections.   
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Figure 3. SE Process Diagram 
 
2.1.1.  Process Review and Problems Identification 
All stakeholder needs and requirements will be collected and prioritized based on 
pertinence to the project objectives and stakeholder importance.  Conflicting needs/requirements 
will be discussed with the required stakeholders to reach an agreement/compromise before the 
team baselines the requirements. 
Process Description: 
The team will review the current systems engineering process contained within the 
Department of Defense (DoD) acquisition process.  The goal will be to examine the process’s 
overall effectiveness at identifying the mission critical requirements and evaluating these 
requirements during developmental testing.  The process will be evaluated to determine how 
system level requirements are developed from user needs.  Further investigation will be 
conducted to examine how operational tests are developed based upon the system requirements 
and the underlying user needs. 
 
Research will be done to identify recently developed systems that passed and failed 
operational testing.  Each system will be examined to determine sources of success and causes of 
failure.  This will be accomplished by addressing questions such as: 
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 How are a system’s requirements captured in a Capability Development 
Document (CDD) supported by (or connected to) doctrinally-defined missions? 
 Are appropriate user-centric, solution-neutral metrics identified?   
 Are a system’s external interfaces identified?   
 Are realistic Concepts of Operation (Conops) used?  
 Were testers and end users formally involved in the Systems Engineering 
Technical Review (SETR)? 
The system’s ability to meet their requirements and objectives that satisfy the 
stakeholders’ needs will be analyzed to determine the mission critical beneficial concepts and 
shortfalls for a system’s engineering process.   
 DoD Process Guidelines: VCJCS Oversight (CJCSI 3170.01), USD(AT&L) Oversight 
(DoDI 5000.02), Navy SETR Handbook., WSARA, and the Navy NR-KPP 
Implementation. 
Inputs: 
 Historical Data based on Existing Systems (Both Passed and Failed OT) 
 Inquiry for Problems (Feedback from Analysis of Alternative Phase) 
 Agreed Upon Requirements from Stakeholders 
Outputs: 
 Identified mission critical beneficial concepts and shortfalls based on historical data 
 Process Map of existing SE Process 
 List of assessed systems  
2.2.2.  Analysis of Alternatives  
The analysis of alternatives will be accomplished following the identification of the 
source of failures pertaining to requirements critical to mission success within the system 
engineering process.  Key decisive criteria will be established at this phase to determine feasible 
alternatives.  The application of decisive criteria will be employed to exclude undesirable 
solutions and highlight acceptable alternatives.  Multiple process concepts will be developed 
based upon these decisive criteria.  A cost analysis will be developed for each of the concepts, 
analyzing the cost of implementation and the cost of execution.  These concepts will also be 
Process Description: 
 140 
rated based on the quality of process improvement, looking at factors concerning thoroughness, 
traceability, and simplicity.  The resulting concepts will then be evaluated and chosen to develop 
the best mission criticality process based on cost-effectiveness and process improvement in order 
to prevent the shortfalls identified in the previous phase. 
The programs identified in the previous phase will be evaluated to determine what 
program will be used as the representative example.  This evaluation will be done based on 
availability of critical information, team knowledge of the program, and the representative nature 
of the program.  The representative nature is defined as being of sufficient complexity to 
adequately demonstrate the process and also the likelihood of the problems encountered on that 
program.  Based on these evaluations, a single program will be selected as the representative 
example.  
 Agreed Upon Requirements from Stakeholders 
Inputs: 
 DoD Process Guidelines: VCJCS Oversight (CJCSI 3170.01), USD(AT&L) Oversight 
(DoDI 5000.02), Navy SETR Handbook., WSARA, and the Navy NR-KPP 
Implementation. 
 Identified mission critical beneficial concepts and shortfalls based on historical data 
 List of assessed systems 
 Process Map of existing System Engineering (SE) Process 
 Mission Criticality Concepts (Feedback from the Detailed Process Design) 
 Mission Criticality Process Solution 
Outputs: 
 Mission Criticality Process Alternatives 
 Representative Program 
 Inquiry for Problems (Feedback to Process Review and Problem Identification Phase) 
2.2.3.  Detailed Process Design 
The selected process concept will be used to develop a mission criticality process that can 
be integrated into the DoD system engineering process. The new process could possibly include 
new deliverables such as: new exit/entrance criteria, modified documents, new/modified 
Process Description: 
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instructions, and organizational charts that describe roles and responsibility.  Mission Criticality 
Process Alternatives will be used as reference material when encountering detail design issues.  
Concepts for improvement can be taken from the alternatives or generated during the detailed 
design.  These concepts can be used as inputs in the Analysis of Alternative phase to create an 
improved process solution.  While designing the new process, the mission criticality validation 
criteria must be developed.  In the next phase, this process will be simulated on the 
representative program selected in the previous phase. 
 Mission Criticality Process Solution 
Inputs: 
 Mission Criticality Process Alternatives  
 Agreed Upon Requirements from Stakeholders 
 Design Modifications (Feedback from the Process Validation Phase) 
 Mission Criticality Detailed Process 
Outputs: 
 Mission Criticality Process Validation Criteria 
 Mission Criticality Concepts (Feedback to the Analysis of Alternatives Phase) 
2.2.4.  Process Validation 
The new mission criticality process will be evaluated on the representative system by 
performing table-top exercises.  The exercises will use the validation criteria developed during 
the design/modeling phase to evaluate the process.  Cost data concerning the execution of the 
process will be collected while the process is validated.  The results from the evaluation will be 
analyzed and reported. 
Process Description: 
 Mission Criticality Detailed Process 
Inputs: 
 Mission Criticality Process Validation Criteria 
 Representative Program 
 Mission Criticality Process Evaluation Report 
Outputs: 
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 Cost Analysis Report 
 Design Modification (Feedback to the Detailed Process Design Phase) 
2.2.5.  Report Findings and Make Recommendation 
Once the process is simulated and analyzed, a final report can be generated for the 
sponsors, stakeholders, and advisors.  The report will include how successful the new process 
was at addressing the problems encountered on the representative system and how other systems 
examined could have benefited from this new process.  The report will include a cost analysis for 
implementation of this process for future systems.  A presentation will accompany the report in 
order to present the findings of the team. 
Process Description: 
 Mission Criticality Process Evaluation Report 
Inputs: 
 Cost Analysis Report 
 Final Report and Recommendations 
Outputs: 
 Brief Out Presentation 
3 Milestones & Deliverables 
Figure 4 below provides the proposed schedule and milestones for this capstone project.  The 
major milestones are IPR #1, IPR #2, and the Final Presentation. 
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  3.1. Schedule 
 
Figure 4. Schedule and Milestones 
  3.2.  Deliverables 
Based on the need to address this deficiency in the current system development process, 
the current DoDI 5000.02 process will be analyzed by investigating methods to improve 
capturing, monitoring, implementing and testing the requirements critical to ensuring mission 
success.  There will be two primary deliverables of this capstone project.  First, enhanced 
processes will be developed supplementing DoDI 5000.02 to improve the handling of these 
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critical mission requirements.  Second, these enhanced processes will be simulated on a DoD 
system in a tabletop exercise to provide an example of how this modified process should be 
performed.  The results from these steps will be documented in the final capstone report. In 
addition, the team will perform a cost/benefits analysis of the enhanced process, including an 
assessment of how the requirements and/or testing of the program would have changed if this 






APPENDIX B:  OPERATIONAL TEST PLANNING PROCESS 
The Operational Test Director (OTD) uses several documents in preparation for testing.  
OTDs have an obligation to get involved early as possible in the development of a new weapon 
system including providing meaningful input to various foundation documents.  The defense 
acquisition system has undergone significant changes since the introduction of the Joint 
Capabilities Integration Development System (JCIDS) in 2003.  Since many programs continue 
to use legacy documents, the OTD references legacy and current foundation documents 
including: 
• Mission Needs Statement (MNS) 
• Operational Requirements Document (ORD) 
• Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) 
• Acquisition Program Baseline (APB) 
• Acquisition Information Assurance (IA) Strategy 
• Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) 
• Capability Development Document (CDD) 
• Capability Production Document (CPD) 
1. Mission Need Statement (MNS) 
DoD Regulation 5000.1R, a legacy document, required DoD components to document 
deficiencies in capabilities and opportunities to provide new capabilities in a MNS.  These 
capabilities are expressed in broad operational terms in the MNS.  System performance 
objectives and minimum acceptable requirements were developed from the MNS as part of the 
development of the ORD. 
2. Operational Requirements Document (ORD) 
DoD Regulation 5000.1R, a legacy document, required the use of the ORD to document 
system requirements.  The JCIDS process uses capabilities documents for system definition, 
some programs may still use an ORD to define system requirements. 
3. Analysis Of Alternatives (AOA) 
DoD Instruction 5000.2 describes the use, format, and content of an AOA.  The AOA is 
an analytical comparison of operational effectiveness, suitability, and life-cycle cost of 
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alternatives that satisfy established mission capability requirements.  The OTD may use the AOA 
as a source document supporting MBTB and TEMP development. 
4. Acquisition Program Baseline (APB) 
The PM initially develops the APB as a concept baseline prior to program initiation.  A 
development baseline and a production baseline are prepared for MS-B and MS-C capturing the 
key parameters that define the system and listing the objectives and thresholds are listed.  Key 
parameters are the Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) and the Measures of Suitability (MOSs) 
identified in the requirements/capabilities document.  The OTD reviews the APB to ensure 
consistency between the requirements/capabilities document, the baseline which establishes 
explicit performance and thresholds, and the TEMP. 
5. Acquisition Information Assurance (IA) Strategy 
IA is defined as measures that protect and defend information and information systems 
by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation.  This 
includes providing for restoration of information systems by incorporating protection, detection, 
and reaction capabilities.  IA must be addressed for all weapon systems; command, control, 
communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems; and 
information technology programs that depend on external information sources or provide 
information to other DoD systems.   
6. Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) 
The ICD is required before MS-A, as part of the JCIDS process.  It is the equivalent of 
the legacy MNS, but is much more definitive in describing the program to be developed.  An 
ICD documents the requirement for materiel or nonmateriel approach, or an approach that is a 
combination of material and nonmateriel, to satisfy specific capability gap(s).  It defines the 
capability gap(s) in terms of the functional area, the relevant range of military operations, desired 
effects, time, and Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel, and 
facilities (DOTMLFP), education, and policy implications and constraints.  The outcome of an 
ICD could be one or more joint DOTMLPF change Recommendations (DCRs) or CDDs.  
Programs that enter the acquisition process at MS-B shall have an ICD that provides the context 
in which the capability was determined and approved, and a CDD that describes specific 
program requirements.  Pre-MS-A projects shall rely on the ICD as the basis for the evaluation 
strategy. 
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7. Capability Development Document (CDD) 
The CDD is required at MS-B and serves the same purpose as the legacy ORD.  The 
CDD outlines an affordable increment of militarily useful, logistically supportable, and 
technically mature capability.  The CDD may define multiple increments if there is a sufficient 
definition of the performance attributes (key performance parameters, key system attributes, and 
other attributes) to allow approval of multiple increments.  The CDD is required at Milestone B 
for new programs and for each increment of an evolutionary acquisition program. 
8. Capability Production Document (CPD) 
The CPD is required at MS-C as part of the JCIDS process.  This is the capabilities 
document that supports IOT&E.  The CPD reflects the operational requirements resulting from 
Engineering Manufacturing and Development and details the performance expected of the 
production system.  Software shall have demonstrated the maturity level required in the CPD 
prior to deploying it to the operational environment.  Once the maturity level has been 
demonstrated, the system or increment is base-lined, and a methodical and synchronized 
deployment plan is implemented for all applicable locations.  OT&E shall determine the 
operational effectiveness and suitability of a system under realistic operational conditions, 
including combat: determine if thresholds in the approved CPD and COIs have been satisfied; 
and assess impacts to combat operations. 
9. Reviewing Foundation Documents 
When reviewing these documents the OTD considers from an operations viewpoint, why 
develop it?  How will it be used?  In what installations or platforms?  In what environments 
(natural and mandate)?  How well should it work?  When should it work? What must DT&E and 
OT&E do to prove the system’s operational effectiveness and suitability?  When must DT&E 
and OT&E prove the system’s operational effectiveness and suitability? 
10. The Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP) 
The TEMP is the single most important T&E document associated with an acquisition 
program.  It is the controlling T&E management document for all acquisition programs and, in 
general, must be approved by the Director of DT&E and the Director of OT&E at milestone B 
prior to beginning OT&E.  The TEMP is directive in nature, and defines and integrates test 
objectives, critical issues, system characteristics, test responsibilities, resource requirements, and 
test schedules. 
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11. Purpose of the TEMP 
The purpose of the TEMP is to combine the DA’s DT&E plans and COMOPTEVFOR’s 
OT&E plans into one integrated master plan approved by the CNO or higher authority.  
COMOPTEVFOR develops the Critical Operational Issues (COIs) for each program and 
publishes them in the TEMP.  The COIs are linked to CNO requirements established in the ORD, 
ICD, CDD, or CPD. 
Determining the essential elements of operational effectiveness and operational 
suitability, the COIs to be resolved in OT&E, and the questions which must be answered to 
resolve those issues is difficult; a contributing factor to the difficulty is the number of sources or 
agencies involved.  MOEs and MOSs should be clearly established in the requirements 
documents COMOPTEVFOR reviews for testability and appropriateness prior to this process.  
When the DA provides a list of MOEs and MOSs on a first-draft TEMP, the OTD ensures that 
they are operational characteristics, not technical characteristics.  From OPTEVFOR’s viewpoint 
operational backgrounds overshadow technical backgrounds.  The OTD should ask two basic 
questions when developing input to the TEMP: 
• What should it do from an operational mission accomplishment viewpoint? 
• What shouldn’t it do from an operational mission accomplishment viewpoint? 
Additionally the TEMP serves several secondary purposes.  It allows all involved to see 
exactly what hurdles the system must clear and when, it allows the DA to project T&E costs 
which must be funded, and it allows Fleet, range, simulator, and target schedulers to plan, well in 
advance, for the required services.  Specifics, including requirements of new or modified 
facilities, must also be identified in the TEMP. 
12. TEMP Policies 
The contents of the TEMP and the relationship of key portions to the successful 
completion of the overall OT&E program cannot be overstated.  An approved TEMP or an 
approved TEMP revision, constitutes direction to conduct the specified T&E program, including 
the sponsor’s committed support, and constitutes approval of the COIs.  Test plans will be 
prepared directly from the TEMP and will carry out its provisions. 
TEMPS may be reviewed in their entirety twice:  once when the DA submits a draft for 
comment, and again when the final version is received for the Commander’s signature.  Before 
the first review, the OTD should have provided the DA with OT&E schedule inputs for Part II, a 
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complete Part IV, and OT&E resource requirements fro the Part V.  At that time, OT-C and OT-
D should be included in the schedule.  The OTD’s review of the complete TEMP should address 
all parts.  The DA is responsible for ensuring the TEMP is updated at milestones, when the 
program baseline has been breached, or on other occasions when the program has changed 
significantly.  The OTD works closely with the DA to ensure COMOPTEVFOR’s input is 
provided in sufficient time to support the required update, ensuring that COMOPTEVFOR is not 
responsible for program delays while preparing TEMP updates. 
The TEMP must be updated at all milestones, when significant program changes occur, 
or when the program baseline has been breached. 
13. TEMP Basics 
A TEMP is prepared jointly by the DA and COMOPTEVOR, with the involvement of 
both the OPNAV program sponsor and the N091 T&E coordinator in early draft reviews.  
During the TEMP review process, the OTD ensures the minimum acceptable operational 
performance requirements (older programs) or MOE/MOS (newer programs) from the approved 
ORD/ICD/CDD/CPD are incorporated.  COMOPTEVFOR contributes to all parts of the TEMP 
and provides the OT&E portions throughout the document.  The parts specifically provided by 
COMOPTEVFOR are drafted by the OTD. 
The TEMP is required at MS-B for all programs.  Since the TEMP is prepared jointly by 
the DA and COMPOPTEVFOR, the OTD is involved in all stages of TEMP preparation.  This 
requires the OTD to be familiar with other program documentation (MNS, ORD, 
ICD/CDD/CPD, Information Assurance (IA) strategy, ONI Capstone TA, etc.) and close 
coordination with the DA, particularly during program changes. 
14. Test Planning  
Operational testing consists of exercising a system or equipment under conditions that are 
as close as possible to the expected natural, operational, and combat environment using 
operational scenarios.  Forces, friendly and oppositional, apply realistic tactics against targets 
that fight back.  Additionally, operational testing consists of ensuring that the test article is 
representative of the intended production equipment and is installed as it is expected to be 
installed in the Fleet.  The test article is operated and usually maintained by Fleet personnel. 
OT provides data on system performance in the operational environment.  Performance 
includes all the elements of operational effectiveness and operational suitability.  The 
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environment includes many things such as people (operators, maintainers, etc.); other systems 
that will also be consuming power, radiating, etc., in the same ship or aircraft; ships or aircraft in 
the vicinity, employing their own systems; established constraints or rules of engagement; 
natural environmental factors (visibility, sea state, oceanographic, etc.); the simulated enemy, 
tactics, and countermeasures the operator employs; and so on.  
15. Test Plan Preparation 
Test plans are required for each identified phase of OT&E for all ACAT programs. 
Preparing the test plan focuses on several fundamental issues important to the overall OT&E 
process.  These issues include the purpose of the test; capabilities/functions of the COIs to be 
examined; how the test will be conducted, whether operation-oriented or scenario-oriented 
testing will be used; evaluation criteria against which test results will be measured; resources 
required to support OT&E; data collection methods and requirements; and data analysis methods 
to be employed. Test plan writing begins upon resolution of these issues. 
16. MBTD Planning Process 
The OT&E methodology is moving from functional-based test design to Mission-Based 
Test Design.  Regardless of the stage in the acquisition process a program resides, the initial 
steps in the MBTD process are alike once the decision has been made to use the MBTD 
methodology.  The MTBD process is also applicable to FOT&E.  The MBTD planning process 
is followed in its entirety for each increment or spiral of a program, although some portions of 
the process may be abbreviated. 
Figure 32 from COMOPTEVFOR Instruction 3980.1 [2008] reflects an overview of the 
MBTD and OT Framework development process.  This figure depicts the steps of a mission 
analysis for the system under test.  It shows the steps required to develop the information needed 
to write the OT Framework.  It also depicts how the OT Framework acts as input to the IT 
integration process (if applicable) and how the mission analysis provides the OTD/C the 




Figure 32.  MBTD (and IT when applicable) Process Flow Chart “From 
COMOPTEVFOR Instruction 3980.1 [2008].” 
 
The MBTD process begins with a meeting or series of meetings held between the 
program T&E stakeholders.  The intent of these meetings is to [COMOPTEVFORINST 3980.1: 
6-3]: 
• Define and map the overarching T&E strategy to ensure all stakeholders start from the 
same philosophical foundation.  
• Develop a list of acquisition and operational documents required to support the mission 
analysis effort.  
• Determine who should participate in/support the mission analysis effort and where and 
when it will commence.  
• Define the format and content of testing requirements inputs to an IT matrix database (if 
IT is applicable).  
• Determine where the IT matrix database (if IT applicable) will be maintained and who 
will have access.  
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• Derive test data and information sharing rules (may be adjusted for the ITT charter).  
• Establish separate analysis/reporting requirements.  
The ground rules and definitions from the meetings are documented in the approved 
TEMP.  The ground rules may be incorporated in a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) 
approved at an appropriate level in the event that the TEMP or a TEMP update is too far in the 
future.  The ground rules and definitions are later followed by approval in the TEMP. 
17. Mission Analysis 
The purpose of mission analysis is to identify the tasks the system will support, derive the 
mission-based COIs, partition the tasks into subtasks, and correlate the result with the required 
capabilities and their associated attributes from the ORD/Capabilities Document (CD).  Upon 
completion of these tasks direct traceability of any system enhancement, risk area, or deficiency 
discovered during testing to a mission or missions is enabled. 
Mission analysis is a combined effort among COMOPTEVFOR, the program 
representatives, and other participants such as the Fleet Forces Command (N8) representatives 
and operational users. Additional Subject Matter Experts (SME) may be included to ensure this 
evolution is completed thoroughly. Inclusion of key participants ensures DT, OT, and CT 
stakeholders (when included) are in full agreement concerning the missions, tasks, requirements, 
and defined capability attributes of the system. To ensure all T&E members are working from 
the same foundation, key participants must first complete and agree on the mission analysis for 
the system.  The mission analysis is conducted by the participants to derive the tasks and 
missions applicable to the system to be tested using the following system documents: 
• The CONOPS or concept of employment  
• The current ORD/CD  
• The Universal Navy Task List (UNTL) (OPNAVINST 3500.38B)  
• The Universal Joint Task List (UJTL), (CJCSM 3500.04C) (for joint programs)  
• The Navy or Marine Mission Essential Task List (METL) 
• Other appropriate documents 
18. Detailed Process Description 
Mission analysis consists of 6 steps:  identify tasks; derive mission COIs; identify 
subtasks; establish conditions; develop attribute matrix; and allocate COIs, tasks, and subtasks to 
attributes.  Mission analysis is an iterative process where two or three of these steps will be 
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conducted together and repeated several times to complete the breakdown of a given mission into 
tasks, subtasks, and conditions. When the mission analysis is complete, the results must be 
documented in the OT Framework and approved in the TEMP (or MOA if needed).  
Step One: Identify Tasks.  This step begins by conducting an analysis of available 
documents (ORD/CD, CONOPS, UNTL, and METL for units employing the system under test) 
to identify tasks that the system under test will support.  There are 2 general cases to this task.  
The first case is when the Mission Essential Tasks (MET) that the system will support are known 
and well documented.  The second is when the specific MEATs are not adequately documented. 
Step One, Case 1: The METs that the system will support are known and well 
documented.  This is usually documented in the CONOPS section of the CD or some other 
task lists.  The known METs are collected and sorted into categories as either “mission tasks” 
or “supporting tasks.” The definition of mission tasks is highly dependent upon the system 
and the unit employing it. Supporting tasks include those tasks that support a defined mission 
task or multiple mission tasks. 
Some tasks may not be called out in available documentation. Upon completion of 
sorting the METs noted above, the UNTL is reviewed to determine if there are other tasks 
that would fit the system under test.  If additional tasks are identified, agreement between all 
stakeholders is sought early in the process to ensure that all selected tasks are appropriate for 
test. 
 Step One, Case 2:  In the case when specific METs are not adequately documented 
there may be no direct relationships established to the UNTL.  Consequently, all available 
requirements documents must be analyzed to determine what missions the system might 
support. Once a notional mission list is compiled, the UNTL is then reviewed and appropriate 
UNTL tasks are “mapped” to the notional mission list.   
Additionally, reviewing the UNTL may yield unique mission tasks not found in other 
documents and/or supporting tasks that could be considered for multiple missions. Once 
tasks have been selected, agreement between all stakeholders is sought early in the process to 
ensure that all selected tasks are appropriate for test. 
Upon completion of step one the OTD should have a documented list of all mission and 
supporting tasks. 
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Step Two: Derive Mission COIs. The mission COIs are derived next based on the list of 
mission tasks identified in step one. COIs are created from individual mission tasks or from 
grouping similar mission tasks to form a single COI.  It is important to ensure that tasks are 
combined such that the COI is specific enough to be relevant to the unit using the system, but not 
so specific that each COI is simply a variation of an overarching mission. Upon completing 
additional steps in the MBTD process, the similarities in task breakdowns, conditional variations, 
and capabilities correlation that exist between COIs may become more obvious and the COI list 
may need to be adjusted.  The result of this step is a list of specific COIs written in a particular 
format.  Additionally, a COI/task summary and a COI task breakdown hierarchy is developed.  
Step Three: Identify Subtasks. Subtasks are separate actions to be performed to carry 
out each task.  It is important to breakdown the subtasks to the correct level as the subtask 
breakdown will enable the identification of all conditions (in step four) that may potentially 
impact task performance. It will also allow for correlation of capability attributes to specific 
subtasks.  
Temporal views, block diagrams that depict the steps of the task process in order of 
occurrence, are produced for each task to depict the breakdown of the task into its component 
subtasks.  The numbering system established in step two is further expanded to include the 
subtasks in order to create a hierarchical numbering of each mission-task-subtask breakdown.  At 
the completion of step three, the OTD should have a temporal view for each task, a mission-to-
subtask hierarchical list, and a subtask cross-reference table.  
Step Four: Establish Conditions.  Conditions are variables of the operating 
environment that affect the performance of the subtask; they describe the physical (littoral, open 
ocean, calm seas, low visibility, etc.), military (single unit/task force/joint operations, aircraft 
division, etc.), and civil (population density, civil unrest, etc.) variations that impact subtask 
performance and form the operational context for selected subtasks.  Conditions/descriptors 
should be derived or implied for the ORD/CD.  If the more general UNTL conditions/descriptors 
need to be used, they should be modified to fit the system-specified capabilities. 
Once the conditions are established and documented, the informational view, a temporal 
view block diagram with conditions, inputs, and outputs added to it, is produced using the 
temporal view (from step three).  First applicable conditions for each subtask are added.  Once 
conditions have been added, subtask inputs and outputs are added. At the completion of this step, 
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the OTD should have produced a conditions directory listing applicable conditions for all 
subtasks and an informational view for each task. 
 Step Five: Develop Attribute Matrix. Document capability attributes from the 
ORD/CD in matrix format. An attribute, sometimes referred to in legacy documents as a 
“requirement,” is as a quantitative or qualitative characteristic of an element or its actions, where 
element refers to the system.  Qualitative attributes may be expressed in terms of an action or 
outcome required from the system. Quantitative attributes usually have numbers associated with 
them and may have quantifiable standards. 
Once all attributes have been documented, standards are defined.  Standards may be 
provided in the ORD/CD.  In cases a standard has not been defined in the ORD/CD, one must be 
defined.  If possibly a quantitative standard is applied to a qualitative attribute.  If this is not 
possible the attribute matrix must somehow specify what is “good enough” with regard to the 
attribute, even if a survey is used as the data collection method. 
At the completion of step five, the OTD should have a table or spreadsheet of all 
ORD/CD-defined attributes and their associated standards. This matrix will form the basis for 
subsequent steps as additional information is added, and will end up forming the basis for the 
OT-DT-CT input to the integration effort that occurs after framework development.  
Step Six: Allocate COIs, Tasks, and Subtasks to Attributes. This step continues the 
population of the attribute matrix created in step five.  It takes the documented ORD/CD 
attributes and their associated standards, and linking COIs, tasks, and subtasks to them. Many 
linkages are explicitly defined in the ORD/CD.  For those that are not, linkages will have to be 
determined based on operational experience. Many attributes may be linked to multiple missions, 
tasks, and subtasks, further complicating the process. However, the linkages must be made as 
they are absolutely essential to the direct traceability between attributes/standards (including Key 
Performance Parameters (KPP) and thresholds) and mission COIs. 
At the completion of this step, the attribute matrix developed in step five, and further 
populated with COI and subtask information, should form the basis of the attribute-to-subtask 
matrix. If, at the end of step six, it is determined that an attribute from the list cannot reasonably 
be associated to a COI, task, or subtask, consideration may be given to removing it from the list 
as either an orphan attribute or as a system attribute that has little or no relation to the operational 
effectiveness or suitability of the system. The program sponsor and other members of the ITT 
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should be consulted prior to making a final decision with regard to removal of an attribute from 
the list since this database will be shared by T&E stakeholders within the ITT. 
Once the above steps are complete the mission analysis section is complete.  This 
provides the prerequisites for stand-alone OT planning. If consensus between all T&E 
stakeholders on the mission analysis for the system is not achieved the statutory requirement for 
OT independence dictates that further OT planning be based on the OT position regarding the 
specific disagreement. The product of this mission analysis effort, including the templates and 
the database, must be documented (to confirm agreement among the participants) in the 
evaluation strategy or TEMP. If the TEMP is still months away, an MOA can be used in the 
interim.  
19. Completing the OT Framework/Stand-Alone OT Planning 
Additional steps are performed by the OTD to complete the OT Framework.  Note that 
once the mission analysis is complete and documented, OT and DT (and CT at some point) can 
begin separate test planning. Separate planning is conducted to produce the stand-alone test 
objectives for OT and DT (and CT, when appropriate).  
OT and DT planners document their test objectives, prior to integrating, to ensure: 
• The IT and independent OT will provide OPTEVFOR sufficient data and assurance in the 
results of testing to make an effectiveness and suitability determination, and Fleet 
release/Fleet introduction recommendation.  
• A basis is established for calculating savings/cost avoidance attributable to the IT effort.  
• Each entity (OT, DT, and CT) has an adequate and approved framework for their testing 
and the integration process; for oversight programs, this would include DOT&E approval 
of the OT Framework.  
The separate OT planning begins with the products of the mission analysis effort.  
Step Seven: Develop Additional Operational Attributes and Standards. The OTD 
expands on previous steps by developing operational attributes which were not included in the 
ORD/CD; developing associated standards for these attributes; and tying them to COIs, tasks, 
and subtasks.  By developing a list of operational attributes to be used in conjunction with the 
ORD/CD documented attributes, the OTD helps to more clearly focus the testing toward 
answering the COI questions so as not to become a mere “spec checker.”  At the completion of 
the process, the OTD should have a comprehensive attribute-to-subtask matrix that includes all 
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necessary test attributes.  This comprehensive matrix is not intended to ensure all requirements 
and operational expectations for the system are defined prior to the beginning of IT.  
Step Eight: Devise Test Methods for Each Subtask. In steps eight and nine the OTD 
devises test methods for each subtask, keeping in mind the attributes/standards and data 
collection requirements associated with these subtasks. Although these tasks are listed as 
separate steps, they are completed simultaneously. Test methods describe the approach to be 
used to collect the data necessary to determine the satisfactory execution of the subtask, and to 
determine performance as compared to the derived and implied standards. Consequently, data 
collection requirements must be known before test methods can be finalized. When completed, 
the test methods will form one of the building blocks for the vignette descriptions built in step 
ten.  
The OTD uses the subtask cross-reference matrix developed in step three to begin 
devising test methods for each subtask.  This matrix ties all like subtasks together to enable the 
OTD to develop a common method for common subtasks. The OTD adds “Attribute,” “Test 
Method,” and “Data Requirements” columns to the matrix. Using the matrix from step seven, the 
attribute numbers corresponding to the subtasks should be added. The test method is added to the 
matrix for each subtask once it has been developed.  In conjunction with step nine, data 
requirements are added to the final column.  The goal of this step is to ensure the collection of 
the data necessary to determine the satisfactory execution of the subtask and to determine 
performance as compared to the attributes/standards. 
Step Nine: Derive Data Requirements. Derive data requirements for all subtasks to 
determine whether the COI, task, and subtask have been satisfactorily accomplished, and 
whether all standards, quantitative and qualitative, have been met. Describe quantitative and 
qualitative data requirements in sufficient detail to support the integration process. For 
qualitative data, the OTD first defines what qualitative information is needed from the survey to 
support the resolution of COIs and standards before relevant, useful surveys can be constructed.  
At the completion of steps eight and nine, the OTD should have a test method/data requirements 
matrix that directly ties data elements back through test methods, standard, subtasks, tasks, and 
COIs. 
Step Ten: Build Vignettes. The OTD’s team (analyst, other operational testers) takes all 
of the information developed in steps one through nine and builds test “vignettes.” Vignettes are 
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designed to ensure the thorough testing of all attributes, standards, tasks/subtasks, and missions.  
Creating vignettes consists of parsing mission and task execution into manageable chunks which 
can be accomplished within a dedicated OT period or throughout the longer IT period. Vignette 
descriptions provide the test team with a detailed methodology and “game plan” for the 
execution of individual test events to ensure all OT objectives are met. 
 When involved in the IT process, the OTD uses the vignette development process to 
determine how much independent OT is required at the completion of IT. Executing the IT 
vignettes provides much of the information necessary to resolve COIs prior to the 
commencement of IOT&E at the end of the IT phase.  IOT&E becomes a series of end-to-end 
mission confirmation events based around combined IT vignettes. 
Vignettes are constructed from single subtasks in some cases and in others subtasks can 
be grouped together logically to be executed together.  The OTD attempts to minimize the 
number of overall conditions, developed in step four, associated with the task and its component 
subtasks.  In this step, the condition list should be reviewed and narrowed down to include only 
those conditions which impact the performance of the system under test in relation to the 
subtask. 
The OTD decides on appropriate subtask parsing and develops basic vignette 
descriptions. The vignettes descriptions, their associated identifiers, subtasks, and conditions are 
then combined into a vignette-to-conditions matrix.  Typically there will be many subtasks and 
associated conditions, multiple matrices may be needed.  The end result this process should 
provides the OTD with a basic description of the vignettes, which will be used to create more 
detailed vignette procedures.  
The OTD identifies each vignette as a candidate for integration or as an independent 
OAT or IOT&E when planning for IT.  This facilitates the integration process and provides 
fidelity to the OT Framework. 
The test method and data requirements, derived in steps eight and nine, supports the 
development of detailed vignette procedures by adding fidelity to the vignette description.  The 
output of step ten is a vignette-to-conditions matrix, a vignette cross-reference matrix, and a 
vignette procedures matrix to which resource requirements will be added in step eleven.  
Step Eleven: Determine Resource Requirements. Upon completing the previous steps 
the OT team has all the information required to determine test resource requirements for stand-
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alone OT of the system. In this step the OTD documents these requirements in sufficient detail to 
support either dedicated OT or the IT integration process, including:  
• Number of test articles with any specific configuration requirements  
• Specific aircraft, ship, submarine, unit, or exercise support requirements  
• Specific range, test site, instrumentation, and threat requirements  
• Flight hours, at-sea time, or system operating time  
• Special support equipment requirements  
• Any M&S requirements  
• Specific operator or maintenance training requirements  
• Pre-faulted modules or Maintenance Demonstrations (M-DEMO)  
• Any special instrumentation or data collection requirements  
These resources are identified by vignette and then rolled up to determine the overall 
stand-alone OT&E requirements. The OTD also identifies any potential limitations to test for 
inclusion in the OT Framework in this step.  Examples include threat replication, inability to test 
the system in certain environments that were identified as significant conditions in step ten, or 
unavailability of key test resources or instrumentation.  
Once the step is completed the OTD  can now bi-directionally trace a data element all the 
way up to the mission COI based on the requirements/capabilities-to-subtask correlation already 
completed in the mission analysis effort.  The OTD can now write an OT Framework, with the 
key component being the final vignette matrix developed through this process. 
20. OT Framework 
The OT Framework is the primary document that defines adequate OT and, when 
appropriate, for integrating the OT objectives with DT and CT objectives to form an IT matrix. 
The OT Framework also provides the basis for the OT input to the TEMP, and defines the OT 
objectives and the specific test requirements for resolution of each COI, and the OTD’s 
minimum IOT&E test requirements. The OT Framework is reviewed and changed if necessary 
any time there are significant program or documentation changes/revisions since it is generated 
much earlier in the T&E process timeline.  Changes include completion of CDR, the release of a 
CDD or CPD, or any major program perturbations.  An update or change to the OT Framework 
is an appropriate place to document any limitations to test that may arise during the course of the 
IT effort.  
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The OT Framework must be approved by COMOPTEVFOR and DOT&E for oversight 
programs.  Once approved, the OTD is ready to begin the integration process. Any future 
changes to the OT Framework would be handled in the same way changes to an approved test 
plan are handled. 
21. Test Integration  
IT combines CT, DT, and OT to form a cohesive testing continuum. Participants (CT, 
DT, and OT) must have determined their entering objectives for adequate testing of the system 
under evaluation before integration testing can occur.  IT does not alleviate the requirement for 
independent OT reporting based on separate OPTEVFOR analysis of the shared test information 
produced by the IT effort. 
The integration process begins with the OT Framework approved. The goal of the process 
is to identify any and all opportunities for synergy in planning, execution, and data collection 
during the IT period.  However, from an OT perspective, an identified synergy may be lost if the 
system configuration changes at a later date or the data collected is deemed unusable for some 
other reason. Each entity should enter the process with a matrix of test objectives in a compatible 
format and based on an agreed mission analysis structure.  The first accomplishment is preparing 
and obtaining approval of an Integrated Test Team (ITT) Charter. The charter specifies critical 
coordination factors such as [COMOPTEVFORINST 3980.1: 6-19]: 
• IT matrix development and format for OT, DT, and CT inputs  
• Detailed IT event planning and execution process  
• Data/test information sharing criteria  
• Separate analysis/reporting  
• Data format and handling  
• Data repository location  
• Data fidelity requirements  
• Scoring criteria and formula for calculated metrics  
• Process for arbitration of disputes  
• Process for inclusion of supplemental or regression testing requirements  
• Process for prioritization of testing requirements  
• Method for identification of comparative cost savings/schedule compression as a result of 
IT 
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The ITT should stand up soon after contract award, which ensures OT participation early 
in the development of the system under test.  The product of the IT integration effort is an IT 
database, similar in structure and content to the OT Framework database, but merged with DT 
and CT objectives. 
22. OPTEVFOR Test Plans 
COMOPTEVFOR test plans consist of E-tests and S-tests.  E-tests are keyed to the COIs 
and are given the title of the COIs they are intended to address.  There are 10 S-tests which are 
standardized in COMOPTEVFOR test plans. They are:  
(1) Test S-1, Reliability  
(2) Test S-2, Maintainability  
(3) Test S-3, Availability  
(4) Test S-4, Logistic Supportability  
(5) Test S-5, Compatibility  
(6) Test S-6, Interoperability  
(7) Test S-7, Training  
(8) Test S-8, Human Factors  
(9) Test S-9, Safety  
(10) Test S-10, Documentation  
All of the 10 standard S-tests will usually be applicable to IOT&E. Some may not be 
appropriate to very early OT&E phases or to late FOT&E.  The inappropriate tests are omitted in 
these cases. Additional tests are used as required.  
23. COIs and Evaluation Criteria  
Each phase of OT&E is an investigation of operational effectiveness and operational 
suitability of the system up to that point in time. Prior to IOT&E, in the early phases, COIs are 
assessed by evaluating risks associated with each COI. In IOT&E, COIs are resolved as either 
SAT or UNSAT, or are unresolved. 
The essential elements of operational effectiveness, the things the system must and must 
not do for mission accomplishment, vary from one system to the next.  For a given system, the 
essential measures of operational effectiveness and operational suitability form the framework 
for the capabilities and functions of the COIs; the COIs define operational effectiveness and 
operational suitability for a given program. 
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All COI capabilities and functions are examined in IOT&E.  Not all COI capabilities and 
functions are examined during earlier OT&E.  This is because, at this point, the equipment 
generally does not closely approximate the planned production configuration.  The capabilities 
and functions of COIs for a phase of OT&E are documented in the TEMP. 
24. Scenario-Oriented or Operation-Oriented Testing 
Although the OT&E testing methodology is moving to MBTD, it is not always the way to 
perform OT testing.  Two common methods in OT&E when not doing MBTD are scenario-
oriented testing and operation-oriented testing.  
Scenario-oriented testing is typically employed for systems whose modes of operation or 
functions change in response to a changing operational situation (e.g., a radar suite).  The OTD 
develops scenarios based upon the threat as derived from the applicable threat documents to 
stress the system under test in a realistic threat-representative manner. Scenario-oriented testing 
typically allows the Fleet user the greatest flexibility in operating the system as the tactical 
situation changes.  This affords the OTD greater opportunity to make informed decisions on the 
merits of the system and its capability to meet CNO-assigned thresholds.  
When developing the scenarios, the OTD must:  
• Be complete and state what results are expected from each scenario.  
• Describe the tactical situation at the start of the exercise (e.g., single-ship littoral 
operations with a high probability of air attack).  
• Describe the situation that develops (e.g., electronic surveillance detection of enemy 
aircraft) and what is expected to happen (e.g., detection, acquisition, and engagement of 
the enemy aircraft).  
• Supplement this narrative with diagrams or tables specifying the movements of exercise 
participants (friendly and enemy) and their expected actions at specific times.  
• Develop a sufficient number of scenarios to test the system, and be prepared for the 
unexpected. Commanding officer’s tactical decisions, loss of assets or services, or fouling 
of the firing ranges can all lead to unexpected results or non-completion of scenarios.  
Several scenarios may be required for multipurpose systems to exercise their various 
capabilities.  The data recorded during the scenarios are used for reconstruction and analysis of 
the various E-tests and S-tests. Often, scenario-oriented testing is dedicated testing (in terms of 
 163 
Fleet RDT&E support), although it can be accomplished on a not-to-interfere basis during Fleet 
exercises. 
Operation-oriented testing is typically employed for equipment whose mode of operation 
or function does not change with the tactical situation (e.g., torpedo tubes or waste disposal 
systems). These systems are either in use or not in use.  They can be tested by simply operating 
them in the anticipated environment. The events and conditions necessary during system 
operation must be specified (e.g., the targets and operating environments) when operation-
oriented testing is used.  Test events and conditions must provide an operationally realistic test of 
the system. 
In either scenario- or operation-oriented testing, the following are kept in mind:  
Simulation of all possible enemy actions are included is included in testing.  This 
includes countermeasures to tactics employed.  All reasonable expected actions the target 
systems are expected to encounter must be adequately replicated in the test.  The 
replication is representative of enemy capabilities.  The range of environments and 
threats is covered. 
The natural and electronic test environment should approximate the anticipated 
operating environment.  This includes the anticipated background noise caused by other 
ships, aircraft, etc., to determine the effects of Electromagnetic Interference (EMI); the 
anticipated natural environmental conditions, such as sea state, temperature, cloud cover, 
etc., to enable a determination of their effect on system performance; operation of other 
equipment that may be used in conjunction with the tested equipment to allow evaluation 
of changes in electrical power loads, effects of gunfire-induced shock and vibration, EMI, 
etc.; and all relevant joint interfaces and other interfaced units/systems in the anticipated 
joint operating environment.  
The number of resources required for testing should reflect what the weapon 
system would realistically be expected to encounter in actual operations. 
25. Operational Test Director Responsibilities 
The Operational Test Director has responsibilities prior to and during test operations.  
Many of these responsibilities include ensuring that various checks are performed. 
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26. OTD Responsibilities Prior to Test Operations 
The OTD performs various checks as the date to begin test operations approaches.  
Checks include the following: 
• Appropriately trained personnel will be available to operate and maintain the equipment 
• The equipment to be evaluated will be installed and checked out 
• Operator and maintenance manuals, the Integrated Logistic Support Plan/Acquisition 
Logistic Support Plan (ILSP/ALSP), NATP, and other  necessary documentation will be 
available from the DA 
• Instrumentation will be available and in working order 
• Targets, simulators, electronic warfare services, etc., will be available 
• Participants have received and understand test plans and LOIs 
• RTD&E support services are on track 
• Contingency plans are available for the unexpected 
• Arrangements have been make for pretest briefings, including arrangements for 
additional briefers if needed 
• Rehearsals of test operations are scheduled if appropriate 
• Pre-faulted modules will be available for an M-DEMO if necessary 
 Immediately prior to the start of test operations the OTD ensures the following: 
• All hands know what they are supposed to do 
• The equipment to be evaluated is in working order 
• Equipment necessary to the test scenario and instrumentation equipment is in working 
order 
• Personnel to activate and deactivate data recorders, and backup data takers are in place 
• Time synchronization and communications have been established as necessary 
• Contingency plans have been discussed with appropriate personnel 
27. OTD Responsibilities During Test Operations 
During test operations the OTD ensures that: 
• Tests are conducted per the test plan and the LOI; any deviations are noted, their impact 
assessed, and necessary corrective action taken; and contingency plans are implemented 
as necessary 
• All hands are briefed on the test plan and understand their roles 
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• COMOPTEVFOR is advised of any potential issues that could result in a COI being 
unresolved unsatisfactorily 
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APPENDIX C:  FULL LIST OF BRAINSTORMING IDEAS 
1. Incorporate backwards compatibility in standards for OT 
2. DT exit criteria to include OT pass criteria 
3. Move towards open architecture 
4. Use actual shipboard hardware and software at the end of DT 
5. Use a hull just for OT 
6. Rotate active user representatives in the PM office 
7. Specific SETR for interoperability 
8. Pre-testing training for operators/users 
9. Standardize test requirements 
10. Interoperability simulation standards 
11. Validate other systems meet interoperability requirement prior to OT 
12. Include testing interoperability criteria into Mission Readiness Assessment (MRA) 
reviews 
13. Use of mission threads for interoperability 
14. Inform the OPTEVFOR about the system requirements early on  
15. Create a new color of money for testing 
16. Consider Interoperability at all milestone reviews 
17. Improve the default requirements list 
18. Involve interoperability Tech Warrant Holder early 
19. Financial incentive for PM 
20. Delete requirements before test that PM knows the system doesn’t meet 
21. Interoperability Readiness Levels 
22. Ensure that all of the interfaces are synchronized 
23. CONOPS and DRMs must be fed into test plans 
24. Validate mission critical sequence with the user 
25. Longer terms for PMs 
26. Don’t test Interoperability 
27. * Salary penalties for PM 
28. * Write tests that match requirements 
29. * Allow PMs to self-certify OT passes 
30. * Do not finalize test requirements procedures until system is ready to test 
31. * No OT until PM says all requirements are met 
32. * PM review of COI prior to OT 
33. * Increase schedule allotted 
34. * Combine all DoD into a single joint service 
35. * Increase funding 
36. * Increase test and requirements funding 
37. * Write better requirements 
38. * Develop simulation of your system for future systems 
39. * Create a full test bed that does not require a ship 
40. * Consider legacy systems 
41. * Use better standards 
 168 
42. * Write more complete MIL-STDs 
43. * Stop improving technologies 
44. * Involve users in DT test plans 
45. * Better DT testing 
46. * Have users involved in DT 
47. * PM accountability over the lifecycle of the system 
48. * Revise milestone C revision gate requirements to include interoperability 
49. Regression testing after fixing a problem found in DT 
50. Improve communication between interoperability personnel 
51. Ensure the future programs have a minimal technology standard/ phase out legacy 
equipment 
52. Need to work with stakeholder to ensure realistic requirements 
53. Include industry or academia assessment of requirements 
54. Harsher simulations (have a list of possible failures to test against)  
55. Have higher fidelity simulators so more realistic tests can be run 
56. Use real test data from previous systems to simulate events 
57. Reevaluate the passing criteria for interoperability 
58. Robot testers, incorporate automated test evaluations  
59. Define in writing the grading criteria, trying to overcome that subject nature of Human 
evaluation 
60. Compare evaluations from several different people, and provide an integrated score or 
assessment form those evaluators 
61. Set Technical competence requirement for government representative who play the 
liaison role for the project 
62. Use risk matrix to assess issues/problems 
63. Force PMs to captain the ship 
 
* Indicates ideas that were considered redundant or impractical and were not evaluated for 




APPENDIX D:  TABLE TOP EXERCISE DOCUMENTS 
This appendix contains documents used in support for the ACIH TTX.  The ACIH is a 
fictitious system created by the authors.  All documents in this appendix were created by the 
authors.  Note that several of these documents are excerpts from larger documents; therefore the 
formatting of table and figure numbers is not consistent throughout this appendix. 
 
ACIH EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Equipment for United States soldiers must offer advantages and capabilities far greater 
than that of the enemy in the battlefield.  A fully-integrated battle suit, consisting of a combat 
helmet and body suit, provides the vital protection that is needed for the soldiers to successfully 
complete their mission.  The combat helmet is the most complex piece of gear in the battle suit 
offering the protection required for any battlefield situation.  The helmet also provides audible 
and visual communication between headquarters and ground troops and improves and enhances 
the solder’s visual awareness using night-vision and thermal imaging devices.  The objective of 
the system architecture design is to create a helmet that can integrate audio and visual 
communications, intelligence information, display information, and provide head protection. 
One of the most important aspects of the helmet is to convey communication between the 
squadron team and the command headquarters.  The helmet will be connected to communication 
devices that transmit and receive audio, video, GPS, and navigation communication.  It will have 
internal speakers and a microphone to relay audible signals for communication between the 
squads and command center.  The helmet will also be equipped with an external video camera 
that allows the ground troops and headquarters to view the ongoing operation as it is in progress.  
The helmet will be a major part of the human interface that improves and enhances situational 
awareness along with providing head protection against blunt and ballistic impact for the 
warfighter.
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DOCUMENTS USED FOR ASR TTX 
 
Includes: 
• ACIH AoA 
• ACIH OV-1 
• ACIH Risk Assessment/Management Plan 
• ACIH Requirements 
• ACIH Notional Schedule 
• ACIH Technology Development Acquisition Phase Plan 
 
1. ACIH AoA 
 
The AoA was performed via a Concept Generation process.  A morphological matrix was 
used as the tool used for concept generation for the ACIH components.  The matrix includes 
several alternatives for each characteristic or property needed to perform functions of the ACIH.  
Characteristics for components arose from analyzing the leaf node functions.  In general leaf 
nodes are functions that were simulated.  Many variations and combinations of solutions can 
then be pursued. 
Once emergent characteristics were identified, they were listed in the matrix.  Next the 
team brainstormed to come up with possible alternatives.  A wide array of alternatives was 
considered and listed in morphological matrix to obtain a broad range of possible solutions.  The 
resultant morphological matrix is listed in Table 3. 
 171 
Table 3 Morphological Matrix – ACIH Functional Allocation 
Characteristic Alternatives 
Navigation GPS Bathymetric   





Transmission Tin can Video, audio Audio, video, 
data 
Audio 
Receiver Audio Audio, video Audio, video, 
data 
Tin can 









Night Vision Gen I Gen II Gen III Gen IV 










Processor Intel AMD   
Video Display CRT visor Projection 
onto visor 
OLED visor Handheld 
monitor 








Concept selection continued from concept generation and was performed by using Pugh 
Matrices as a tool.  The alternatives from the morphological matrix were considered and 
analyzed in a Pugh matrix.  Specific components were selected and these components were 




Table 5 Pugh Matrix Audio Video Transmission 






















+ - + 
Size - - + 
Rugged S S S 
Consumption - + - 
Digital - S S 
Sum of Positives  2 1 2 
Sum of Sames   1 2 2 




The communications between the soldiers is accomplished through wireless connection 
and therefore the security of the communication becomes an important concern for the soldiers.  
As such, all communications include audio and video must be encrypted for transmit and 
decrypted at the receiver end.  Again, the weight, size, and power consumption of the component 
other than the component function are important factors when integrating it with the ACIH.  
While the secure communication devices offer compact, light weight, secure, user-friendly, 
portable voice and data communication, it is still an external component that adds a burden to the 
real estate of the ACIH.  An alternative to the solution is to perform the functions of encryption 
and decryption with the encryption algorithm One-Time pads.  Using this algorithm, the process 
of encrypting/decrypting data requires very little computation, and the generation of the random 
pads can be accomplished on the processor.  The software encryption/decryption is ideal for this 
type of weight, size, and power consumption limitation.  Table 6 shows the Pugh evaluation 
matrix for the encryption and decryption component. 
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Table 6 Pugh Matrix Data Encryption/Decryption 






















+ - + 
Size - - + 
Rugged S S S 
Consumption - + - 
Digital - S S 
Sum of Positives  2 1 2 
Sum of Sames   1 2 2 
Sum of Negatives  2 1 1 
  
 
Night Time Vision and Thermal Imaging 
The Generation I, II, III, and IV Night Time Vision technology are the key alternatives 
for the Provide Night Time Vision function.  The infrared camera, uncooled thermal imaging 
device, and cryogenically thermal imaging device are the key alternatives for the Provide 
Thermal Vision function.  The top alternatives are determined using the Pugh matrix in the 
concept selection phase.  The Pugh matrix provides the tool to evaluate and compare the physical 
architecture components that best suited to carry out the functions.  The following Pugh matrices 
of alternative design concepts for the night time and thermal vision are evaluated and compared 
using vital criteria for the stakeholder, in Tables 7 and 8. 
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Table 7 Pugh Night Time Vision 




















Light Amplification - - + 
MTTF - - - 
Signal to Noise Ratio - - + 
Sum of Positives 0 0  3 
Sum of Sames 0 0  0 
Sum of Negatives 4 4  1 
 
 














Sensitivity - + 
Resolution 
- + 
Sum of Positives 0  3 
Sum of Sames 0  0 
Sum of Negatives 3  0 
 
 
The key criteria for the night time vision concepts are image resolution, light 
amplification, mean time to failure (MTTF), and signal to noise ratio.  The key criteria for the 
thermal imaging concepts are operating temperature, sensitivity, and resolution.  The design 
concepts are evaluated and ranked with respect to the design criteria to determine the preferred 
concepts. 
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The trade off analysis for the night time vision using the Pugh matrix shows the 
Generation III night time vision technology as preferred alternative with the best design concept.  
The Generation I and II do not ranked highly in the scoring matrix.  The Generation IV 
technology is rejected due to its drawback in the mean time to failure (MTTF).  In addition, the 
matrix for the thermal imaging depicts the cryogenically thermal imaging device as the preferred 
design concept.  The device surpasses the datum concept of uncooled thermal imaging device 
when compared using the specified design criteria.  The cryogenically thermal imaging device is 
the best design concept that meets the stakeholder requirements. 
The selected design concepts are transferred into CORE as Component elements for the 
system architecture development.  The Generation III night vision technology and the 
cryogenically thermal imaging device are the Component elements that perform the Provide 
Night Time Vision function and the Provide Thermal Vision function.  The 2.4GHZ Digital 
Video and Audio transmitter performs video and audio transmission.  The Encryption/decryption 
is based on software algorithm such as One-Time Pad.  These elements are represented and 
related to the remaining the architecture model as shown below. 
 
Navigation 
For navigation we had 4 choices, Paper/Digital Maps & Compass, GPS, Bathymetric and 
Celestial Navigation. 
 
Using Paper/Digital Maps & Compass consist of a sailor carrying a map of the area and 
using a compass to finds his/her location. The soldier would need to be contacting Head Quarters 
(HQ) or the rest of team to report his/her location. The size of the map would depend on the size 
of the area. The accuracy, the update rate and speed for the soldier to calculate the position and 
transmit the info would depend on the map, the compass, the surrounding area, the present 
situation (hostile and none hostile environment), and the experience of the soldier. 
Using a GPS devise would require no soldier interface. The GPS would be part of the 
helmet. The size of the devise would be smaller than any map. The devise updates at about 1 
record per second, and using a processor and a transmitter it would automatically sends its 
position to HQ or the rest of the team. The accuracy for a GPS Standard Positioning is <15 
meters, 95% typical.  
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Bathymetry is use to measure the depths of large bodies of water, like oceans, seas, and 
lakes. It has more use for underwater assignments. It would not work on our dessert hostage 
scenario. 
The last option we got is using celestial navigation. It uses the sun, moon, stars, or planets 
to find your way around. It would require a map, a Sextant and tables. This is a complex and 
involved process that involves a fair amount of calculating, correcting, referring to tables, 
knowledge of the heavens and the Earth, as well as a lot of common sense. 
Using a Pugh evaluation matrix, we selected for criteria: weight, size, reliability, 
accuracy, update rate, portability, speed to process/ transmit data and require power.  GPS score 
7 (+), 1 (same) and 1 (-). Bathymetric and Celestial navigation didn’t have a positive score.  See 
Table 9. 
 





















+ - - 
Size + S  S  
Reliability S  S  S  
Accuracy + - - 
Update Rate + - - 
Portability + - S  
Speed to 
Process/Transmit data + - - 
Sum of Positives  6 0 0 
Sum of Sames   1 4 4 







Based on the Pugh selection matrix the Tin Can option is not a viable choice.  Neither is 
the audio option, although it could be an improved audio.  Both the audio/video combination and 
the audio/video/data combination should be pursued further.  Considering stakeholder needs 
outlined in the Design Reference Mission, the best alternative to pursue at this time is the 
audio/video/data receiver.  See Table 10 for the Pugh matrix. 
 



















+ + - 
Size S - - 
Reliability + + - 
Accuracy + + - 
Sum of Positives  3 3 0 
Sum of Sames  1 0 0 














Image Capturing, Processing, and Video Display 
 
Table 11 Pugh Matrix Image Capturing 




















Size S - 
Reliability + + 
Accuracy + - 
Update Rate S + 
Portability - + 
Sum of Positives  2  3 
Sum of Sames  2  1 




 Concerning image capturing: there were three options: normal capture (Contour HD), capture 
with zoom (GoPro Hero Wide), and image snap shot (Olympus CA Media D-595).  We are comparing the 
cameras as a whole for parts, which will be later broken down into the helmet.  Comparing the cost, 
Contour HD is the most expensive option as it provides HD video.  The products’ durability are all 
relatively equal, with the Olympus camera being less so.  Concerning resolution, the Contour HD and the 
Olympus both can capture high resolution images.  Concerning the frames per second, the Contour HD 
has the highest capability shooting either 60 fps at SD or 30 fps at HD, while the GoPro shoot only 30 fps 
SD.  The Olympus is not a camcorder, and greatly losses in this area.  The weight of the cameras is the 
same, while the Olympus is a bit lighter due to its ability.  The GoPro and has a fixed zoom ability, while 
the Contour HD does not.  The Contour does shoot higher resolution images which can be optically 
zoomed.  The Olympus has the greatest zoom ability with a 3x optical zoom with high resolution.  Based 
on the Pugh chart, the Olympus has the most benefits; however it comes at a great cost, it actually is not 
sending video, but slowly sending images.  The Contour HD on the other hand seems to offer the best 
performance out of the three options.  See Figure 11 for the Pugh matrix. 
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The image capturing is built in the video component system, and is implemented by the soldiers on the 





Table 12 Pugh Matrix Processing 
Processor  
Criteria 















Clock frequency + S 
Power Usage + S 
L2 Cache + S 
Performance + - 
Sum of Positives 4  1 
Sum of Sames  0  3 
Sum of Negatives 1  1 
 
 
 Table 12 shows the Pugh matrix for the processor.  There are two main producers of processor 
chips: Intel and AMD.  The options chosen were high end processors, while also including the newest 
high-end processor (Intel i7).  Even though these processors are our options, a more suitable processor 
may be decided later after processor requirements get further refined.  The three options for processors 
are the Intel i7, Intel Core 2 Quad, and the AMD Phenom II X4.  These were compared using five 
characteristics: cost, clock frequency, power usage, L2 Cache, and performance.  The Intel i7 is the 
newest processor and because of that it is the most costly of the bunch.  However, this gives the processor 
the best performance compared to the other two.  Comparing the other two processors, they match with 
each other very closely.  However, the AMD has been known for being somewhat cheaper than the Intel 
brand, making their Phenom processor slightly cheaper than the Intel Core 2 Quad.  However, when 
comparing performance Intel Core 2 Quad has a slight edge compared to AMD’s Phenom.  Based on the 
Pugh Chart, the new Intel i7 provides the most positives between the options. 
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 The processor is built from the custom SW to be run on the system and will be implemented by 
the soldiers in the field.  The processor will perform a large array of tasks including: encryption of data, 
decryption of data, compiling the navigational map, displaying enhanced vision, and displaying video. 
 














Transparency + -  
Brightness + +  
Resolution S S  
Size (Volume) + -  
Sum of Positives 3  1 
Sum of Sames 1  2  
Sum of Negatives 1  2  
 
 
 There are three options for the video display (Table 13):  an OLED screen that can be attached to 
a visor, a projector to place images onto the visor, and a removable LCD screen.  These options were 
compared with five characteristics: cost, see through, brightness, resolution, and size.  The most 
expensive option is the OLED since it is technology that is relatively new.  The projection method and 
LCD method are more experienced technology with a similar price point.  “Transparency” is a 
characteristic important for a visor display.  The OLED can display a clear picture with a flexible screen 
as thin as paper, which is transparent.  The projection method will project its image onto the visor; 
however, this may reduce the transparency of the visor.  The LCD is not transparent at all and will need to 
be removable.  The brightness of the LCD and OLED are equivalent, while the projection may suffer 
visibility issues during daylight.  All three options have the same resolution.  Volume wise, the OLED 
will take the least amount of space in the helmet compared to the other methods.  The LCD will take up 
the most volume.  Based on the Pugh Chart, the OLED provides the best performance. 
 The OLED display will be built in the helmet and implemented by the soldiers in the field.  This 
component is the main interface for the soldier, displaying the navigational map, video, and enhanced 
vision. 
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Provide Head Protection 
A Pugh matrix was put together to take a look at alternatives to the concept design of the 
helmet.  Criteria were provided by the stake holders as to the needs the helmet is to meet during 
mission use.  The criteria provided included strength, comfort, heat protection, impact 
cushioning, shrapnel protection and volume.  Three helmet concepts were compared; full faced 
helmet, open faced helmet and flip face helmet.  All three had positives and negatives.  The best 
alternative to select is the full face helmet.  Compared with the other helmets, the full face 
helmet meets 95% of the user's needs.  See Table 14. 
 
    Table 14 Pugh Matrix Head Protection 
Helmet 
Criteria 
Full Face  
O
pen Faced  
Flip Face  







Comfort - - 
Heat Protection + + 
Impact 
Cushioning + + 
Shrapnel 
Protection + S  
Volume + S  
Sum of Positives 4   2  
Sum of Sames 1   3  
Sum of 




The trade off analysis for components was performed using the Pugh matrices of 
alternative design concepts.  The selected design concepts are transferred into CORE as 
Component elements for the system architecture development.  Figure 12 shows a hierarchical 




Figure 12 ACIH Component Selection and Allocation Hierarchy Diagram 
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The OV-1 shows a hostage rescue scenario where the Advanced Combat Integrated 
Helmet provides the soldiers with increased situational awareness, showing them a navigational 
map and allowing them to know where their other team members and enemies are located.  The 
helmet allows for constant encrypted video and audio communication between the soldiers and 
the headquarters.   
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3. ACIH RISK ASSESSMENT/MANAGEMENT PLAN 
 
The risk assessment and associated risk management/mitigation plan includes the 
evolving external environment. 
ASR review assesses the alternative systems that have been evaluated during Concept 
Refinement, primarily through the AoA, and ensures that the preferred system is cost effective, 
affordable, operationally effective and suitable, and can be developed to provide a timely 
solution to a need at an acceptable level of risk.  Of critical importance to this review is the 
understanding of available system concepts to meet the requirements from the ICD or the CDD, 
as well as the affordability, operational effectiveness, technologies, and adaptability to the 
evolving external environment, risk inherent in each alternative concept. 
One of the artifacts of this review is to provide a comprehensive assessment on the 
relative risks associated with including Commercial Off-The Shelf (COTS) or Non-
Developmental Items (NDI) as opposed to a new design, with emphasis on host platform 
environmental design, diagnostic information integration, dependence on other government 
programs and maintenance concept compatibility. 
All the components including hardware and software used in the ACIH shall be designed 
to provide encrypted and reliable communication serves as Operational Awareness to the special 
operation soldiers throughout the entire operation.  The chosen components shall be capable of 
operate in a harsh environment.  With fewer dollars available for research, test and evaluation, 
and procurement of new systems, an important advantage of many COTS and/or NDI 
acquisitions is the reduced acquisition cycle time.  This reduction results primarily from 
decreased in design and engineering time due to the fact that the COTS components have already 
been tested and have gone through general acceptance of the product in the commercial 
marketplace or in a previous military application. 
However, there are unique risks associated with COTS-based / NDI acquisitions. Most of 
the COTS components used commercially are not designed for used in the military operational 
environments.  Failing to realize the impacts of using COTS components can add to system cost, 
schedule and performance risks.  Therefore, this review must address some of the risk factors 




COTS-based / NDI Component Risk Factors: 
1. Rapid and asynchronous changes 
2. Different obsolescence impacts 
3. Proprietary data. 
4. Higher life cycle costs 
5. Multiple configurations 
6. Commercial standards 
7. Time-limited manufacturer support 




1. Involve COTS - knowledgeable individuals in all analytical processes 
 Benefit - Facilitates the application of COTS mitigation strategies and informed  
 decision making 
2. Involve users early and throughout the program life cycle to identify and resolve  
 COTS-related constraints 
 Benefit - Reduces chances of surfacing user acceptance issues late in system  
  development and deployment 
3. Perform continuous COTS product market research 
 Benefit - Allows product team to project and plan for changes in technology,  
  product configurations and obsolescence-related issues 
4. Integrate market research results with field data and new requirements 
 Benefit - Optimizes and prioritizes cost, schedule and performance factors  
  between obsolescence-driven system changes and system upgrades 
5. Develop and maintain flexible performance requirements suited to the use of  
  COTS products 
 Benefit - Allows for appropriate level of specified function description and the  
  inclusion of COTS technical performance factors 
6. Institute and maintain ongoing COTS product testing capability 
 Benefit - Allows project to assess new COTS products/technologies for   
  specification compliance, form/fit/ function compatibility and standards   
  conformance 
7. Integrate COTS-based technology evolution planning within the Integrated  
  Program Plan 
 Benefit - Provides centralized planning that captures system evolution strategy,  
  obsolescence projections and risk mitigation decisions 
8. Emphasize strong and COTS relevant configuration management practices 
 Benefit - Reduces the possibility of untested COTS product changes affecting  
  system performance and supports multiple system configurations 
9. Use a COTS-experienced systems integration agent 
 Benefit - Facilitates acquisition, development, deployment and support activities  
  with proven COTS capable personnel and services 
10. Leverage the commercial infrastructure wherever feasible 
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 Benefit - Prevents costly duplication of already existing COTS product support  
  infrastructure 
11. Ensure the chosen hardware and software conform to IA compliance                       
  Benefit – Reduces the chances of unauthorized access to the system while   
  increasing inter-operability among different products that meet commercial  
  standards.   
 
ACIH Operational Effectiveness Risk Factors: 
The combat helmet is a vital piece of protective equipment hat is essential in the 
battlefield.  The helmet should provide basic head protection as well as advance capabilities in a 
mission allowing an increase in situational awareness.  Proper integration of audio and video 
components provides soldiers critical communication capability in such the team can 
strategically plan their operation to counteract the enemy and carry out their mission.  Risk 
factors associate with operational effectiveness are as follow: 
1. Communications (audio and video) intercept by enemy 
2. Communications signal being jammed 
3. Power consumption limitation 
4. Transmit and receive distance 




1. All communications (audio and video) are encrypted.  The communications are  
  encrypted with one time secret key.  The secret key is used to encrypt and decrypt 
  audio and video signal.  The strength of the secret key must exceed the life time  
  of the mission 
2. Anti-jamming algorithm prevent jamming signal interrupting communications 
3. The battery shall have proper capacity to provide power to audio and video  
  components throughout the entire operation.   
4. The transmitter and receiver shall be capable of operate effectively within   
  communications distance between soldiers. 
5. The one time secret key shall be changed for each operation   
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4. ACIH REQUIREMENTS 
 
NEEDS 
In order to meet the needs outlined in the executive summary, the helmet must: 
• Be well ventilated and comfortable to wear in lengthy operation. 
• Properly seat on the head without obstructing the user’s view. 
• Absorb and reduce energy from blunt and ballistics impact to reduce the risk of 
head injury. 
• Provide the capability enabling the soldiers to see and operate in an environment 
with or without visible illumination. 
• Allow the soldiers to carry out their search, identification, and monitoring of 
enemy activities during all times of day as they prepare and organize their 
operation. 
• Allow the soldiers to exchange situational information and video with one another 
as well as their command headquarter. 
 
The Projected Operational Environment (POE) of the Advanced Combat Integrated 
Helmet (ACIH) is designed to be used in the desert area such as Iraq and Afghanistan. The ACIH 
is mostly used by Special Forces in the operation of a hostage rescue mission. Desert warfare is 
highly vulnerable to foreign armies that are not familiar or experienced with the area. Knowing 
how to navigate in the desert is the desert fighter's best advantage.  The ACIH will have 
communication equipment (transmit and receive), and GPS and navigation, to provide better 
maneuvering and situational awareness during the rescue operation in the desert environment. 
 
DRM Example 
A group of armed hostiles take defensive positions in an urban city.  Hostages are taken 
to deter engagements on their location.  The objective is to retreat or eliminate soldiers.  The 
mission is to infiltrate the building undetected, detect the enemy, capture or eliminate hostile 
enemies, and secure the hostages. 
 
Mission Success Requirement 
The ACIH provides advanced combat operation architecture to ensure special combat 
operation soldiers can effectively fight in a diverse range of operational environments to carry 
out their mission.  Its ultimate goal is to accomplish Enhance User to Perform Rescue Mission. 
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The mission is defined as a success if the following conditions are true: 
• Enemy forces and hostages are identified 
• Enemy and hostages activities are monitored 
• Enemy and hostages activities are relayed to the squadron and command headquarter 
• Operation is carried out at any time of day 
• Enemies are captured 
• Hostages are rescued 
• Soldiers and hostages survive the rescue operation 
 
ACIH Requirements:  
 
• The Advanced Combat Integrated Helmet (ACIH) requirements shall provide and 
maintain audio and video communications throughout entire hostage rescue operational. 
• The system shall provide Operational Awareness including the ability to transmit and 
receive user and team location, as well as receive intelligence from headquarters. 
• The system shall enable to user to detect an enemy at a minimum distance of 400 meters 
in any environment, lighting, or condition. 
• The ACIH shall protect the user from blunt force trauma, sharp objects, explosions, and 
bullet fragments.  The ACIH will protect the user from injury, death, and illness. 
• The ACIH helmet shall share encrypted data to protect users and the mission. 
• The ACIH helmet shall process the data and output the required information to the user. 
• The system shall have a MTBF of no less than 3900 hours. 
• The system shall operate after impact from blunt forces. 
• The system shall operate without hindering users' performance. 
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6. ACIH TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT ACQUISTION PHASE PLAN 
 
The purpose of this phase is to reduce technology risk and to determine the appropriate 
set of technologies to be integrated into the full system.  This will ensure that the proposed 
technology solution is affordable, militarily useful, and based on mature technology. 
 
Entrance Criteria 
A successful completion of AoA and proposed materiel solution is presumed at this stage 
of the acquisition process. 
 
Phase Description: 
1. The Technology Development Phase begins when the MDA has approved a material 
solution and the Technology Development Strategy (TDS). 
2. The DoD component shall submit a cost estimate for the proposed solution(s) identified 
by the AoA.   
3. Final Requests for Proposals (RFPs) for the Technology Development Phase shall not be 
released until the MDA has approved the TDS. 
 
Technology and Development Plan for Advanced Combat Integrated Helmet (ACIH) 
Description of Approach 
The advanced combat helmet is a complex piece of gear that provides vital protection 
needed for the soldiers to successfully complete their rescue/hostage mission.  The helmet 
provides audible and visual communication between headquarters and ground troops to enhance 
situational and operational awareness.  The real-time audio and video data are processed and 
transferred using the current transmitter and receiver technology to facilitate instant 
communication.  The latest and up-to-date situational and operational information is critical in a 
successful engagement planning and operational maneuver. 
 
1. The selected approach is preferred due to the advanced transmitter and receiver technology 
that is widely available for immediate use.  The use of transmitter and receiver to exchange 
audio and video data and information is advantageous as the maturity of the existing 
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technology has been previously studied and verified.  It is more assuring that the transmitter 
and receiver will likely to perform as designed when earlier studied and documented data are 
examined and considered during the system design and development.  An acceptable risk 
level can be determined from the use of commercial components to ensure that it is suitable 
for the overall system interoperability.  The determination of suitable transmitter and receiver 
for the proposed system is successfully completed by using Pugh matrices.  Refer to the AoA 
section for the Pugh Matrix for each component.   
 
a. A 2.4 GHz audio transmitter is selected for the transmission of audio and video data.  
The transmitter offers the greatest capability with given criteria. 
b. A Contour HD camera provides the required capability to capture image and process 
video.  The camera offers HD video quality with high resolution.  It is able to provide 
the highest image capturing capability at 30 frames per second.  This feature is ideal 
for the diverse operating environment of the proposed advanced helmet system. 
c. The audio/video/data receiver provides the needed capability for communication 
exchange.  The selection fulfills the operational need of enhancing situational 
awareness in a combat operation. 
d. OLED screen is the selected component that will provide clear picture or video 
display.  The OLED is a thin transparent flexible screen that can be attached to a 
helmet visor to view video data. 
 
2. A software interface will be used to integrate individual component into a full system.  
The software application will be used to manage, control, and maintain the 
interoperability of microphone, headphone, and video display.  Equipment readiness is 
monitored to determine their operating condition.  Data and information exchange 
between components is also processed and handled by the software program.  The data is 
encrypted and decompressed prior to transmission then decrypted and uncompressed 
upon receipt.  This ensures that the information is securely transferred to intended 
recipients.  The One-Time pads is the selected component that provides a secure data 
transfer.  . 
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The data encryption and decryption will be used in conjunction with a processor to 
 process audio and video information.  Intel 17 processor provides the best processing 
 power and speed for such information exchange.  Refer to the AoA section for the Pugh 
 Matrix for encryption/decryption and the processor 
 
3. A Technology Development Strategy will be prepared for additional reviews. 
4. A preliminary acquisition strategy, including cost, schedule, and performance goals for the 
total research and development program will be provided during the review. 
5. Final Requests for Proposals (RFPs) for the Technology Development Phase will be 
submitted. 
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• ACIH Operational Requirements Document 
• ACIH Operational Test Plan and Scenarios 
• ACIH Training Plan 
• ACIH DT&E Test Data 
• ACIH DT&E Test Report 






































1. ACIH OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT 
 
The ACIH Requirements artifact for the ASR was used as the Operational Requirements 

























OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT 
 
1. General  Description of Operational Capability.   
Special operation soldiers in combat typically operate in a diverse range of 
operational environments and are vulnerable to injury threats placing demands on the 
soldiers’ protective system to provide consistent performance throughout a range of 
situations and threats.  The combat helmet is a vital piece of protective equipment that is 
essential in the battlefield.  Stakeholders seek a comfortable helmet that provides basic 
head protection as well as advanced capabilities in a mission allowing an increase in 
situational awareness as such that the team can strategically plan their operation to 
counteract the enemy and carry out their mission of hostage liberation. 
1.1. Mission Need.   
The equipment for United States soldiers must offer advantages and capabilities 
far greater than that of the enemy in the battlefield.  A fully-integrated battle suit, 
consisting of a combat helmet and body suit, provides the vital protection that is needed 
for the soldiers to successfully complete their mission.  The combat helmet is the most 
complex piece of gear in the battle suit offering the protection required for any battlefield 
situation.  In addition of providing audible and visual communication between 
headquarters and ground troops, the helmet also improves and enhances the solder’s 
visual awareness using night-vision and thermal imaging devices.  The objective of the 
system architecture design is to create a helmet that can integrate audio and visual 
communications, intelligence information, display information, and provide head 
protection. 
1.2. Overall Mission Area Description.  
The ACIH is designed to be used during the day or night in the desert area such 
as Iraq and Afghanistan. The ACIH is mostly used by Special Forces in the operation of 
a hostage rescue mission. Desert warfare is highly vulnerable to foreign armies that are 
not familiar or experienced with the area.  Knowing how to navigate in the desert is the 
soldier’s best advantage. The ACIH will have communication equipment (transmit and 
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receive), and GPS and navigation, to provide better maneuvering and situational 
awareness during the rescue operation in the desert environment. 
1.3. Descriptions of the Proposed System.   
One of the most important aspects of the helmet is to provide reliable and 
encrypted communications between the squadron team and the command headquarters.  
The helmet shall be capable of transmit and receive audio, video, GPS, and navigation 
communication Audio communication between the squads and command center shall be 
accomplished without interruption causes by harsh operational environment.  The helmet 
shall also be providing real-time video stream on the battle ground in such that allows the 
ground troops and headquarters to view the ongoing operation as it is in progress.  The 
helmet will be a major part of the human interface that improves and enhances situational 
awareness along with providing head protection against blunt and ballistic impact for the 
warfighter.  It is the most Advanced Combat Integrated Helmet (ACIH) that gives special 
operation soldiers ability to strategically plan their operation and carry out their mission 
with minimum casualty. 
     1.4.  Supporting Analysis.  
     1.5.  Mission the Proposed System Will Accomplish.  
     1.6.  Operational and Support Concept. 




The OV-1 shows a hostage rescue scenario where the Advanced Combat 
Integrated Helmet (ACIH) provides the soldiers with increased situational awareness, 
showing them a navigational map and allowing them to know where their other team 
members and enemies are located.  The helmet allows for constant encrypted video and 
audio communication between the soldiers and the headquarters.   
          1.6.2.  Support Concept.   
     1.7.  Acquisition Approach.   
2. Threat. 
The threat is an armed hostile group considered to be trained in firearms and explosives.  The 
hostiles are operating in a desert urban environment.  Threat is assumed to have no surveillance 
equipment installed.   
Threat Properties: 
Average Size: 8 hostiles 
Weapons:  Kalashnikov AK-47, Unknown Explosive Devices 
Potential Hostages: 2-3 
 
The threat’s courses of action (COA) are defined as follows: 
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Most Likely COA: A disorganized armed group of hostiles retreat to a civilian location, taking a 
defensive position within a building.  The hostiles will silently wait till the situation has died 
down before retreating to an enemy encampment.  The hostiles will shoot at soldiers on sight if 
they suspect their location is compromised. 
 
Most Dangerous COA: An armed team infiltrates a civilian location and reinforces the area with 
small scale explosives.  The hostiles take civilian hostages to deter possible engagements.  The 
hostile’s goal is to eliminate as many soldiers as possible, shooting any soldier on sight.  They 
have no regard for their own lives. 
 
3.  Existing System Shortfalls. 
 
     Operational Shortfalls.  The ACIH is designed to combine advance combat 
technology to meet current and projected requirements.  It is designed to provide comfortable 
head protection against blunt and ballistics impact and allow the soldiers to operate in low to no 
illumination environment.  The helmet is designed to increase situational awareness by providing 
real time communication between the ground troops and headquarters.  The immediate 
communication can provide valuable command and control and decision support in the search, 
identification, and monitoring of enemy. 
4.  Capabilities Required.   
     4.1.  Operational Performance Parameters.  
Conditions: 
 Environment 
Requirement Developed System Projected Operation 
Temperature -30 F to 110 F -50 F to 130 F 60 F to 110 F 
Time of Day Night and Day Night and Day Night 
Environment Desert, Urban, Snow Desert, Urban, Snow Desert 
 
     4.2.  ORD Key Performance Parameters (KPPs). 
• Operator shall receive continuous geographical/navigational satellite data with a lag of 
less than 3 seconds. 
• The encrypted video data shall be transmitted and received no greater than 1 second. 
• The encrypted audio data shall be transmitted no greater than 1second and received no 
greater than 0.25 seconds. 
• The navigational data shall be transmitted in less than 0.5 second. 
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• The ACIH high grade absorbent padded lining shall absorb blunt force within 6 
milliseconds.   
• The ACIH Kevlar shall protect the user from shrapnel traveling at 340 meters/second. 
• The ACIH shall protect the user from heat and fire generated from a grenade explosion at 
4 seconds. 
     4.3.  System Performance.  
          4.3.1.  Mission Scenarios.   
A group of armed hostiles take defensive positions in an urban city.  Hostages are taken 
to deter engagements on their location.  The objective is to retreat or eliminate soldiers.  The 
mission is to infiltrate the building undetected, detect the enemy, capture or eliminate hostile 
enemies, and secure the hostages.   
          4.3.2.  System Performance Parameters.   
4.3.2.1. The audio communication equipment such as headsets shall reduce noise 
exposure while delivering clearer audio and comfortable fit.  High noise levels in 
surrounding environment can affect situational awareness. Misunderstood commands and 
repeated instructions can increase operational risk and reduce mission effectiveness.  The 
headsets offer active and passive technologies which together provide full-spectrum noise 
reduction with comfortable, lightweight designs that can be worn continuously during 
long missions. 
4.3.2.2. With the capability of the secure video communication, the soldiers 
during the hostage rescue operation can gain insight of the hostile environment via real-
time video communications.  The video communication should leverage satellite 
communication that provides a secure wireless video communications infrastructure 
between command center and the ground soldiers.  The video communication provides 
the soldiers visibility and intelligence by feeding the soldiers imagery resulted of 
reconnaissance and coordinated mission planning.  It also provides real-time streaming 
video of the operation to command center to assess the operation developments. 
4.3.2.3. The ACIH shall use GPS to coordinate, record soldier and team location 
during a hostage rescue operation.  This includes determining distance, direction, 
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location, elevation/altitude, route, and data for navigation aids, orientation and rate of 
movement. 
4.3.2.4. The ACIH shall enable the soldier to detect enemies at a minimum 
distance of 400 meters in any environment, lighting, or condition.   
4.3.2.5. The system shall amplifies light to allow the soldier to see at dark.  This 
allows the soldier to see in levels of light that approach total darkness.  The device shall 
use a system no older than Generation 3 (GEN III). 
4.3.2.6. The systems shall enable soldier to see enemy heat signatures. 
4.3.2.7. The ACIH will protect the soldier’s head from injury, illness, and death as 
a result of blunt force trauma, sharp objects (knives), and explosions.   
          4.3.3.  Information Exchange Requirements.   
          4.3.4.  Interoperability.   
System interoperability involved the ability for the systems of system to provide 
and accept services from each other to enable them to operate effectively together.  For 
ACIH system, audio, video, and navigational data must be exchanged via the transmitter 
and receiver to achieve the desired services.  The data from the microphone and speaker 
is processed with software and delivered to the user after completion.   
          4.3.5.  Logistics and Readiness.  
          4.3.6.  Other System Characteristics.   
5.  System Support.   
     5.1.  Maintenance. 
     5.2.  Supply.      
     5.3.  Training. 
     5.4. Transportation and Facilities.   
6.  Force Structure.   
7.  Schedule.   
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8.  System Affordability.   
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Introduction to the Project 
 
1.0 Introduction 
The purpose of this Operational Test (OT) event is to assess the Advanced Combat Integrated 
Helmet (ACIH) by identifying system enhancements and significant areas of risk to the programs 
successful completion of OT&E.  OT ACIH will be conducted from 15 – 19 November 2010 at 
the U.S. Army Yuma Proving Ground Test Center, Yuma, AZ. 
 
The level of risk is associated with the successful resolution of Critical Operational Issues (COI) 
during OT ACIH.  This risk is based upon assessment of thresholds, program documentation, 
program plans, and Subject Matter Expert (SME) analysis. 
 
1.1 System Description 
 
The ACIH is intended to integrate audio and visual communications, intelligence information, 
display information, and provide head protection.  The ACIH will convey communications 
between a squadron and command headquarters.  It will be connected to communication devices 
that transmit and receive audio, video, Global Positioning System (GPS), and navigation 
communication.  It will have internal speakers and a microphone to relay audible signals for 
communication between the squadrons and command centers.  The helmet is also equipped with 
an external video camera that allows the ground troops and headquarters to view the ongoing 
operation as it is in progress.   
 
The ACIH consists of a 2.4 GHz Digital Light Weight Audio Video Transmitter, One-Time Pads 
Data Encryption / Decryption, GEN III Night Vision, Cryogenically Thermal Vision, GPS 
Navigation, Audio/Video/Data Receiver, Contour HD (Image Capturing, Processing, and Video 
























General responsibilities of activities involved in the testing are provided in this section, as well 
as appropriate points of contact.  Continuing close liaison is essential to timely and successful 






1. Provide changes to this test plan. 
2. Conduct briefings for all participating units, including Operations Security (OPSEC) 
requirements and procedures. 
3. Supervise data collection, participate in test analysis, and publish final report. 
Program Executive Office Integrated Warfare System (PEO IWS) 
 
1. Furnish required material and technical support. 
2. Provide for installation and maintenance of project equipment. 
3. Provide funding for data collection, reduction, and analysis support. 
4. Provide for and coordinate targets and range support. 
5. Provide for appropriate safety certifications. 
6. Certify system readiness for OT ACIH per SECNAVINST 5000.2C. 
2.2 Points of Contact 
 
Points of contact are provided in table 2-1. 
Table 2-1 Points of Contact  
Name/Rank Title (Code) Address Commercial 
CDR John Doe Operational Test 
Coordinator (Code 72) 
Commander, 
Operational Test and 
Evaluation Force 
7970 Diven St 
Norfolk, VA 23505 
757-222-2222 
 
2.3 Visitor Control 
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SECNAV’S policy regarding visitor observance of Operational Testing (OT) is strict.  This is to 
preclude any perception of a lack of objectivity in the T&E process or any perception of outside 
influence on the OT unit and/or OTD.  Therefore, observers will not normally be permitted in the 
test area during OT.  During testing, visit authorization will be controlled by Program Executive 
Office Integrated Warfare Systems (PEO IWS) and granted only for valid requirements or for 
technical assistance. 
 
2.4 Disclosure Policy 
 
Test Data.  Factual OT data will, as expeditiously as possible, be released/shared with the 
program office.  The logistics of release/sharing of data will not interfere with the conduct or 
evaluation of any OT.  Factual data does not include information based on consensus or opinion, 
such as operator or maintainer surveys.  Such information is subjective and part of the evaluation 
process, and will not be made available prior to the release of the final report.  DOT&E access to 
test data will be per applicable sections of Title 10. 
 
Proprietary Information.  Requests for access to proprietary information will be referred to the 
proprietor agency for disposition.  Proprietary information will not e disclosed by 
COMOPTEVFOR.  Information collected by the OTD in the form of survey sheets (user and test 
team feedback, comments, opinions, and conjecture of system performance) during OT 
constitutes proprietary information of COMOPTEVFOR.  This includes information gathered 
from questionnaires and interviews.  Such information will be labeled:  “FOR OFFICIAL USE 
ONLY – NOT RELEASABLE OUTSIDE OF COMOPTEVFOR. 
 
Deviations from the test plan.  The OTD is authorized to deviate from this test plan as the 
operational situation and good judgment dictates, keeping COMOPTEVFOR advised.  
COMOPTEVFOR will advise DOT&E of deviations from this test plan. 
 
Release of information to the press or other agencies.  Prior to formal issue of the final report, 
no test data will be released.  Once the report is issued by COMOPTEVFOR, the CNO will 
release data per existing policy.  Media requests to observe OT will be referred to Chief of 
Information (CHINFO) in Washington, DC.  Requests for other than OT&E information will be 









Scope of the Evaluation 
 
3.1 Critical Operational Issue (COIs):  COIs for OT ACIH: 
COIs           Tests 
Maintain Communications        E-1 
Provide Operational Awareness         E-2 
Enable User Vision         E-3 
Reliability          S-1 
Maintainability          S-2 
Availability          S-3 
Interoperability         S-4 
Training          S-5 
 
3.2 Evaluation Criteria 
 
CNO provided the required Measures of Effectiveness (MOE), Measures of Suitability, and 
Critical Technical Parameters (CTP).  Table 3-1 is the Operational Activities for the ACIH and 
MOEs.  Table 3-2 is the Critical Technical Parameters.  Table 3-3 is the Operational Activities 
that the components of the ACIH must meet.  COMOPTEVFOR will consider all of these in the 
assessment of the ACIH.  Data will be collected and analyzed to obtain a characterization of the 
ACIH and to determine improvement trends throughout the testing cycle. 
 
 
Table 3-1:  Operational Activities for the ACIH 
Operational Activity Description MOE 




• User shall receive a constantly updated 








• The video data shall transmit encrypted 
data in no greater than 1 second 
• The audio data shall transmit encrypted 
data in no greater than 1 second 
• The navigational data shall transmit 











• The audio shall reach the user with a lag 
no greater than 0.25 seconds. 
• The video shall reach the user with a lag 
no greater than 1 second. 
• The user shall receive a constantly 
updated map with a lag no greater than 3 
seconds. 
Request Command & 
Decision Support 
Request for support 
from command 
center for operation 
planning or decision 
making for tactical 
maneuver and 
engagement 
• The video data shall transmit encrypted 
data in no greater than 1 second 
• The audio data shall transmit encrypted 
data in no greater than 1 second 





detain enemy and 
rescue hostages 
• The ACIH high grade absorbent padded 
lining shall absorb blunt force within 6 
milliseconds 
• The ACIH Kevlar shall protect the user 
from shrapnel traveling at 340 
meters/second 
• The ACIH shall protect the user from 
heat and fire generated from a grenade 
explosion at 4 seconds 
• The user shall receive a constantly 
updated map with a lag no greater than 3 
seconds 
 
Table 3-2:  ACIH Critical Technical Parameters 
The Advanced Combat Integrated Helmet (ACIH) requirements shall provide and maintain audio 
and video communications throughout entire hostage rescue operational. 
The system shall provide Operational Awareness including the ability to transmit and receive 
user and team location, as well as receive intelligence from headquarters. 
The ACIH helmet shall share encrypted data to protect users and the mission. 
The ACIH helmet shall process the data and output the required information to the user. 
The system shall have a MTBF of no less than 3900 hours. 
 
 
Table 3-3:  Operational Activities that the components of the ACIH must meet 
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X X  X  
 Receive Audio 
Communication 
X  X X  
 Transmit Audio 
Communication 




 X X   
 Transmit User 
Location 
X  X  X 
Helmet Provide Head 
Protection 










X  X X  
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 Digitize and 
compress video 
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Navigational 
Data 
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Location 
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 Provide Night 
Time Vision 
(NTV) 
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 Provide 
Standard Video 
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X X X   
 Receive Video 
Feed 
 X X X  
 Transmit Video 
Feed 




Test operations will exercise the ACIH at the Yuma Proving Ground.  System testing will 
provide data for operational effectiveness (E-tests) and operational suitability (S-tests) COIs.  



















Test scenarios are based on a squadron of 10 Special Forces soldiers using the ACIH.  Their 
mission is to rescue a group of three hostages who are being held captive by a group of 8 
hostiles.  The hostiles are considered to be trained in firearms and explosives, and are armed with 
Kalashnikov Ak-47s and unknown explosive devices.  The hostages are being held in a desert 
urban environment.  The Special Forces are to be dropped via helicopter and once on the ground 
they are to communicate with each other and Headquarters via the ACIH.  They will download 
satellite imagery of the terrain and building where the hostages are being held.  The team will 
then locate the building using the GPS component of the ACIH.  Once the building has been 
located, they will then transmit voice and video imagery of the situation to Headquarters 
awaiting further orders.  All data will be encrypted and decrypted per OPSEC.  Once the order is 
given, the team will engage the hostiles and take the hostages to a safe location using the ACIH 
communication devices that transmit and receive audio, video, Global Positioning System (GPS), 
and navigation communication.  This mission will be executed twice, once during the day and 
once during the night.  During the evening mission, the Special Forces will locate the hostiles 
using night vision and infrared components of the ACIH.  All weapons engagements will be 
simulated.  The ACIH will be operated continuously throughout the test period. A detailed 
schedule of events will be used during OT ACIH and will be promulgated by the test conductor 
prior to the test period. 
 
4.2 Test E-1, Maintain Communications 
Objective:  The ACIH, operating with its integrated supporting components will 
maintain audio and visual communications throughout entire hostage rescue mission. 
1. Receive Audio Communication and Transmit Audio Communication. 
2. Receive Video Feed and Transmit Video Feed. 
Procedure:  ACIH will be assessed at each test event during the test period.  Data will be 
recorded via observer notes, OT test team comment sheets and DX. 
Data Analysis:  Maintaining of Communications will be assessed qualitatively and 
quantitatively based on OT test team comment sheets, DX analysis, and operational experience.  
The ACIH will be evaluated on whether or not it can reduce noise exposure while delivering 
clearer audio providing full spectrum noise reduction with comfortable, lightweight design that 
can be worn continuously during long missions.  ACIH will also be evaluated on being able to 
transmit and receive audio/video between team and headquarters.  The video communication 
should leverage satellite communication that provides a secure wireless video communications 
infrastructure between command center and the ground soldiers.  The video communication 
provides the soldiers visibility and intelligence by feeding the soldiers imagery resulted of 
reconnaissance and coordinated mission planning. 
 
4.3 Test E-2, Provide Operational Awareness 
Objective:  The ACIH, operating with its integrated supporting components will 
maintain operational awareness throughout entire hostage rescue mission. 
1. Receive Team Location 
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2. Transmit User Location 
3. Receive Intelligence Information 
Procedure:  ACIH will be assessed at each test event during the test period.  Data will be 
recorded via observer notes, OT test team comment sheets and DX. 
Data Analysis:  Providing Operational Awareness will be assessed qualitatively and 
quantitatively based on OT test team comment sheets, DX analysis, and operational experience.  
The ACIH will be evaluated on whether or not it can use GPS to coordinate, record user and 
team location during a hostage rescue operation.  This includes determining distance, direction, 
location, elevation/altitude, route, and data for navigation aids, orientation and rate of movement. 
4.4 Test E-3, Enable User Vision 
Objective:  The ACIH, operating with its integrated supporting components will enable 
user vision to detect enemies at a minimum distance of 400 meters in any environment, lighting, 
or condition. 
1. Provide Night Time Vision (NTV) 
2. Provide Thermal Vision (TV) 
Procedure:  ACIH will be assessed at each test event during the test period.  Data will be 
recorded via observer notes, OT test team comment sheets and DX. 
Data Analysis:  Enabling User Vision will be assessed qualitatively and quantitatively 
based on OT test team comment sheets, DX analysis, and operational experience.  While 
operating in levels of light approaching total darkness, the ACIH shall amplify light to allow the 
user to see.  When operating in total darkness or at night, the ACIH shall allow the user to see 




















The suitability testing will use data generated by continuous operation of the ACIH 
throughout test operations, including effectiveness tests described in Section 4.  A 
maintainability demonstration will also be conducted.  Tests specifically designed to generate 
maintainability data are described in the following Suitability Tests (S-Tests). 
5.2 Test S-1, Reliability 
Objective:  Will the ACIH reliability support completion of the mission? 
Procedure:  Reliability will be assessed continuously during the test period.  
Maintenance action forms will be completed for each failure or issue noted during operations, 
and for each preventive maintenance action that finds a failed part.  Data will be recorded via 
observer notes/OT test team comment sheets, maintenance logs, and DX. 
Data Analysis:  Reliability will be assessed qualitatively and quantitatively based on 
observer notes/OT test team comment sheets, maintenance logs, and operational experience.  
Reliability quantitative assessment is based on calculations for MTBOMFHW and MTBOWFSW: 
MTBOMFHW is the mean time between operational mission hardware failures occurring 
during system operation and is calculated by: 
 
MTBOMFHW = Total System Operating Time / # of Operational Mission Hardware 
Failures 
Where an operational mission hardware failure is one which causes the ACIH to fail its 
mission.  System operating time includes only the time the system is operating.  It does not 
include standby time. 
MTBOMFSW is an operational mission software fault.  An operational mission software 
fault is an interruption of ACIH operation not directly attributable to hardware, which causes the 
ACIH to fail its mission. 
MTBOMFSW = Total System Operating Time / # of Operational Mission Software Faults 
5.3 Test S-2, Maintainability 
Objective:  Is the ACIH maintainable by Special Forces? 
 Procedure:  Maintainability will be assessed continuously during the test period.  
Trouble and/or maintenance action reports will be completed and reviewed as appropriate.  Data 
will be recorded via observer notes/OT team comment sheets, and maintenance logs. 
Data Analysis:  Maintainability will be assessed qualitatively and quantitatively based 
on observer notes/OT test team comment sheets, maintenance logs, and operational experience.  
Maintainability quantitative assessment is based on calculations for MCMTOMFHW and 
MCMTOMFSW. 
MCMTOMFHW is the average elapsed corrective maintenance time needed to repair all 
operational mission hardware failures. 
MCMTOMFHW = Total Elapsed Time to Correct Operational Mission Failures / Total # 
of Operational Mission Failures. 
5.4 Test S-3, Availability 
Objective:  Will the ACIH be available to support completion of the mission? 
Procedure:  All OT test team comment sheets, maintenance forms, and time meter 
recordings from tests S-1 and S-2 will be reviewed. 
Data Analysis:  AO is computed using the formula:  AO = Uptime / Uptime + Downtime  
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5.5 Test S-4, I/O 
Objective:  Will the ACIH be interoperable with the systems with which it must 
interface? 
Procedure:  This test will be conducted throughout the OT ACIH.  Test S-4 will examine 
the I/O between ACIH and interfacing systems. 
Data Analysis:  I/O will be assessed qualitatively based on observer notes/OT test team 
comment sheets, maintenance logs, and operational experience.  The impact of any I/O issues on 
overall mission accomplishment identified during testing will be assessed. 
5.6 Test S-5, Training 
Objective:  Will the ACIH training support system operation and maintenance by Special 
Forces? 
Procedure:  At this point, only adequacy of the ACIH Navy Training System Plan 
(NTSP) training programs will be assessed.  Selected ACIH training courses may be audited by 
the OTD to determine adherence to NTSP requirements and potential effectiveness for training 
Special Forces. 
Data Analysis:  The ACIH training program will be qualitatively assessed based on 
operational experience and judgment.  Training issues observed during the assessment will be 
























Reports required in connection with this project are described in the following 
paragraphs.  Distribution should be limited where indicated. 
6.2 Readiness Reports 
PEO IWS Certification.  PEO IWS shall certify the ACIH readiness for OT ACIH per 
SECNAVINST 5000.2C 
Unit Readiness.  Prior to commencement of testing, PEO IWS will submit a message 
report to COMOPTEVFOR if the Yuma Proving Ground test site is not ready to commence 
operations.  This report will include the reason project operations cannot commence and any 
expectations or reservations on the part of PEO IWS. 
6.3 OT Commencement Report 
 Upon commencement of OT ACIH, the ACIH OTD will notify COMOPTEVFOR 
indicating actual start time (Date-Time-Group (DTG) Zulu) of testing.  Comments, particularly 
anticipated limitations, may be included in this communication. 
6.4 Status Reports 
Deficiency Reports 
A deficiency recommendation will be submitted by quickest available means directly to 
COMOPTEVFOR by the ACIH OTD when the project is delayed because the equipment cannot 
be operated properly, the required support is lacking, or there has been prolonged delay in 
equipment delivery.  The deficiency recommendation will contain a summary of the deficiency, 
action taken, and recommended corrective action. 
Anomaly Reports 
An initial anomaly report will be submitted by quickest available means directly to 
COMOPTEVFOR by the ACIH OTD when failures or anomalies occur that impact OT and 
require correction, but are not so severe that a deficiency report is required.  The anomaly report 
will identify the failure or anomaly, its impact on OT and overall system performance, and 
recommend corrective action.   
Completion of Test Operations Report 
Upon completion of the OT ACIH  data analysis process, the ACIH OTD will notify 
COMOPTEVFOR indicating the completion time (DTG Zulu) of OT ACIH. 
6.5 Evaluation Reports 
Analysis Report 
Data Analysis Team (DAT) analysis reporting will be per reference x. 
COMOPTEVFOR Report 
COMOPTEVFOR will submit a final evaluation report to CNO within 90 days of 
completion of project operations.
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NAVY TRAINING PLAN FOR THE  




























Advanced Combat Integrated Helmet (ACIH) is a modern day device that helps enhance 
military capabilities in vital combat operation.  The helmet helps improve situational awareness 
and operational readiness by providing real-time audio and video communication between the 
operating forces and headquarter.  The exchange of up-to-date operational situations helps 












PART I – TECHNICAL PROGRAM DATA 
A. 
a. Title Nomenclature Acronym:  Advanced Combat Integrated Helmet – ACIH 
Title-Nomenclature-Program 
b. Program Element: XXXX 
 
B. Security Classification
a. Audio  communication transmit/receive – Secret 
: Security documents are developed in accordance with 
OPNAINST C5513.6C – Communication and Satellite security Guidance  dated 7 
DEC 2005  
b. Video Communication transmit/Receive – Secret 
 
C. 
a. Director of Naval Training   CNO  
NTP Principals 
b. Bureau of Naval Personnel  BUPERS 
c. Commandant of the Marine Corps CMC (ASM) 
d. Principal Development Activity  NAVSEASYSCOM 
e. Assistant Chief of Naval Operation  CNO  
f. Manpower and Personnel Mission   
 Sponsor      CNO 
    
D. 
a. Purpose: The ACIH consists of audio and video assembly that provides real-
time communication between operational forces and headquarter.   
Operational Uses 
b. Foreign Military sales and Other Source Procurement 
 
E. Technical and/or Operational Evaluation (TECHEVAL/OPEVAL):  
 
The training plan 
developmental will be verified during OTRR. The plan will be revised based on 
inputs/comments from the review. The plan will be testing during OT. 
F. 
a. Audio Communication System: 
Equipment/System/Subsystem replaced 
i. Receive/Transmit  devices – I level maintenance 
b. Video Communication System: 
i. Transmit/Receive devices – I level Maintenance 
ii. Display component 
iii. Night time vision 




a. Functional Description: The ACIH consists of audio and video assembly that 
provides real-time communication between operational forces and 
headquarter.  The audio assembly facilitates point-to-point verbal 
communication as the video assembly provides visual information that is 
displayed on the OLED screen on the face visor.  The communication 
exchange is achieved with the use of digital transmitter and receiver to 
transfer encrypted information.  The encrypted data is securely processed via a 
software interface called One-Time Pads.  The One-Time Pads is a software 
program that is used to encrypt and decompress information prior to 
transmission.  It is also used to decrypt and uncompressing data upon 
reception by the receiver.  The secured audio information is sent to the user’s 
earpiece and the video data is displayed onto the screen on the helmet.   
Description 
b. Physical description: The physical and electrical characteristics of the ACIH 
are as follows: 
i. Weight     
ii. Diameter 
iii. Power requirement for Audio/Video  
iv. Power requirement for display 
 
H. 
a. Operational: The training is to provide the users with the best practice for 
ACIH operation.  The user will gain in depth knowledge of the operation and 
maintenance of the helmet to ensure that it is properly used and function 
during the mission.  The training curriculum provides operational concept so 




i. Transmit/Receive audio communication 
ii. Transmit/Receive video communication 
iii. Display video information 
 
b. Maintenance: The ACIH maintenance objective is to provide the means to 
restore the unserviceable unit back to serviceable condition with minimum 
down time.  The training curriculum provides the end user information and 
tool to diagnose problem and determine what level support the unserviceable 
unit be sent to. Follow the initial diagnose results, the unserviceable unit will 
be sent to one of the three level maintenance which designed by the Naval 
maintenance principle 
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i. Organization level maintenance 
ii. Intermediate level maintenance 




K. Manpower Requirements 
L. On-Board Training 
M. List of Related Navy Training Plans and Applicable 
 
PART II – BILLET AND PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS 
A. Billets Required for Operational and field Support 
a. Field Logistic Support 
b. Training refresh support 
 
B. Billets Required for Maintenance 
a. I-Level Maintenance  
b. Depot Maintenance level 
 
PART III - Training Requirement 
A. 
a. Operator :  1.5 week course  
Length of the training program 
i. ACIH components familiar 
ii. Video communication Hardware operational 
iii. Audio communication Hardware operational 
iv. Basic Networking  
v. Basic Satellite communication 
b. Maintenance: 3 weeks course 
i. ACIH Hardware familiar 
ii. Basic electronics theory 
iii. Basic Networking theory 
iv. Troubleshooting Video communication system 
v. Troubleshooting Audio communication system 




a. Special Test equipment 
Logistic Support  
i. Network analyzer 
ii. Signal generator –  audio/video  
b. Tool  
 
PART IV - Points of Contact 
A. NSWC-PHD  Code XXX   
B. FTCLANT  Code XXX 
C. FTCPACT  Code XXX 
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4. ACIH DT&E TEST DATA 
 
 
Six DT&E Test Data Sheets for the ACIH were utilized: 
 
• Test Scenario Name:  COMPONENTS 
• Test Scenario Name:  USER INTERFACE 
• Test Scenario Name:  HEADQUARTERS CONNECTION TO SATELLITE 
• Test Scenario Name:  CONNECTION BETWEEN HEADQUARTERS – 
SATELLITE - ACIH 
• Test Scenario Name:  ACIH CONNECTION TO ANOTHER ACIH 










5. ACIH DT&E TEST REPORT 
 
DT&E TEST REPORT 
For the 
Advanced Combat Integrated Helmet 
 
 
1.  Executive Summary 
The following paragraphs summarize the results of the Advanced Combat 
Integrated Helmet (ACIH) Developmental Test and Evaluation (DT&E).  The purpose of 
this test was to assess the ability of the Advanced Combat Integrated Helmet (ACIH) to 
meet the Mission Critical Thread:  ACIH communications (audio/visual) shall not be 
interrupted and compromised throughout the operation. 
 
2.  Scope 
Testing was conducted at the Contractor’s facility.  The ACIH system 
accumulated 72 operating hours over a 7 day period. 
 
3.  Background 
The developmental test was performed in preparation for the Operational Test 
Readiness Review (OTRR).  The testing included the integration of the hardware, 
software, and interoperability.  This evaluation included an assessment of the ACIH 
critical technical parameters in support of the mission critical thread. 
 
4. Resources 
Test resources include simulators (satellite, desert environment, etc.), GFE ACIH 
equipment, bandwidth limiter, noise signal generator, wireless network sniffer, wireless 
network throughput and latency measurement equipment. 
 
5.  Test Results 
The overall finding is that the maturity of the ACIH during DT&E was found to be 
satisfactory.  The assessment is based on the following: 
 
Critical Technical Parameters 
• The Advanced Combat Integrated Helmet (ACIH) requirements shall provide and 
maintain audio and video communications throughout entire hostage rescue 
operational. 
• The system shall provide Operational Awareness including the ability to transmit 
and receive user and team location, as well as receive intelligence from 
headquarters. 
• The ACIH helmet shall share encrypted data to protect users and the mission. 
• The ACIH helmet shall process the data and output the required information to 
the user. 




All tests were performed according to the Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP).  
Some issues arose in preparation for the test; contractors corrected the issues prior to 
system testing.  For system testing four scenarios were tested:  satellite connection to 
headquarters, connection between endpoints (headquarters to/from satellite to/from 
ACIH), ACIH connection to other ACIH units, and connection between 10 ACIH units. 
 
Some issues arose during the test.  Contractors corrected issues before proceeding.  See 
DT&E DATA RESULTS.xls file for DT&E test data and results. 
 
6. System Assessment 
The ACIH was found to meet all system level requirements in support of the 
mission critical thread.  This system level assessment is based on extensive testing in the 
laboratory.  Testing included end-to-end performance in a desert environment and 
exercised audio and visual communications. 
 
7.  Findings 
The overall finding is that the maturity of the ACIH was found to be satisfactory.  
Specifics of these findings include: 
 
a.  Finding #1:  Successful communication paths tested:  the ACIH successfully 
provided uninterrupted audio/visual communication throughout. 
 
b. Finding #2:  The ACIH met or exceeded all test objectives. 
 
c. Finding #3:  Although communications were demonstrated to meet the test 
objectives, some components lost communication for brief periods or did not 
receive all data. 
 
Issues: 
a. Issue #1:  The ACIH was only able to receive 4 of 5 GPS information artifacts 
from headquarters. 
 
b. Issue #2:  Only the first ACIH received map layouts from headquarters, the 
second ACIH did not during ACIH to ACIH testing. 
 
c. Issue #3:  Only five ACIH units received map layouts, the other five did not 
during the ACIH test with 10 units. 
 
8. Recommendations 
Issue #1 - #3:  All issues pertained to loss of data.  Although uninterrupted 
communication was achieved, the loss of data in some components may result in 
interrupted communication in operational use.  Improve reliability of transportation 
and receipt of data.  
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Other recommendations:  Address Integrated Logistics Support. 
 
 
9.  Conclusion 
ACIH DT&E was successful in meeting its test objectives demonstrating 
hardware, software, and interoperability maturity.  We recommend that the ACIH 
proceed to OTRR. 
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• Picatinny has been made the ISEA for the ACIH 
– Will perform the ISEA role for the helmet





• Troubleshooting and Diagnostics
– Troubleshooting and diagnostic equipment well be 
shipped with the helmets to ensure working 
helmets














• Spare Helmets located at HQ




















APPENDIX E:  MODEL DETAIL 
main.m 
%% Initialize variables 
tic 
  
nSys = 1000; % number of systems run 
CTI_min = 5; % minimum number of Critical Technology Interfaces 
(CTIs) a system can have 
CTI_max = 20; % maximum number of CTIs a system can have 
  
t = 1; % normalized program time 
  
% define the I/ORL requirement for each review 
MS_pass = {}; 
MS_pass.ASR = 1; 
MS_pass.SRR = 2; 
MS_pass.SFR = 3; 
MS_pass.PDR = 3; 
MS_pass.CDR = 5; 
MS_pass.IRR = 6; 
MS_pass.FRR = 7; 
MS_pass.OTRR = 7; 
MS_pass.OT = 7; 
  
rework_time = {}; % amount of additional time it takes to fix a 
I/ORL problem 
rework_time.ASR = .1; % note this data was not validated, so it 
is not used in the output 
rework_time.SRR = .1; % if actual data is found, these values can 
be adjusted 
rework_time.SFR = .1; 
rework_time.PDR = .1; 
rework_time.CDR = .1; 
rework_time.IRR = .1; 
rework_time.FRR = .1; 
rework_time.OTRR = .1; 
rework_time.OT = .1; 
  
a = 2.25; % scaling factor to match the relative costs to actual 
SE data 
rework_cost = {}; % amount of additional cost it takes to fix a 
I/ORL problem 
rework_cost.ASR = a*.001; 
rework_cost.SRR = a*.002; 
rework_cost.SFR = a*.005; 
rework_cost.PDR = a*.0075; 
rework_cost.CDR = a*.010; 
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rework_cost.IRR = a*.015; 
rework_cost.FRR = a*.025; 
rework_cost.OTRR = a*.125; 
rework_cost.OT = a*.25; 
  
init = ones(1,nSys); % define an initial array of ones with one 
element for each of the number of systems 
  
old = struct('pass',init,'sched',init,'cost',init,... 
    'IORL_avg',init,'IORL_min',init); % data structure for 
holding run info for the old SE process 
  




%% Run simulation 
  
for i=1:nSys 
    %% initialize system 
  
    t = 1; % reinitialize schedule variable 
    new.cost(i) = 0; % initialize cost variable 
    old.cost(i) = 0; 
  
    nCTI = round(rand*(CTI_max-CTI_min)+CTI_min); % define number 
of CTIs for system 
  
    IORL_act_new = zeros(1,nCTI); % establish initial I/ORLs for 
new SE process 
    IORL_meas_new = zeros(1,nCTI); % establish array for 
perceived I/ORL values 
  
    IORL_act_old = IORL_act_new; % establish initial IORLs for 
old SE process 
  
    %% ASR 
    'ASR'; 
    delta = work_IORL(IORL_act_new,'ASR')-IORL_act_new; % 
calculate actual I/ORL improvement over the phase.  this ensures that 
the improvement is only due to the rework and not random variation. 
   
    IORL_act_old = delta + IORL_act_old; % add I/ORL improvement 
to old 
    IORL_act_new = delta + IORL_act_new; % add the same 
improvement to new 
  
    IORL_meas_new = measure_IORL(IORL_act_new,IORL_meas_new); % 





    t = t + rework_time.ASR*sum(IORL_meas_new<MS_pass.ASR);  % if 
the system doesn't meet the I/ORL threshold, add schedule based on the 
current review and number of failured interfaces 
                                                            % 
this code may need to be adjusted based on the SE process data 
discovered 
    new.cost(i) = new.cost(i) + 
rework_cost.ASR*sum(IORL_meas_new<MS_pass.ASR); % if the system misses 
the threshold, also add cost based on the current review and number of 
failed interfaces 
  
    IORL_act_new(IORL_meas_new<MS_pass.ASR) = 
rework_IORL(IORL_act_new(IORL_meas_new<MS_pass.ASR),'ASR',MS_pass); % 
rework the I/ORL value until it passes 
    IORL_meas_new = measure_IORL(IORL_act_new,IORL_meas_new); % 
convert actual interoperability values to measured I/ORL values 
  
    %% SRR 
    'SRR'; 
    % rinse and repeat for the SRR, etc. 
    delta = work_IORL(IORL_act_new,'SRR')-IORL_act_new; 
    IORL_act_old = delta + IORL_act_old; 
    IORL_act_new = delta + IORL_act_new; 
    IORL_meas_new = measure_IORL(IORL_act_new,IORL_meas_new); 
  
    t = t + rework_time.SRR*sum(IORL_meas_new<MS_pass.SRR); 
    new.cost(i) = new.cost(i) + 
rework_cost.SRR*sum(IORL_meas_new<MS_pass.SRR); 
  
    IORL_act_new(IORL_meas_new<MS_pass.SRR) = 
rework_IORL(IORL_act_new(IORL_meas_new<MS_pass.SRR),'SRR',MS_pass); 
    IORL_meas_new = measure_IORL(IORL_act_new,IORL_meas_new); 
  
    %% SFR 
    'SFR'; 
    delta = work_IORL(IORL_act_new,'SFR')-IORL_act_new; 
    IORL_act_old = delta + IORL_act_old; 
    IORL_act_new = delta + IORL_act_new; 
    IORL_meas_new = measure_IORL(IORL_act_new,IORL_meas_new); 
  
    t = t + rework_time.SFR*sum(IORL_meas_new<MS_pass.SFR); 
    new.cost(i) = new.cost(i) + 
rework_cost.SFR*sum(IORL_meas_new<MS_pass.SFR); 
  
    IORL_act_new(IORL_meas_new<MS_pass.SFR) = 
rework_IORL(IORL_act_new(IORL_meas_new<MS_pass.SFR),'SFR',MS_pass); 
    IORL_meas_new = measure_IORL(IORL_act_new,IORL_meas_new); 
  
    %% PDR 
    'PDR'; 
    delta = work_IORL(IORL_act_new,'PDR')-IORL_act_new; 
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    IORL_act_old = delta + IORL_act_old; 
    IORL_act_new = delta + IORL_act_new; 
  
    IORL_meas_new = measure_IORL(IORL_act_new,IORL_meas_new); 
  
    t = t + rework_time.PDR*sum(IORL_meas_new<MS_pass.PDR); 
    new.cost(i) = new.cost(i) + 
rework_cost.PDR*sum(IORL_meas_new<MS_pass.PDR); 
  
    IORL_act_new(IORL_meas_new<MS_pass.PDR) = 
rework_IORL(IORL_act_new(IORL_meas_new<MS_pass.PDR),'PDR',MS_pass); 
    IORL_meas_new = measure_IORL(IORL_act_new,IORL_meas_new); 
  
    %% CDR 
    'CDR'; 
    delta = work_IORL(IORL_act_new,'CDR')-IORL_act_new; 
    IORL_act_old = delta + IORL_act_old; 
    IORL_act_new = delta + IORL_act_new; 
    IORL_meas_new = measure_IORL(IORL_act_new,IORL_meas_new); 
  
    t = t + rework_time.CDR*sum(IORL_meas_new<MS_pass.CDR); 
    new.cost(i) = new.cost(i) + 
rework_cost.CDR*sum(IORL_meas_new<MS_pass.CDR); 
  
    IORL_act_new(IORL_meas_new<MS_pass.CDR) = 
rework_IORL(IORL_act_new(IORL_meas_new<MS_pass.CDR),'CDR',MS_pass); 
    IORL_meas_new = measure_IORL(IORL_act_new,IORL_meas_new); 
  
    %% IRR 
    'IRR'; 
    delta = work_IORL(IORL_act_new,'IRR')-IORL_act_new;  
    IORL_act_old = delta + IORL_act_old; 
    IORL_act_new = delta + IORL_act_new; 
  
    IORL_meas_new = measure_IORL(IORL_act_new,IORL_meas_new);  
  
    t = t + rework_time.IRR*sum(IORL_meas_new<MS_pass.IRR); 
    new.cost(i) = new.cost(i) + 
rework_cost.IRR*sum(IORL_meas_new<MS_pass.IRR); 
  
    IORL_act_new(IORL_meas_new<MS_pass.IRR) = 
rework_IORL(IORL_act_new(IORL_meas_new<MS_pass.IRR),'IRR',MS_pass); 
    IORL_meas_new = measure_IORL(IORL_act_new,IORL_meas_new); 
  
    %% FRR 
    'FRR'; 
    delta = work_IORL(IORL_act_new,'FRR')-IORL_act_new; 
    IORL_act_old = delta + IORL_act_old; 
    IORL_act_new = delta + IORL_act_new; 




    t = t + rework_time.FRR*sum(IORL_meas_new<MS_pass.FRR); 
    new.cost(i) = new.cost(i) + 
rework_cost.FRR*sum(IORL_meas_new<MS_pass.FRR); 
  
    IORL_act_new(IORL_meas_new<MS_pass.FRR) = 
rework_IORL(IORL_act_new(IORL_meas_new<MS_pass.FRR),'FRR',MS_pass); 
    IORL_meas_new = measure_IORL(IORL_act_new,IORL_meas_new); 
  
    %% OTRR 
    'OTRR'; 
    delta = work_IORL(IORL_act_new,'OTRR')-IORL_act_new; 
    IORL_act_old = delta + IORL_act_old; 
    IORL_act_new = delta + IORL_act_new; 
    IORL_meas_new = measure_IORL(IORL_act_new,IORL_meas_new); 
  
    t = t + rework_time.OTRR*sum(IORL_meas_new<MS_pass.OTRR); 
    new.cost(i) = new.cost(i) + 
rework_cost.OTRR*sum(IORL_meas_new<MS_pass.OTRR); 
  
    IORL_act_new(IORL_meas_new<MS_pass.OTRR) = 
rework_IORL(IORL_act_new(IORL_meas_new<MS_pass.OTRR),'OTRR',MS_pass); 
    IORL_meas_new = measure_IORL(IORL_act_new,IORL_meas_new); 
  
    
    %% Operational Test 
     
    % compare the I/ORL values to the OT threshold and tally 
    % the number of failures 
    new.pass(i) = sum(IORL_act_new<MS_pass.OT); 
    % for each failure, apply the OT rework costs for each 
    % failed interface 
    new.cost(i) = new.cost(i) + 
rework_cost.OT*sum(IORL_act_new<MS_pass.OT); 
    % repeat for the current SE process 
    old.pass(i) = sum(IORL_act_old<MS_pass.OT); 
    old.cost(i) = old.cost(i) + 
rework_cost.OT*sum(IORL_act_old<MS_pass.OT);; 
  
    %% Data Logging 
     
    % store average I/ORL values 
    new.IORL_avg(i) = mean(IORL_act_new); 
    old.IORL_avg(i) = mean(IORL_act_old); 
    % store minimum I/ORL values 
    new.IORL_min(i) = min(IORL_act_new); 
    old.IORL_min(i) = min(IORL_act_old); 
    % store schedule slippage 
    new.sched(i) = t; 





% calculate the percentage of passing systems 
perc_old = sum(old.pass==0)/nSys; 
perc_new = sum(new.pass==0)/nSys; 
  
% print data to matlab command window 









plot([MS_pass.OT,MS_pass.OT], [0 1*nSys], 'r-.') 
axis([0 10 0 1*nSys]) 
title('Comparison of I/ORL process to Current SE Process') 




plot([MS_pass.OT,MS_pass.OT], [0 1*nSys], 'r-.') 
axis([0 10 0 1*nSys]) 








function CTI_out = work_IRL(CTI_in,MS) 
  
 % define mean and standard deviation of I/ORL work 
mean = 1.115; 
std = .215; 
  
% determine the review that the system is being evaluated 
% and apply the appropriate amount of I/ORL work 
switch MS; 
    case{'ASR'} 
        CTI_out = CTI_in+max(0,mean+randn(size(CTI_in))*std); 
    case{'SRR'} 
        CTI_out = CTI_in+max(0,mean+randn(size(CTI_in))*std); 
    case{'SFR'} 
        CTI_out = CTI_in+max(0,mean+randn(size(CTI_in))*std); 
    case{'PDR'} 
        CTI_out = CTI_in+max(0,mean+randn(size(CTI_in))*std); 
   case{'CDR'} 
        CTI_out = CTI_in+max(0,mean+randn(size(CTI_in))*std); 
    case{'IRR'} 
        CTI_out = CTI_in+max(0,mean+randn(size(CTI_in))*std); 
    case{'FRR'} 
        CTI_out = CTI_in+max(0,0+randn(size(CTI_in))*std); 
    case{'OTRR'} 
        CTI_out = CTI_in+max(0,mean+randn(size(CTI_in))*std); 
     
    otherwise 
        debug = 'broken' 
        CTI_out = CTI_in; 
end 
  






function CTI_out = rework_IRL(CTI_in,MS,MS_pass) 
  
 % rework the system until it matches the requirement for the 
review 
 % if the interface is close to the requirement, increase it by a 
small amount (.1 units)  
  
switch MS;  
    case{'ASR'} 
        CTI_out = max(CTI_in+.1,MS_pass.ASR); 
    case{'SRR'} 
        CTI_out = max(CTI_in+.1,MS_pass.SRR); 
    case{'SFR'} 
        CTI_out = max(CTI_in+.1,MS_pass.SFR); 
    case{'PDR'} 
        CTI_out = max(CTI_in+.1,MS_pass.PDR); 
   case{'CDR'} 
        CTI_out = max(CTI_in+.1,MS_pass.CDR); 
    case{'IRR'} 
        CTI_out = max(CTI_in+.1,MS_pass.IRR); 
    case{'FRR'} 
        CTI_out = max(CTI_in+.1,MS_pass.FRR); 
    case{'OTRR'} 
        CTI_out = max(CTI_in+.1,MS_pass.OTRR); 
    case{'SVR'} 
        CTI_out = max(CTI_in+.1,MS_pass.SVR); 
    otherwise 
        debug = 'broken' 
        CTI_out = CTI_in; 
end 
  






function CTI_out = measure_IRL(CTI_in,last) 
  
% define probabilities 
p_c = .8; % probability of getting the value correct 
p_fp = .15; % probability of a false positive 
p_fn = .05; % probability of a false negative 
     
p = rand(size(CTI_in)); % create an array of random numbers 
  
% create array to modify the I/ORL values 
delta = zeros(size(p));  
delta(p<=p_c) = 0; % if correct, leave alone 
delta((p>p_c) & (p<=(p_c+p_fp))) = 1; % if false positive, add 
one 
delta((p>(p_c+p_fp)) & (p<=(p_c+p_fp+p_fn))) = -1; % if false 
negative, subtract one 
  
CTI_out = min(9,floor(max(last,CTI_in+delta))); % modify I/ORL 
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